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I. INTRODUCTION
Is it possible to incorporate a serious concern for privacy
into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence? Even before the
terrorist attacks on America, the question was a pertinent one;
in the aftermath, it has become even more so. Fourth
Amendment case law is of course grounded in an explicit
concern for reasonable expectations of privacy.2 But given a
long line of decisions rendered prior to the attacks, one could
* Professor of Law, John Jay College of Criminal Justice and the Graduate Center,
City University of New York. Marc Bernstein, Janice Dunham, and Steve Wasserman
provided helpful suggestions concerning an earlier draft of this article.
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Justice Harlan developed the expectation-of-privacy test in his concurring
opinion in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). Numerous opinions of the
Court have since adopted Harlan's test for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis.
See, e.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95-96 (1990); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 211 (1986).
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hardly say that the Supreme Court has shown a serious concern
for privacy. The Court, for example, has held that individuals
do not have any Fourth Amendment privacy interests in their
bank records,3 in the phone numbers they dial,
4 or in freedom
from low-flying surveillance of their backyards.
5 Moreover, by
the Court's analysis, even our garbage places us at risk. If
someone wraps her garbage carefully in an opaque bag and
places the bag on the street, that person, the Court has held,
cannot expect the police to refrain from inspecting it to find
out what's going on in her home.6
Clearly, the Court has parsed the concept of privacy as
thinly as possible. It has expressed concern for residential
privacy'-but has allowed police helicopters to conduct
surveillance of backyards.' It has expressed concern for the
privacy of phone conversations 9 but has said people have no
privacy interest in the numbers they dial.'
° Whether-or how
much-terrorism's arrival in America will influence future
privacy jurisprudence is hard to say, but it does at least seem
clear that even before its advent the Court did not take privacy
seriously as a Fourth Amendment value. My question at the
outset, though, was not directly concerned with Supreme Court
rulings. Rather, I asked whether it is possible to incorporate a
serious concern for privacy into Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. In this Article, I argue that it is. But a cogent
argument can be advanced to the contrary, an argument that
requires special attention given the challenge that police work
poses for privacy interests.
SeeUnited States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449-51 (1988); see also Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212-14.
See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
7 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) ("The Fourth Amendment
protects the individual's privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy
more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions
of the home."); see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984) ("At the risk
of belaboring the obvious, private residences are places in which the individual
normally expects privacy free of government intrusion not authorized by a warrant,
and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as
justifiable.")
8 See Riley, 488 U.S. at 449-51; see also Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212-14.
' See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (A person using a telephone
"is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be
broadcast to the world.")
"0 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
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The core features of this counterargument are easy to grasp.
Privacy norms require people to exercise forbearance in
everyday life: they require people not to act on their curiosity
about their neighbors and officemates, not to encourage third-
party confidences, not to snoop through incoming mail, and so
on. But the police, it could be contended, must be exempted
from these norms. This exemption is essential for the
investigation of what the Court has called "ordinary criminal
wrongdoing."" It is wholly indispensable, one could continue,
for police work on what the Court has called "special
governmental needs" 2 (the investigation of terrorism quite
clearly comes under this heading). Police officers, it could be
conceded, must avoid egregious violations of privacy norms.
Nothing more than this should be expected of them if they are
to perform their function effectively.
Indeed, one could further argue that the Supreme Court's
privacy jurisprudence is admirable precisely because it draws the
line here. The central principle of Fourth Amendment case
law, it could be maintained, is that the police cannot engage in
egregious privacy violations-for example, they must respect the
privacy of the home" and personal belongings carried outside
the home. On the other hand, the corollary principle implicit
in the case law is that the police are otherwise free to gather
information about people-and so they can use helicopters to156
hover over backyards, can sift through people's garbage, 6 and
so on. If undertaken by a layperson, the Court's defender
would say, these activities would be called "snooping." When
undertaken by the police, the defender might continue, the
same activities should be endorsed as sound law enforcement
practices.
Because it is too early to tell what effect, if any, the
investigation of terrorism will have on privacy jurisprudence, 7 I
E.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 38 (2000).
2E.g., Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989).
"See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
'4See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-11 (1977).
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449-51 (1988); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
212-14 (1986).
" California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-40 (1988).
17 In a speech delivered at New York University Law School on September 28, 2001,Justice O'Connor stated that the attack on New York and Washington "has already
altered our way of life. And it will cause us to re-examine some of our laws pertaining
to criminal surveillance, wiretapping, immigration, and so on." Linda Greenhouse,
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devote the bulk of this Article not to the special problems that
will arise in the aftermath of the attacks on New York and
Washington, but to an examination of the argument, outlined
above, as applied to police investigation of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing. In particular, I respond in two ways to the claim
that police are entitled to a discount from lay privacy
expectations. First, I agree that the argument provides a
descriptively accurate account of the Court's position on Fourth
Amendment privacy protection. The Court, I suggest, has
relied on a critical ambiguity in its privacy decisions. When
speaking in general terms, it has made privacy protection
appear to hinge on lay people's understandings of how they
should treat each other-thus the significance of the often
invoked reference to the expectations of privacy "that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable." 8 When resolving specific
cases, though, the Court has reasoned in terms of a narrow,
occupationally-grounded conception of privacy. 9 The police,
the Court has implied, perform a legitimate role as front-line
information gatherers about the public.2 0  They are thus
entitled, it has further implied, to a special dispensation from
In a New Climate of Unity, Justices Face Divisive Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001 A16. (Full
copy of speech on file with author). It is not clear whetherJustice O'Connor, in her
use of the word "us" was referring to the American people through their
representatives, the nine justices of the Supreme Court, or both. I argue, in any
event, that the Court already has the doctrinal tools needed for responding to the
threats posed by terrorism.
" The original source for this is Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). The phrase appears, in slightly different form, in
Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95-96
(1990); Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211 (1986); Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 306, 313 (1978).
" The contrast between lay and occupationally-grounded expectations is readily
apparent in Greenwood, which was concerned with the warrantless inspection of
garbage. See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 37-38. When outlining its general standard for
assessing the case, the Court appealed to lay expectations, stating that the Fourth
Amendment would be implicated if it could be shown that the defendants whose
garbage was inspected "manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in [it] that
society accepts as objectively reasonable." Id. at 39. A page later, however, the Court
justified warrantless police inspection of the defendants' garbage on the ground that
scavengers and snoops have been known to sift through people's garbage. Id. at 40.
" The most telling example of this is to be found in the Court's invocation of
scavengers and snoops in determining the proper role of the police when sifting
through garbage. See id. Scavengers and snoops are at the front of the front-line in
gathering information about others. In treating them as the baseline for determining
the proper police role, the Court must also think of the police as legitimately
performing the same function.
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everyday privacy norms, one that doesn't extend to egregious
21violations but that does encompass minor ones.
On the other hand, I argue that as a normative matter the
distinction between occupationally-grounded and lay
conceptions of privacy is constitutionally unacceptable. The
Court, I suggest, has reasoned in terms of a vigilance model of
privacy, one that requires people to be constantly alert to the
way in which others can intrude on their lives.22 The vigilance
model, I maintain, is inappropriate even when the investigation
of terrorism is concerned; the proper approach there is to
recalibrate the Fourth Amendment balancing test by taking into
account the special urgency of public security while continuing
to accord full weight to lay expectations of privacy. And when
we move beyond the special problems occasioned by terrorism,
we can see how wholly inappropriate the model is for the
investigation of ordinary criminal activity. Vigilance is
particularly troubling as an informing principle once one takes
into account law enforcement's appetite for information and its
capacity to feed it.
The Court, I suggest, has been blind to the points just
made; indeed, it has fundamentally misconceived the nature of
privacy norms. These norms are grounded not in vigilance but
in an expectation of forbearance on the part of others-that is,
in an expectation that others will restrain their curiosity with
respect to those aspects of life that are essential to defining and
maintaining individual identity. The notion of forbearance
explains why privacy matters to us: we cherish it because it holds
out the prospect of an unanxious shelter from the larger world.
When the Court has spoken about reasonable expectations of
privacy, it has appeared to be concerned with the substantial
degree of forbearance that underlies everyday privacy norms
though in fact it has reasoned in terms of the norms followed by
" See id. The Court's favorable reference to snoops in Greenwood and its use of a
snoop-baseline for determining the legitimacy of police behavior indicate that it is
prepared to tolerate minor deviations by the police from everyday privacy norms. By
contrast, its comments on the importance of privacy of the home underscore its
unwillingness to tolerate egregious privacy violations. See infra note 7 for its
comments on residential privacy.
22For discussion of the vigilance model, see infra notes 119-27 and accompanying
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those whose job is to penetrate privacy. 3 I argue that the Court
should honor the premise implicit in its standard.
This Article is divided into three sections. The first
examines the development of Fourth Amendment privacy
doctrine; the final two provide a framework for improving
contemporary doctrine. My aim in the first section is to trace
the evolution of Fourth Amendment privacy jurisprudence-to
show why eighteenth century courts linked privacy protection to
the law of trespass and explain why it was proper for the
twentieth century Supreme Court to sever this connection. In
the second section, I outline a forbearance approach to privacy
protection and contrast it with the Court's vigilance model.
Even in settings where terrorism is under investigation, I
maintain, privacy expectations, understood in terms of the
forbearance model, are entitled to full respect. What
distinguishes the policing of terrorism, I contend, is not the
weight to be accorded privacy interests, but the extra emphasis
entitled government interests in preserving public safety. In the
final section, I apply the forbearance approach to specific Court
decisions concerning ordinary criminal activity. In the course
of this section, I consider not only those settings where police
conduct surveillance of suspects but also those in which the
police penetrate private life, either by encouraging individuals
to betray intimate acquaintances or by seeking a foothold of
false intimacy themselves.
II. PRIVACY AND PERSONAL SECURITY:
ENTICK TO OLMSTEAD TO KATZ
Two issues-one conceptual, one interpretive-must be
considered when thinking about Fourth Amendment privacy
interests. The conceptual one has to do with the meaning of
the term "privacy," the interpretive with the Fourth
Amendment's bearing on privacy. Clearly, the conceptual issue
has priority: we need to understand what people mean when
they talk about privacy before we can understand how the
Fourth Amendment protects it. I thus begin this section with
some provisional comments about the concept of privacy,
comments I then use to examine changing interpretations of
the Amendment. In the next section, I expand on these
See infra note 181 for discussion of the analogy between journalists' and police
use of helicopters to conduct surveillance of the curtilage of the home.
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provisional remarks as I advance an alternative to the Court's
account of Fourth Amendment privacy protection.
As a provisional matter, we can say that privacy has two
strands. The first has to do with access to one's person, the
other with information about key aspects of one's life. These
strands can converge: when someone wishes not to reveal
something about her person (a scar on her abdomen, a
glandular disease, etc.), then limiting access to her person
becomes essential to controlling the dissemination of
information about herself. But they don't have to converge.
Think first about access to one's person. If someone rushes
home from a car trip announcing that her bladder is full and
that she really needs to go to the bathroom, there is no
information she's trying to withhold from others; nonetheless,
once she reaches the bathroom, she'll want to be sure no one
has access to her person while she's there. Now think about
informational privacy. In the modern world, a person is often
not in the place where information about her life is located.
Indeed, one of the important features of informational privacy
is that it allows people to circulate in the larger world while
repositories of information about them remain closed to others.
If this is what we mean by "privacy," what justification can be
advanced for respecting privacy interests? The general answer
to this, which I refine later, is that people feel vulnerable about
revealing information bearing on their personal lives and also
about allowing unrestricted access to their persons. One can
imagine a society in which people have no informational
privacy. One can also imagine a society in which there is no
privacy of the person; a society in which people dress, copulate,
and excrete, among other things, without the benefit of
seclusion. The mere mention of these possibilities suggests
what it is that legitimates privacy claims: once we agree that
people tend to feel vulnerable about granting access to their
bodies or revealing facts concerning their intimate lives, we
must also agree that they are entitled to avail themselves of the
conventions of privacy and so reduce this sense of vulnerability
to others.
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A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S GUARANTEE OF PERSONAL
SECURITY
To provide even a rudimentary analysis of privacy is to
establish a conceptual framework that goes beyond eighteenth
century reflections on the subject. Although the Oxford English
Dictionary records instances of the use of the word "privacy" in
pre-eighteenth and eighteenth century literature, these
occasional sightings of the word must be considered in light of
its absence from key eighteenth century documents dealing with
political life. Perhaps the most important of these documents is
the Constitution itself, which contains numerous references to
other terms that matter in twentieth century life ("property,
2 5
"religion, 26 and "speech, ' 7 for example), but none to privacy.
Equally significant is the failure of the authors of The Federalist
Papers to discuss the concept of privacy: Madison, for example,
was deeply concerned about the protection of property rights
but had nothing to say about privacy.2 8 Historians warn us about
the risk of interrogating the past in light of a conceptual
2' Two of the sightings from pre-eighteenth century literature are two William
Shakespeare plays: TROILUS AND CRESSIDA, act III, sc. iii, 190 (Achilles: "Of this my
priuacie, I haue strong reasons." Ulysses: "But 'gainst your priucie The reasons are
more potent and heroycall.") and THE MERRY WIVES OF WINDSOR, act IV, sc. v, 24
(Host: "Let her descend: my Chambers are honourable; Fie, priuacy?"). It will be
noted that the term "privacy" is not accorded positive value in either of these
passages: it prevents the world from appreciating Achilles's heroic stature; in THE
MERRY WIVES, it is a condition associated with secret goings-on. The sightings
reported for the eighteenth century are more positive, but they are hardly abundant.
8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1388 (1933)..
" "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law ... nor shall any private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
26 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
" "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech . U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
28 "This term [property], in its particular application, means 'that dominion which one
man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in exclusion of every other
individual.' [quoting Blackstone] In its larger and juster meaning, it embraces everything
to which may attach a value and have a right, and which leaves to eveyone else the like
advantage."
THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON
243 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1976) (quoting James Madison, Property, NATIONAL GAzETTE,
March 29, 1972); see also JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY (1990).
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framework derived from the present.29 This risk must be borne
in mind when thinking about the Fourth Amendment. Privacy
is an abiding concern of the present age. As far as the Fourth
Amendment is concerned, we must begin by reasoning in terms
of one of the abiding concerns of the eighteenth century--that
is, we must begin by reasoning in terms of its profound respect
for property rights.
"There is nothing," Blackstone remarks in his Commentaries,
"which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the
affections of mankind, as the right of property."3 Important as
it was for many branches of the common law, property law and,
in particular, the bundle of rules collected under the heading of
"trespass" were especially significant in determining the search
and seizure liability of government agents. According to
eighteenth century common law cases, a necessary condition for
establishing such liability was proof that one of the
government's agents had trespassed on someone's property.3
Clearly, this trespass approach to searches and seizures provides
substantial protection for privacy interests. Trespass on
someone's person-an arrest can be defined as a trespass in this
sense 32-interferes with privacy of the person. Similarly, a
trespassory incursion into someone's home interferes with
informational privacy, and, if the owner is home, interferes with
privacy of the person as well. On this analysis, however, privacy
of person and informational privacy are only incidentally
protected by the law of search and seizure. Put differently, we
can say that if trespass is to function as a necessary condition for
search and seizure liability, then certain matters that clearly
come under the heading of "privacy" cannot be actionable in
21 "[W]hen we organize our general history by reference to the present we are
producing what is really a gigantic optical illusion... HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE
WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 29 (1968) "The total result of this method [the
method of Whig history] is to impose a certain form upon the whole historical story,
and to produce a scheme of general history which is bound to converge beautifully
upon the present .. " Id. at 12.
3 2 WILuAM BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *2-3.
31 The most prominent case is Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's St. Trials 1029
(1765).
12 The term "trespass" is normally employed to refer to possessory interests in real
estate. However, the term is relevant to possession of one's person. As Professor
Dobbs has remarked, "The gist of the tort [of trespass] is intentional interference
with rights of exclusive possession; no other harm is required." DAN B. DOBBS, THE
LAW OF TORTS 95-96 (2001). "Exclusive possession" can of course refer to rights over
one's person as well as rights over real estate.
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terms of search and seizure-nontrespassory eavesdropping on
conversations, for example, and nontrespassory "peeping" on
people in their bedrooms.
Do the Fourth Amendment's protections hinge on this
trespass limitation? The Amendment's text doesn't definitively
answer this question; indeed, it contains no reference to
trespass at all. Rather, the Amendment's organizing idea is the
concept of personal security. The Amendment's first, and most
important, clause states: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . . "s In
interpreting this clause, one might reason in terms of a narrow
version of personal security, one that treats the trespass
standard as implicit in the Amendment and that therefore
identifies security with control over physical objects, in
particular the objects essential to personal life (persons, houses,
papers, and effects). Alternatively, one might argue that
because the Amendment contains no reference to trespass, it is
grounded in a broader version of personal security. On this
account, the Amendment offers protection for the physical
environment essential to personal life, but, one could continue,
it is also concerned with background factors that can make
someone feel vulnerable to others-that is, with nontrespassory
surveillance such as constant scrutiny of one's person or the
interception of oral communications with friends. According to
the narrow version of personal security, the Amendment offers
only incidental privacy protection. According to the broad
version, it treats privacy as an independent value, one that
matters even when officials do not carry out a physical incursion
on someone's immediate possessions.
In the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has moved
from an interpretation of the Amendment based on the narrow
version to an interpretation based on the broader one.34  As
noted, the Amendment's text provides no conclusive reason for
" U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For a comment on the importance of the concept of
personal security in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see United States v. White, 401
U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("For those more extensive intrusions
that significantly jeopardize the sense of security which is the paramount concern of
Fourth Amendment liberties, I am of the view that more than self-restraint by law
enforcement officials is required and at the least warrants should be necessary.")
34 The contrast is developed through an analysis of Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1928), discussed infra in Part I.B, and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967), discussed infra in Part I.C.
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preferring one to the other. However, it's clear that the
Amendment's common law sources are grounded in the narrow
version 35-and clear as well that the early twentieth century
Court, relying on this common law background, read the
Amendment as if it constitutionalized the common law.36 Thus
anyone who argues, as I do, that the Amendment can properly
be interpreted as a provision that protects the broad version of
personal security must deal directly with both the Amendment's
common law background and with the early twentieth century
Court's reliance on that background. I turn to these issues
next; then I advance an argument for reading the Amendment
in light of the broad version of personal security.
B. THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY SOURCES
Eighteenth century commentators on search and seizure
appear never to have used the word "privacy" when writing
about their subject. Their conceptual framework was grounded
in a concern for property generally and the law of trespass in
particular. 3' Thus, if we are to find a concern for privacy in
eighteenth century commentaries on search and seizure, we
must superimpose the categories mentioned earlier-
informational privacy and privacy of the person-on judicial
opinions and political oratory informed by a conceptual scheme
grounded in property law. As I have already noted, such an
undertaking is fraught with danger: the act of translating the
past's conceptual scheme into one congenial to the present
carries with it many opportunities for intellectual dishonesty. In
this case, though, the danger can be avoided, for a strong
argument can be advanced for saying that eighteenth century
commentators were indeed deeply concerned with each type of
privacy I have mentioned even though they did not use the
rhetoric of privacy in formulating their claims. Two examples
" For a discussion of the Amendment's common law sources, see NELSON B.
LASSON, HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 13-50 (1937).
3' See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); see also Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
" See text and note 30 supra for an example of the high regard in which the
concept of property was held by eighteenth century commentators. For an example
of how eighteenth century common law judges analyzed search and seizure in terms
of trespass, see infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
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can be cited in support of this argument, one related to
informational privacy, .the other to privacy of the person.
Consider first a leading eighteenth century case, Entick v.
Carrington,18 that deals with what I have called informational
privacy. Entick is one of the many cases that arose out of the
Crown's efforts to suppress the anti-government pamphlets
John Wilkes and his followers distributed during the early 1760s..
At issue in it was the lawfulness of government officials' seizure
of Entick's personal papers.' 9  At the beginning of their
investigation, Lord Halifax's agents conducted a dragnet search,
arresting more than twenty people on suspicion." By the time
they turned to Entick, they were able to identify him as a likely
participant in Wilkes's efforts but were unable to specify which
papers of his should be seized.41 In bringing an action for
trespass, Entick alleged that the officials searching his home
"broke open the boxes, chests, drawers, &c. of [all his] private
papers," thereby discovering and making public his "secret
affairs."42 Lord Camden drew on each of these points in finding
for Entick, emphasizing in particular the private nature of the
papers seized.
Camden grounded his approach in a Lockean premise
about the ends of government, contending that "[t]he great
end, for which men entered society was to secure their
property."' 44 The law of trespass, Camden continued, serves to
protect property interests:
By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so
remote, is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground without
my license, but he is liable to an action [in trespass].... If he admits to
the [trespass], he is bound to shew by way of justification that some
positive law has empowered or excused him.
19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765).
See LASSON, supra note 35, at 43 (describing the investigation of Wilkes and its
implication for the development of the law of search and seizure); see also GEORGE
RUDE, WILKES AND LIBERTY 17-37 (1962).40 TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 30 (1969).
41 See LASsON, supra note 35, at 47.
42 Entick, 19 Howell's State Trials at 1066.
41 See note 47 infra and accompanying text.




Because Camden concluded no such justification was
available to the officials who searched Entick's home, he held
that they were liable in trespass.46 Moreover, he also concluded
that because the papers seized were personal ones, extra
damages should be assessed against them. Camden remarked:
Papers are the owner's goods and chattels: they are his dearest property;
and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an
inspection; and though the eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty
of a trespass, yet where private papers are removed and carried away, the
secret nature of those goods will be an aggravation of the trespass, and
demand more considerable damages in that respect.
47
To the modern reader, the concept of privacy may seem to
be the dominant one here. In fact, though, as close inspection
of the passage makes clear, Camden carves out a special domain
within property law for the seizure and inspection of those
articles that contain a person's intimate thoughts. Although
property damages are normally assessed in market 'terms, the
market doesn't provide the baseline for Camden's reasoning as
far as private papers are concerned. These are a person's dearest
property, he remarks: their seizure and illegal inspection call for
aggravated damages. With his use of the adjective "dearest,"
Camden unmistakably focused on the emotional rather than
the market value of private papers. What matters, Camden
maintained, isn't the price such papers will fetch on an open
market but the role such papers play in sustaining personal life.
One does no violence to Camden's Entick remarks, then, by
saying that he evinced a profound respect for informational
privacy when writing his opinion for the case. His categories of
analysis were those of property law, but property provided an
awkward proxy for the values he was actually championing.
Now consider remarks relevant to privacy of the person. A
year after Entick, as repercussions of the government's
investigation of Wilkes continued to be felt, William Pitt
outlined his home-as-castle principle to the House of Commons:
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the
Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it;
the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England may
46 Id. at 1044.
47 Id.
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not enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined
tenement."
Security in the home, the principle Pitt champions in these
remarks, promotes a number of different interests, not only
privacy of the person but also informational privacy and control
over property. Pitt's eloquent comments thus underscore the
fact that eighteenth century commentators didn't view privacy
as a separate consideration but instead reasoned in terms of a
general interest that, in retrospect, can be said to include a
number of specific ones, including privacy of the person. That
Pitt expected this general interest to be protected by the law of
trespass is made clear by his reference to "cross[ing] the
threshold." But we fail to come to terms with the eighteenth
century's ambiguous heritage if we focus simply on property
rights. Pitt, like Camden, viewed personal property as having a
special significance. His remarks, like Camden's in Entick, make
it clear he was concerned not with the exchange value of
property but with the way in which a certain type of property-
the property essential to personal life-sustains independent
existence. Indeed, Pitt went out of his way to emphasize this
concern by focusing attention on the lowest common
denominator of seclusion: the "ruined tenement" of the
destitute man. This kind of home is significant not because of
its commercial value but because it, just as much as a great
mansion, offers the possibility of seclusion from the world. The
point made about Camden thus also applies to Pitt, for here too
property is a somewhat awkward proxy for the values really at
stake in Pitt's remark. As the reference to the ruined tenement
makes clear, what matters in Pitt's comments is not property's
usual function-its exchange value. Instead, what matters is the
way in which it offers security against the larger world.
C. TRESPASS AND THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY HERITAGE: CHIEF
JUSTICE TAFT'S OPINION FOR THE COURT IN OLMSTEAD V. UNITED
STATES
Early twentieth century Supreme Court opinions
interpreting the Fourth Amendment focused not on these
general considerations but on the stubborn fact that Entick and
its companion cases used the trespass standard in assessing
" LASSON, supra note 35, at 49-50.
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search and seizure liability. To the early twentieth century
Court, the Fourth Amendment was to be read as containing an
implicit trespass condition.49 The Court employed the following
originalist chain of reasoning: (1) Government officials cannot
violate the Fourth Amendment if they engage in neither a
search nor a seizure; (2) Given eighteenth century case law, a
search can be said to occur only if government officials commit
trespass; (3) Therefore, trespass by a government official (or an
agent of one) must occur if the Fourth Amendment is to come
into play.5"
Here, then, is a formula that upholds the narrow version of
personal security. Under the formula, the Amendment offers
protection against the classic method of investigating crime-
that is, it offers protection in settings where officials engage in
physical incursions on a defendant's person or property. But
the formula, of course, offers no protection against modern,
nontrespassory methods of investigation. The first case in which
the Supreme Court considered nontrespassory surveillance was
Olmstead v. United States,51 decided in 1928. At issue in Olmstead
was the admissibility of evidence secured through wiretaps of
the defendants' phone conversations.5 ' During the course of
their investigation of the Olmstead defendants, who were
suspected of running a bootleg liquor ring, government officials
placed taps on phone lines going into the defendants' homes
and offices, thus avoiding any physical incursion on their
property.53 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Taft treated this
point as the critical fact of the case. The Fourth Amendment,
' See note 60 infra and accompanying text.
The first-uncontroversial-premise follows from the text of the Fourth
Amendment. The second-controversial and critical-premise is central to Chief
Justice Taft's Fourth Amendment originalism. It follows from his remark, quoted
infra in text at note 57, that the Fourth Amendment is to be interpreted "in light of
what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure at the time it was adopted" and
also from the deep respect late nineteenth and early twentieth century members of
the Court accorded Entick v. Carrington. See, e.g., the comments ofJustice Bradley for
the Court in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886) (characterizing Lord
Camden's opinion as a "monument of English freedom" and "the true and ultimate
expression of constitutional law" on the subject of search and seizure). The third
premise, which follows from the first two, is the central doctrine of Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), discussed infra at notes 51-56 and accompanying
text.
SI 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
2 Id at 456-57.
5' Id. at 457.
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he had stated in an earlier case, "is to be construed in the light
of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it
was adopted., 54  Given this originalist premise, Taft had no
difficulty resolving the case. "There was no searching," he
concluded. 55 "There was no seizure," he continued, for "[t]he
evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that
only.
5 6
No search? Taft's no-search claim may seem wildly
implausible in light of the fact that officials had installed
wiretaps as part of their effort to find out about the defendants'
activities. But Taft of course viewed the language of the Fourth
Amendment through the prism of trespass law. The
Amendment's text, he pointed out, mentions only material
objects: it offers protection, he argued, not for conversations
but for tangible objects that can be subject to physical incursion-for
an individual's home, her person, papers, and effects.57 The
wrong it condemns, he maintained, is arbitrary government
interference with an individual's control over certain material
objects. 8 Because no physical incursion on one of the protected
objects had occurred in Olmstead, Taft concluded that the
Fourth Amendment wasn't implicated in the case.59
D. THE COURT'S REPUDIATION OF THE TRESPASS STANDARD IN
KATZ V. UNITED STATES
What rationale has the contemporary Court advanced for
rejecting Taft's conclusions in Olmstead? The answer to this is
"none." In overruling Olmstead, Katz v. United States,60 decided in
1967, unmistakably established privacy as an independent
variable in Fourth Amendment analysis. But neither Justice
Stewart's majority opinion for the Court nor any of the other
concurring opinions in the case offered a sustained argument as
to why Taft was mistaken-as to why, in other words, it is not
5' Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
277 U.S. at 464.
'6 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
17 Id. ("The Amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material things-
the person, the house, his papers or his effects. The description of the warrant
necessary to make the proceeding lawful is that it must specify the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.").
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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necessary to interpret the Fourth Amendment as containing an
implicit trespass requirement. This is just what I propose to do
in the remainder of this section. I first summarize the Court's
conclusions in Katz. Then I advance a justification, based on
the broad conception of personal security, for its rejection of
Taft's position.
1. Katz and the Court's Recognition of Privacy as an Independent Fourth
Amendment Variable
At issue in Katz was the legality of an unusual,
nontrespassory method of recording telephone conversations.
Government agents hung a listening device on top of a phone
booth they knew the defendant to use, and in doing so they
made sure the device didn't touch the booth's ceiling.' Their
actions thus satisfied the trespass standard, but the Katz Court
was not impressed by this point. The "'premise that property
interests control the right of the Government to search and
seize has been discredited,"' Justice Stewart declared. 6' The
government's electronic surveillance, he stated, "violated the
privacy upon which [Katz] justifiably relied., 6' As for the
trespass standard, Stewart dismissed it in a single sentence: "The
fact that the electronic device ... employed to achieve that end
... did not happen to penetrate the wall of the [phone] booth,"
he remarked, "can have no constitutional significance. ''6'
Stewart thus held that the Fourth Amendment protects
privacy independently of its protection of interests in tangible
objects. This is Katz's core conclusion, a conclusion that can be
squared only with the broader version of personal security. This
holding did not resolve the case, however, for the government
further contended that even if its agents did interfere with a
protected Fourth Amendment interest they didn't violate the
Amendment. At the time its agents installed their listening
device, the government maintained, they had probable cause to
61 Id. at 348.
62 Id. at 353 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)). In speaking ofproperty interests in Katz, Justice Stewart was concerned solely with the question of
trespass. The material objects limitation for the Fourth Amendment established in
Olmstead was not at issue in Katz because the Court had already rejected this
limitation in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). See infra note 124 and
accompanying text.
63 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
64 Id.
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believe that Katz was breaking the law, thus making their
conduct reasonable (the government asserted) despite the
absence of a warrant to overhear his conversations.65 Stewart
emphatically rejected this argument. Stressing that "searches
conducted outside the judicial process . . . are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions," he
held that no further exception to the warrant requirement
could be carved out for an electronic surveillance case such as
the one at issue in Katz.66 Stewart thus dealt with the two key
issues relevant to Fourth Amendment privacy interests. First,
and most importantly, he held that the Fourth Amendment
independently protects these interests. And second, he held
that when government officials interfere with privacy interests in
circumstances such as those at stake in Katz, their conduct will
be classified as unreasonable unless they have obtained a
warrant beforehand.
2. Vindicating the Court's Conclusions in Katz
If Justice Stewart can be said to have advanced any
justification at all for the Katz Court's interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment, it is to be found in his remark that a
narrower reading of the Constitution would "ignore the vital
role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication."67 This statement, however, is at most a first
step toward justification. Two options are worth considering in
building on it. First, one might justify Katz by resorting to an
analogy. Telephone conversations are functionally similar to
letters, one could maintain, so it is appropriate to expand the
Amendment's reach (think of the reference to papers in the
Amendment's catalog of protected objects) from written to oral
communication. Alternatively, one could contend that there is
a general principle implicit in the Fourth Amendment-a
principle that enjoins government respect for the environment
of personal life-and then argue that Katz properly applied this
principle to telephone conversations. As will become clear, this
latter approach is more promising. The former, however,
merits careful attention, in particular because it has informed
See id. at 354.
Id. at 357.
67 Id. at 352.
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Justice Scalia's recent opinions on Fourth Amendment privacy
issues.
In resorting to analogy, Justice Scalia has cited the
Amendment's catalog of protected objects and asked how far
courts can go when applying the catalog to specific fact
patterns.8 The question is significant for its negative
implication-for its implication that anything outside the scope
of a reasonable analogy is not protected under the Amendment.
For example, in construing the term "secure in their .
houses," Justice Scalia has remarked that the Court was right to
hold that a tenant who rents his home is protected. 69 The Court
was also correct when it held that a grandson who lived in his
grandmother's home is protected' 0 And it was even right to
protect an overnight guest staying in a host's apartment. But
protection of such guests, he has insisted, is the "absolute limit
of what text and tradition permit."72  In particular, he has
argued that the Court would go too far were it to extend the
Amendment to a guest who is not staying overnight in a home.73
Justification by analogy, it should be clear, requires fine and
hardly convincing hair-splitting (overnight guest protected,
shorter-term guest unprotected). But this is not its primary
flaw. Rather, the major difficulty with this approach is that it
casts doubt on the legitimacy of Katz. If reasoning by analogy is
to be employed, then Taft's point about the material nature of
the objects in the Amendment's catalog must be taken into
account. 4  There are, of course, degrees of analogy, but
analogy's appeal lies in the discipline it is supposed to impose
on courts. Justice Scalia has made just this point in criticizing
the Court's later use of Katz. In castigating these opinions as
"subjective and "self-indulgent,"76 he has implied that his
68 For exampleJustice Scalia has remarked that "[w]e [i.e., the Court] went to the
absolute limit of what text and tradition permit in Minnesota v. Olson when we
protected a mere overnight guest against an unreasonable search of his hosts'
apartment." Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 96-97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
69 Id. at 97 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610
(1961)).
70 See id. (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968)).
71 See id. at 96-97 (citing Minnesota v. Olsen, 495 U.S. 91 (1990)).
72 Id.
71 See id. at 97. This was the issue at hand in Carter, 525 U.S. 83.
74 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
7 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). In this instance,Justice Scalia was
speaking for the Court.
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analogy-based approach places limits on the judiciary." But if it
is discipline Scalia wants, then surely the material-objects point
circumscribes the reach of the Amendment-and surely, Katz
must then be said to have been wrongly decided given the
protection it offers oral communication when the Amendment's
catalog is limited to material objects.
One could attempt to salvage Scalia's approach by relying
on Taft's purer version of it.7 But Taft's originalism is also
incompatible with Katz, and it compounds difficulties by
requiring hair-splitting inquiry into when a trespass occurs. The
sounder analysis breaks entirely with this approach while still
taking the text seriously. On this account, there is a principle
implicit in the Fourth Amendment that ensures individuals a
secure environment in which to conduct their personal lives.
The catalog makes this clear. In speaking of "persons, houses,
papers, and effects,"79 the Amendment identifies the physical
foundations of personhood, the objects an individual must
control (including her person) to feel secure in everyday life.
But the items are significant not simply as physical objects. The
contents of the home and personal papers are, as Camden put
it, their owner's dearest property. 0 They matter not because they
are material objects but rather as props of personhood and as
containers of information about an individual's life. Given this
intangible value, it is wholly appropriate for courts to think not
only about the physical environment of personhood but about
its intangible attributes-and thus appropriate for courts to
protect conversations as well as material objects.
This appeal to principle is consistent with the Fourth
Amendment's. But is it consistent as well with its common law
background-in particular with the common law's insistence on
trespass as a prerequisite to search and seizure liability? This
" Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring). In this
instance,Justice Scalia was speaking only for himself andJustice Thomas.
77 One of the central themes ofJustice Scalia's jurisprudence has been that judges
must place limits on themselves in construing statutes and the Constitution. See
generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175
(1989).
7' Chief Justice Taft's interpretation of the Amendment limited its scope to
material objects and also treated trespass as a prerequisite to liability. See Olmstead,
277 U.S. at 464. According to Taft, these limitations are required by an originalist
account of the Amendment. Id. at 465.
79U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1209, 1066 (1765).
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question is significant in light of Chief Justice Taft's unbending
originalism. Justice Scalia, while also claiming to rely on "the
original meaning of the Fourth Amendment,"'" has in fact
diluted originalism by not insisting on either the material-
objects limitation or the trespass rule.82 Taft's Olmstead opinion,
on the other hand, relies on both. On Taft's account, the
Fourth Amendment gives constitutional standing to Entick, thus
making trespass and a material-objects limitation essential to
Fourth Amendment analysis.
83
The best way to answer this Olmstead-inspired challenge is
to note what is not contained in the Fourth Amendment's text.
There is no reference in it to trespass, nor does the text contain
a reference to the common law. The significance of this
omission is underscored by an examination of the text of the
Seventh Amendment. 84 That provision contains an explicit
reference to the common law, preserving the right to a civil jury
trial in common law suits where the value in controversy
exceeds twenty dollars. Given this unequivocal, and detailed,
reference, one can discern the different strategies at stake in the
drafting of each Amendment. The authors of the Fourth
Amendment appealed to a broad principle of personal security,
a principle informed by the common law but that also
transcends it through use of a term ("unreasonable searches
and seizures") not typically employed by common law judges.
"S Kyllo, 553 U.S. at 39.
82Justice Scalia's failure to insist on this is consistent with his general conception of
originalism. Although he advocates an originalist interpretation of the Constitution,
he has maintained that his approach must be qualified by respect for stare decisis. See
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861 (1989).
Justice Scalia can be understood to say, then, that he must follow Katz given its
repudiation of Olmstead. But the question to ask of Justice Scalia in this context is
what is left of Fourth Amendment originalism, other than a desire to limit the
Amendment's protection, once a concession has been made about the material-
objects and trespass limitations ChiefJustice Taft established in Olmstead.
" See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464; see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149
(1925) (Chief Justice Taft remarked that the Fourth Amendment "is to be
interpreted in light of what was deemed to be an unreasonable search and seizure
when it was adopted.").
84 The Seventh Amendment provides:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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The authors of the Seventh Amendment, on the other hand,
referred to the common law and set an exact dollar amount for
preserving the common law right to jury trial in civil cases. The
Fourth Amendment is thus best read as a provision containing a
principle of broad application. Taft's error was to read it as if it
were analogous to the Seventh Amendment's mandate to fix
forever the dollar amount of the civil trial jury right.
This focus on constitutional principle rather than a
narrowly circumscribed common law rule has two advantages as
far as interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is concerned.
First, it captures the significance of Camden's and Pitt's remarks
about the importance of security within personal life. On the
account proposed here, the Amendment's catalog is suggestive
rather than exhaustive. The catalog underscores the
importance of the environment of personal life but doesn't
purport to list all items essential to that environment. Although
their positions differ in important respects, the Scalia and Taft
accounts are similar in treating the catalog as exhaustive-as a
list of discrete entities that defines the outer limits of Fourth
Amendment privacy protection. Scalia's approach is marred by
inconsistency: it casts doubt on Katz's legitimacy but avoids the
originalist reading of the Amendment that distinguishes Taft's
analysis. Taft's framework is internally consistent, but it rests on
the problematic assertion that the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment is to freeze the common law in its tracks.
Second, the interpretation proposed here makes it possible
to consider the continuity between property and privacy
interests. It is true of course that these are distinct categories,
but it is also true they have some points in common. In
particular, both are interests individuals assert for the purpose
of excluding others-interests that set us off from others,
emphasize our individuality, and weaken our ties to larger
communities. s5 Moreover, there is an important sense in which
the rhetoric of privacy is derived from that of property-thus
the significance of references to invasions of privacy and
intrusions on it, expressions that appeal to boundaries and the
"5 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 341 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("Privacy itself implies the exclusion of uninvited strangers, not just strangers who
work for the Government."); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978)
("One of the main rights attaching to property is the right to exclude others .... and
one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a
legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude.")
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language of trespass even though only metaphorical boundaries
are at stake. As these points make clear, privacy rights have
much in common with property rights because they originated
in them and only gradually became distinct from them.86 In the
less mobile eighteenth century, property rights offered nearly
complete protection for privacy interests." In the twentieth
century, as mobility of the person became increasingly
important, privacy came to matter on its own-above all, people
came to value it as a device for protecting information about
themselves while circulating in society.8  Had the Fourth
Amendment been written in the narrow terms used for the
Seventh, courts could not have properly invoked it to offer
personal protection for this new, more mobile way of life. Given
the Amendment's appeal to principle, though, it was entirely
appropriate for the Katz Court to apply it to the changing
circumstances of life.
E. FOURTH AMENDMENT PLURALISM
Implicit in the justification I have advanced for Katz is the
claim that there are different ways in which officials can
destabilize the environment of personal life-and so different
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. One is to
interfere with someone's freedom of movement, to seize her
person. Another is to interfere with her control over her
personal property, to seize her home, papers, and effects. Yet
another is to subject her to surveillance, to search her person,
86 Indeed, the property framework continues to be employed when talking about
informational privacy. For example, in My Data, Mine to Keep Private, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
23, 2000, at A25, Linda Monk denounces efforts by members of Congress to discover
information obtained by census workers on the basis of promises of confidentiality.
Clearly, information provided to the census is the property of the United States
government, not the property of the person -who provided it. But when the
information is provided on the basis of a pledge of confidentiality, one feels a strong
sense of empathy with those who resort even to property-based arguments for limiting
dissemination of their disclosures.
87 As Justice Black noted, even in the eighteenth century the trespass doctrine did
not provide complete privacy protection, because eavesdropping-that is, listening or
observing without trespassing-remained possible. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 366 (1967) (BlackJ., dissenting).
Seminal cases such as Olmstead and Katz can be understood in light of this
remark. Each raises questions about the Fourth Amendment's protection of
informational privacy. The same value was of course at stake in Entick and in Fourth
Amendment cases decided in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but it
was not until Olmstead that the value of informational privacy was considered
independently of other considerations.
[Vol. 92
FOURTH AMEDMENT PRIVACY INTERESTS
home, papers, and effects. Each of the intrusions just mentioned
interferes with a different interest in personal security-with a
liberty interest (in freedom of movement), with a property
interest (in exercising control over personal property), or with a
privacy interest (in avoiding surveillance of one's person and of
the sources of information about one's personal life). These
three interests are of course complementary. But they are also
analytically distinct-that is, each can be infringed without the
others being affected. It is because this is so that one can speak
of "Fourth Amendment pluralism."
Standing in contrast with this is Fourth Amendment
monism, a doctrine that views the Amendment as protecting
directly only one interest. Taft, it is clear, was a proponent of
Fourth Amendment monism. When he argued in Olmstead that
the Fourth Amendment is triggered only by trespass, he
maintained that the Amendment is concerned exclusively with
the control people exercise over physical objects, whether those
objects are their person or personal property. 9 Another kind of
monism is possible, however. One can read Katz as having
turned Olmstead on its head, as having interpreted the Fourth
Amendment as a provision that offers direct protection only for
privacy. This is surely as mistaken an approach to the
Amendment as the one Taft employed in Olmstead, yet the post-
Katz Court appeared at one time to be prepared to endorse it.9°
To understand the significance of privacy in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, it is essential to see how the Court
came close to endorsing privacy as the only value directly
protected by the Fourth Amendment-and how it turned away
from this, as it should have from the outset, by adopting a
pluralistic interpretation of the Amendment.
The case that comes closest to Olmstead inversion is Oliver v.
United States.9' At stake in Oliver was a claim that government
agents violated a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights when
they trespassed on his open fields, located far from his home, to
seize marijuana he was growing.9' Writing for the Court, Justice
Powell offered two rationales for holding that the Fourth
Amendment wasn't implicated in the case. One was drawn from
" See 277 U.S. at 464.
" See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
91 I
92 Id. at 173.
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its language. Open fields, Powell noted, aren't mentioned in
the Amendment's catalog; therefore, he concluded, the
Amendment offers no protection for government intrusion on
them.93
This first rationale stands as a primitive version of the Taft-
Scalia reading of the Amendment's text. The account advanced
by these justices does not limit protection to those objects
specifically mentioned in the catalog;94 rather, their accounts
allow for the possibility of reasoning by analogy from the
enumeration to other candidates for protection. But although
Powell's specific enumeration analysis is wholly unpromising,
the principle just outlined of protecting the environment of
personal life provides a ready justification for Oliver. On this
analysis, the Amendment's catalog provides a starting point,
rather than an exhaustive list, of what matters in personal life.
In treating it as a starting point, one can see that there certainly
are objects besides those mentioned in the text that offer
important support for the conduct of personal life. Absent
special circumstances, though, one cannot argue that open
fields provide a context for such conduct. Open fields are not
like hotel rooms, which can temporarily become the focus of
one's most intimate activities. Rather, they are more like factory
workshops or open-air markets in that they are places where
people work but do nothing essential to personal life.
It is possible, then, to produce a convincing rationale for
the Court's conclusions in Oliver, one that Powell himself could
have provided had he read the Amendment's inventory as
suggestive in form rather than as an exhaustive list of specifically
protected objects. Unfortunately, Powell not only failed to
employ this interpretive strategy, he compounded his
difficulties by advancing another justificatory argument, one
that strongly implies that the Amendment's protection does not
extend beyond privacy interests. "Since Katz," Powell remarked,
"the touchstone of [Fourth] Amendment analysis has been the
question whether a person has a 'constitutionally protected
reasonable expectation of privacy."' 9 Continuing, Powell stated
"See id. at 176-77.
't Chief Justice Taft, for instance, wrote the opinion for the Court in which
provided that limited Fourth Amendment protection was provided moving vehicles.
See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925).
9' Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177.
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that the question posed in all Fourth Amendment cases is
whether "a search infringes upon individual 
privacy. 9 6
Here, then, is an example of Fourth Amendment monism
almost as narrow as the monism espoused in Olmstead, although
Taft's monism relied on property and Powell's 
on privacy.97
Given Powell's approach in Oliver, it is of course property interests
that are incidentally protected under the Amendment.98
According to Oliver, if government officials seize someone's
wallet or purse, the person suffering the seizure can speak of a
cognizable Fourth Amendment interest only if officials violate a
privacy interest associated with the object-by, say, opening the
wallet or purse. Thus, if officials were merely to dispossess
someone of, say, her purse and not inspect its contents, that
person could not claim she had suffered an infringement of
interests protected by the Amendment.
Oliver, however, did not establish the course the Court has
ultimately followed in interpreting the Amendment. Fifteen
days prior to Oliver, in United States v. Jacobsen,99 the Court took
its first step toward Fourth Amendment pluralism-its first step,
in other words, towards an interpretive approach that
emphasizes multiple, analytically distinct Fourth Amendment
values. In reading the Fourth Amendment, Justice Stevens
declared in his opinion for the Court in Jacobsen, it is essential to
distinguish between two different kinds of government
intrusions: searches and seizures. "A 'search,"' Stevens wrote,
"occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared
to consider as reasonable is infringed."'00  A "'seizure' of
property," he continued, "occurs when there is some
meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests
in that property."10° Finally, he remarked, a "'seizure' of a
person" occurs when there is "meaningful interference,
however brief, with an individual's freedom of movement."02
In retrospect, it seems clear that other members of the
Jacobsen majority did not grasp the significance of Justice
M at 177-79.
97 Contrast Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464 with Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177.
Thus, on Justice Powell's account in Oliver, the Fourth Amendment offers no
protection against trespass on open fields.
9466 U.S. 109 (1984).
,00 Id. at 113.
101 Id
'02 Id. at 113 n.5.
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Stevens's triadic division of the Fourth Amendment. When
Oliver was decided fifteen days later, the majority and dissent
groupings on the Court were the same, with one exception.
The exception, of course, was Stevens, who moved from the
majority in Jacobsen to the dissent in Oliver. In time, though,
Stevens's insistence on pluralism came to dominate the Court's
interpretation of the Amendment. The best evidence of this is
to be found in the Court's conclusions in the 1992 case of Soldal
v. Cook County.'5°
At issue in Soldal was the Fourth Amendment's relevance to
an eviction carried out in the presence of deputies of the Cook
County Sheriffs Office. 4 Knowing that the management of a
trailer park had initiated an eviction proceeding against the
Sodals but that no order of eviction had been obtained, sheriffs
deputies nonetheless assisted management employees as they
disconnected the sewer and water pipes to the Soldals' trailer
home, pulled the home free of its moorings, and towed it to the
street." The Soldals subsequently brought suit for money
damages against the deputies, alleging that they had violated
the Fourth Amendment. 0 6 The trial court granted summary
judgment against them, and Judge Posner, speaking for the
Seventh Circuit, upheld this ruling.0 7 To Posner, the Court's
treatment of the Fourth Amendment as a provision primarily
concerned with privacy was the critical point.08 No one had
entered the Soldals' trailer, so their privacy hadn't been
invaded, Posner stated.10 9 Dispossession of one's home, he
continued, affects only property interests, and these interests,
he held, are protected under the Fourth Amendment only
when government officials interfere with privacy interests.10
10 506 U.S. 56 (1992). See also, William C. Heffernan, Property, Privacy, and the
Fourth Amendment, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 633 (1995) (for further analysis of Solda's
significance).
104 506 U.S. at 58.
o0 Id. at 58-59.
'o Id. at 59.
107 See 942 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1990).
10 Although recognizing that the Soldals' trailer had been seized, see id. at 1078
("not every interference with exclusive dominion and control is a seizure in the
relevant sense because not every such interference compromises privacy"). Posner
held that the Soldals did not have a cognizable Fourth Amendment claim because
their privacy had not been affected by the seizure. Id. at 1080 ("no interest protected
by the Fourth Amendment is involved" in the case) (emphasis in original).
"' Id. at 1077.
110 Id.
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Reversing, Justice White, writing for a unanimous Supreme
Court, treated Stevens's Jacobsen dicta as controlling and so took
a pluralist approach to the Fourth Amendment."' Katz, White
stated, had not "snuffed out the previously recognized
protection for property under the Fourth Amendment.
'"2
Indeed, in drawing on both Katz and Jacobsen, White intimated
that there is a general theme running throughout all Fourth
Amendment cases-vindication of security expectations in
everyday life against arbitrary action by government officials." 3
Accepting Stevens's Jacobsen framework,"4 White suggested
that personal security is grounded in a set of analytically distinct
but complementary expectations about government 
behavior.15
One of these expectations is that government officials will not
arbitrarily interfere with one's privacy-thus Katz's significance.
Another is that officials will not arbitrarily interfere with one's
personal property-thus Soldal. And yet another is that they will
not arbitrarily interfere with one's personal mobility-thus the
many Fourth Amendment cases dealing with freedom of
movement. Taken together, these expectations point to a more
general one: an expectation of security-of stability and relative
invulnerability to destabilizing intrusions-into one's personal
life. Table 1 provides an overview of the three interests, Justice
Stevens's definition of each in Jacobsen, and the Supreme Court
cases that treat them as analytically distinct.
Two features of this table require comment. First, it must
be emphasized that the table is concerned with interests, not
rights. Because the Amendment prohibits only unreasonable
searches and seizures, many government operations that
interfere with interests protected by the Amendment do so
reasonably and so do not violate the right established by it.
Given the interest/right distinction, courts can be said to follow
. See the lengthy citation to Jacobsen in Soldal, 506 U.S. at 62-63.
112 Id. at 64.
"' See id. at 69 ("What matters is the intrusion on the people's security from
governmental interference .... [I]t would be 'anomalous to say that the individual
and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the
individual is suspected of criminal behavior."' (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court of
San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967)).
"4 See id. at 63.
"' Id. White noted here that Posner's framework would undermine not only the
Court's conclusion in Jacobsen, but also its holding in United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696 (1983).
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a two-step inquiry when considering Fourth Amendment privacy
claims. First, a court asks whether one or more of the interests
it protects was infringed by a government operation. Only if the
answer to this is positive does a court move to the second stage
of inquiry-whether the government's operation was reasonable
under the Amendment, with reasonableness determined in
light of the level of suspicion that preceded the operation and
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concept of an interest is thus critical to determining whether
the Fourth Amendment is implicated at all in a given operation.
The concept of a right is critical to the second question that must
be asked about an operation: whether the government's
interference with an interest was reasonable.
The other feature of Table 1 that merits comment has to do
with Justice Stevens's distinction between searches and seizures.
Under Fourth Amendment monism, either the term "search" or
the term "seizure" becomes dominant for judicial
interpretation: "seizure" for Olmstead-type monism, "search" for
its Oliver counterpart. Under pluralism, by contrast, each noun
is given independent weight, with the Amendment's protection
triggered even when only one type of intervention occurs (that
is, under pluralism, there can be a search Without a seizure, and
a seizure without a search). Pluralism is superior to monism
because it requires courts to recognize that a government
operation can affect one kind of personal security without
affecting others. Under Fourth Amendment pluralism, one
can, when the facts so require, distinguish between pure privacy,
pure property, and pure liberty wrongs. (The three cases
mentioned in Table 1-Katz, Soldal, and Garner-provide an
example of each.) On other occasions, one can build from this
base and analyze government encounters with individuals in
terms of the interplay of these interests-one can think, for
example, about the interplay of liberty and privacy interests in
stop and frisk or about the interplay of property and privacy
interests when government officials enter a home. This flexible
approach isolates the basic elements of personal security while
allowing for the possibility that they will intersect in many
settings."6 Our primary concern in the remainder of the article
will be with privacy interests as they stand alone. However, we
shall occasionally consider privacy interests in tandem with
property and liberty interests.
III. DEVELOPING THE FORBEARANCE MODEL
To say that the Fourth Amendment offers independent
protection for privacy interests is not, of course, to say what the
"6 For a justification of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule through an
analysis of the different interests that the Amendment protects, see William C.
Heffernan, Foreword: The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Remedy,
88 GEO. L.J. 799, 832-40 (2000).
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term "privacy" means. Curiously, the modern Court has not
addressed this question. It has commented frequently on what
privacy is not.'1 7 However, it has provided no definition of what
privacy is. Nor has it given serious consideration to alternatives
to a formal definition. For example, although post-Katz
opinions have often invoked Harlan's reasonable expectations
test, 118 none has systematically addressed the question of how to
identify the expectations that make a privacy claim valid. The
cost of this omission has been substantial, for the Court's failure
to reflect carefully on the nature of privacy has opened the way
for the vigilance model that now dominates Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. In the first part of this Section, I outline the key
features of the vigilance model. I then turn to its alternative,
the forbearance model. In doing so, I offer an answer to the
question neglected in Katz and subsequent cases-the question
of what someone must demonstrate to establish a valid privacy
claim under the Fourth Amendment.
A. POST-KATZ PRIVACYJURISPRUDENCE: AN UNREASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF ETERNAL VIGILANCE
Three years before Katz was decided, Justice Stewart
famously remarked, in Jacobellis v. Ohio,"9 that he was unable to
define pornography but that he knew it when he saw it."2°
Stewart's approach to privacy was strikingly similar. As he had
in Jacobellis, Stewart avoided a positive definition of the subject
at hand when writing for the Court in Katz. But Stewart did at
least comment on what privacy is not. The
defendant/petitioner in Katz v. United States advanced a place-
based definition of privacy; both parties disagreed not on
whether places are critical to the identification of privacy
interests but on whether a phone booth can be a private place."'
Stewart rejected their dispute as irrelevant. "What a person
' See infra notes 122-23 and accompanying text. The Court has invoked this
statement of what privacy is not in Calfornia v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988);
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986); and United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,
442 (1976).
..8 See supra note 2.
... 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
'20 Id. at 197 (Stewart, J. concurring) ("I shall not today attempt further to define
the kinds of material [at stake in obscenity cases]; and perhaps I could never succeed
in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved
in this case is not that.")
"' See 389 U.S. 347, 349-50 (1967).
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knowingly exposes to the public," he stated, "even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. '  By contrast, he stated, "what [a person] seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected."2 '
Stewart's juxtaposition of modal verbs reveals just how
reluctant he was to provide positive guidance as to privacy
claims. He commented forcefully on what is not protected
under the Fourth Amendment ("what a person knowingly
exposes to the public"). But he made no commitment as to
what is protected, using the cautious locution "may be
protected" when talking about what someone seeks to preserve
as private. On Stewart's account, exposure is critical to
understanding nonprivacy-critical, in other words, to
identifying why a privacy claim must fail. But of course this sets
the stage for questions about how to identify a valid claim. The
most important of these turns Stewart's assertion inside out: is
nonexposure, one must ask, an identifying criterion of privacy?
Other questions are closely related. For example, if
nonexposure is critical, is this a necessary, or perhaps even a
sufficient, condition for a valid claim? And what, in any event, is
the relationship between nonexposure and concealment? The
latter term suggests an affirmative effort to withhold something
from others. The former, by contrast, suggests either an effort to
withhold or acquiescence in a pre-existing condition of
nonaccessibility. In speaking of exposure rather than
concealment, Stewart appeared to endorse a broad conception
of privacy, one that includes affirmative efforts to withhold but
but extends beyond them (though Stewart's comments about
privacy were, it must be emphasized, so casual one can hardly be
certain about his intentions).
It is because Stewart and his colleagues in the Katz majority
were conscious of the fact that they were inaugurating a new
line of Fourth Amendment inquiry-they had, after all, had
years of experience in applying Olmstead 2'-that one would
122 I at 351.
122 Id. at 351-52.
124 Indeed, Stewart was the author of the Court's Solomonic opinion in Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), which overruled sub silentio one portion of Olmstead
by holding that conversations are subject to Fourth Amendment protection.
Olmstead, it will be recalled, held that that conversations lie outside the ambit of the
Amendment because the Amendment's text is concerned solely with material objects.
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have expected the Court's opinion in the case to address issues
such as the ones just mentioned. As his comment on obscenity
made clear, though, Stewart was perhaps the Warren Court
justice least likely to be interested in offering positive guidance
as to the meaning of a contested concept. It is possible, of
course, that Stewart was opposed in principle to formal
definition-possible, in other words, that he believed an
attempt at formal definition is likely to have a worse effect on
future decisions than no definition at all.
This is certainly a plausible point. The legal realist
suspicion of formal definition 12 has a good deal of merit, and
Stewart may well have been worried about harming the
development of privacy law by advancing a definition of the
term. There is, however, a middle ground between formalism
and intuition, one that avoids abstract definition but does at
least provide identifying criteria. What is missing from Stewart's
Katz opinion is just this kind of mid-range analysis. Stewart, it
should be noted, didn't even comment directly on what is
obvious about all privacy claims: that an assessment of
someone's claim about privacy must be assessed in light of what
was known in the ex ante--it must be based, in other words, on
what government officials know prior to an intrusion.2 6
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). Stewart's Silverman opinion
maintained that the case could be resolved without determining whether Olmstead
should be overruled. See Silverman, 365 U.S. at 508-09. As noted, though, Silverman in
fact did just that, a point Justice Black belatedly discovered in the electronic
surveillance cases decided in the late 1960s. "I would not have agreed with the
Court's opinion in Silverman," he remarked in dissent, "had I thought that the result
depended on finding a violation of the Fourth Amendment or had I any inkling that
the Court's general statements about the scope of the Amendment were intended to
negate the clear holding in Olmstead ...." Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 78-80
(1967). Extraordinarily careful reasoning had thus become necessary under the
Olmstead regime, reasoning so finely developed its implications even escaped Justice
Black, if only for awhile.
125 ,,[I]f I am right, finding out what the judges say is but the beginning of your task. You
will have to take what they say and compare it with what they do. You will have to see
whether what they say matches with what they do. You will have to be distrustful of
whether they themselves know (any better than other men) the ways of their own doing,
and of whether they describe it accurately, even if they know it."
KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 5 (7th prtg. 1981)
(1930).
"26 Needless to say, the Court has commented on this on other occasions. See, e.g.,
its remarks in Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 543 (1990) (citations omitted):
[Vol. 92
FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY INTERESTS
Post-Katz opinions have tried to fill the gaps created by
Stewart's opinion by drawing on Harlan's concurrence
concerning privacy expectations. '1 In one sense, this move has
been successful. By emphasizing the importance of society's
understandings, the Harlan test undercuts any attempt at
abstract definition and so requires justices to consider practices
that prevail in everyday life. But there is another, more
important sense in which this move has failed. To say that
society's expectations matter when trying to identify privacy
interests is simply to change the terms of discussion. An
abstract definition won't do under Harlan's test; but some kind
of identifying criterion is nonetheless needed to understand
when society's understandings implicate privacy and when they
do not. Moreover, the Harlan formula adds another factor to
the equation, for it requires courts to explain when, and why, an
expectation turns into a constitutionally valid interest. Like
Stewart, Harlan didn't consider foundational issues such as
these. His test is far from self-executing, yet the Court has
drawn on it as if it resolves the problem of guidance left open in
Stewart's opinion.
The results, as numerous commentators have agreed,2 8 have
been deplorable-a kind of Khadi 29-style justice for Fourth
Amendment privacy interests rather than a reasoned analysis of
them. We can best understand how things have gone wrong by
examining the Court's use of Harlan's test in post-Katz cases.
This test has subjective and objective prongs. First, Harlan
"[U]ustify[ing] the arrest by the search and at the same time ... the search by the arrest,"
just "will not do." As we have had occasion in the past to observe, "[i]t is axiomatic that an
incident search may not precede an arrest and serve as part of its justification."
For comments on the implications of this point for the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule, see Heffernan, supra note 116, at 838-40.
27 See supra note 2.
121 See, e.g., Laurence A. Benner, Diminishing Expectations of Privacy in the Rehnquist
Court, 22J. MARSHALL L. REV. 825, 826 (1989); Brian Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy:
A New Model for Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 594 (1989); Richard
G. Wilkins, Defining the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy": An Emerging Tripartite
Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1087-88 (1987).
" For Weber's discussion of Khadi justice, see MAX WEBER, ON LAW AND ECONOMY
AND SOCIETY, 213 (Edward Shils trans., Max Rheinstein ed. 1954). Professor
Rheinstein helpfully notes that Weber uses the term "Khadi justice" "to describe the
administration of'justice which is oriented not at fixed rules of a formally rational law
but at the ethical, religious, political, or otherwise expediential postulates of a
substantively rational law." Id. at 213 n.48.
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remarked, a person must "have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy ;3 second, he continued, the expectation
must "be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable..". Most post-Katz opinions treat each condition as
necessary for establishing a valid privacy claim, though at least
one majority opinion has conceded that in some instances the
first, subjective prong provides "an inadequate index of Fourth
Amendment protection.' 32  This point is surely valid. If the
government were to announce that henceforth all homes will be
subject to warrantless inspection (to use the Court's example'33),
then, assuming the first prong remains essential, Fourth
Amendment privacy protection would be reduced to the extent
that the government, through its own efforts, was able to reduce
subjective expectations. It is perhaps for this reason that the
Court has not treated the first prong as a key element of its post-
Katz jurisprudence.' Indeed, the first prong of the
expectations test is of such marginal importance in post-Katz
decisions that I shall return to it on only a few occasions in the
remainder of the Article.
Rather, it is the second, objective-expectations prong of the
Harlan test that has guided modern privacy jurisprudence. As
noted, Harlan viewed an expectation of privacy as objectively
valid only if it is one "society is prepared to recognize as
30 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan,J., concurring).
Id. Morgan Cloud has criticized this first prong as "perhaps the most
nonsensical premise in Fourth Amendment law." Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and
Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 250 (1993). This seems
far-fetched. Privacy can properly be classified as a claim-right-that is, as a right to
something that someone must secure for herself. Given its status as a claim-right, it is
surely plausible to say that a person must take a step to secure the condition of
privacy for herself. The further question to ask, of course, is whether a demanding
standard is established for asserting the claim.
112 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979).
133 See id.
134 In practice, the Court has settled for relatively modest steps as a way of
establishing a subjective expectation of privacy. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529
U.S. 334, 338 (2000) (Passenger on bus exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy
"by using an opaque bag and placing that bag directly above his seat."). Even in cases
where the Court has held that someone lacked an objectively reasonable expectation
of privacy, it has been willing to concede that relatively modest efforts may establish a
subjective expectation. See.,e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988) (Use
of opaque bags for garbage may well indicate that someone does "not expect that the
contents of their garbage bags would become known to the police or other members
of the public.").
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'reasonable."" 35  Harlan's approach thus requires courts to
examine society's practices-and so to look beyond the
Constitution's text-in trying to discern privacy norms.
Olmstead-based inquiry had also required inquiry beyond the
Constitution. Under Olmtead, however, the Court had
considered common law property rules when determining the
Fourth Amendment's scope. Harlan's reasonable expectations
test made social norms the focus of attention. In doing so, it
quite properly changed the terms of discussion from arcane
rules of property law to generally held assumptions about the
prerequisites of personal security.
But how are courts to identify privacy norms? It is here that
the Court has failed to provide guidance. Harlan's test contains
only a suggestion for reorienting Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence; it does not, however, contain a criterion for
singling out privacy norms. Unfortunately, no post-Katz opinion
has taken up the challenge. Instead, modern privacy
jurisprudence has employed the following, grim chain of
reasoning: (1) Only objectively reasonable privacy expectations
are protected under the Fourth Amendment;
3 6 (2) There is no
need to provide a criterion for identifying these expectations
because it is clear that whenever someone knowingly exposes an
object or information to the public, that person cannot claim to
have an objectively reasonable privacy expectation;
3 7 and (3)
The terms "knowingly," "exposed," and "public" should be
interpreted as broadly as possible. Whenever there is
uncertainty about whether exposure was knowing or
inadvertent, it should be classified as "knowing."'
' 8  Even a
fleeting opportunity to view an object should be interpreted as
"exposure.""" Finally, the term "public" should be defined
"' Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan,J., concurring).
"6 As Harlan stated, these are expectations "that society is prepared to recognize as
,reasonable."' Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
"' See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). When a person exposes
something to the public, the Court reasons, he cannot have an objective reasonable
privacy expectation in it. See id.
"' See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). In Ciraolo, the defendant
had constructed a six-foot outer fence and ten-foot inner one to shield his backyard
from observation by passersby. Id. at 209. The Ciraolo Court, citing Katz's knowing
exposure standard, concluded that the defendant had knowingly exposed his yard to
the public. Id. at 213.
"' See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). In Riley, the defendant had
enclosed placed thick shrubbery around his greenhouse and covered it with
corrugated roofing panels, some translucent, some opaque. Id. at 448. To examine
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expansively to include not simply randomly encountered
strangers but also providers of services indispensable to life in
modern society."o It is by considering the significance of these
latter, highly controversial claims that one grasps the
significance of the vigilance model. Later in this section, I
propose a corrective solution to the Court's approach. At
present, however, it is important to concentrate on what the
vigilance model has meant in practice.
1. The Anxious Quest for Privacy
On the Court's account, even the slightest exposure of an
item to the public can defeat a privacy claim. California v.
Greenwood, the case concerned with the possibility of privacy
interests in garbage, provides a chilling illustration of this
point. ' Placing garbage in an opaque bag and leaving it on the
street on collection day would appear to meet the requirement
of making sure it is not exposed to the public. In holding
otherwise, the Court noted that "scavengers and snoops" often
rummage through garbage before it is picked up.142 Using the
behavior of "snoops" as its baseline for thinking about privacy,
the Court concluded that the Greenwood defendants had indeed
exposed their garbage to the public and could therefore not
claim any privacy interest in that garbage. 4 ' How can someone
ensure privacy in his garbage, then? Will shredding followed by
random distribution of the shredded pieces to several dumps
suffice? In applying Katz's exposure-to-the-public standard, a
lower court held that even these steps were inadequate.144
Perhaps only an incinerator system-for which permits are hard
to obtain-will do.
the contents of the greenhouse, the pilot of a police helicopter had to circle it twice
from a height of 400 feet. Id. Although the opportunity to look into the greenhouse
was, of necessity, a fleeting one from airspace, five members of the Court nonetheless
concluded that the defendant did not have a privacy interest in its contents. Id.
"° See Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (no privacy interest in financial
records despite the fact that the only members of the public to whom they have been
exposed are bank employees); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (no
privacy interest in telephone numbers dialed from the home).
"' 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
142 See id. at 40 n.4.
143 Id. at 41.
14 See United States v. Scott, 975 F.2d 927 (1st Cir. 1992) (Acting without a warrant,IRS agents seized Scott's garbage, combed through it, and pieced together 5/32-inch
shredded strips. They used the information provided by these strips to obtain a
warrant to secure additional evidence against Scott.).
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2. The Problem of Exposure to Third Party Facilitators
What if the only member of the public to whom an object
has been exposed is a third party facilitator? Settings involving
this kind of limited, special-purpose revelation abound in
everyday life. For example, people who take steps to ensure that
the public does not have access to their financial records
nonetheless routinely rely on bank officials to process their
checks and deposits. Similarly, even when people take steps to
make sure strangers are unaware of the pattern of phone
numbers they dial, they are not troubled by the fact that these
patterns are discoverable through a search of the phone
company's computers. For the Court, these facilitators are
members of the public to whom people have voluntarily
exposed information about their personal 
lives. 145
3. Calculating What a Member of the Public Might Discover
What if it is clear that an effort has been made to avoid an
object's exposure and the only person who discovers the object
is a government official who has expended great effort to make
the discovery? The Court's sole concern on such occasions is
with what a member of the public who is acting lawfully might
have discovered. Thus in the Court's most recent aerial
surveillance case, it did not matter that the only evidence about
what was in a person's backyard came from a government
helicopter pilot specifically assigned to use his craft to find out
about the contents of that very yard.'40 The Court was not
swayed by the presence of a "DO NOT ENTER" sign on the
perimeter of the backyard. Nor did it matter that trees and
shrubs made the backyard invisible from the street and that
corrugated roofing made it difficult to inspect the yard's
contents from the air.147 What did matter to the Court was that a
member of the public hovering over the backyard in a
helicopter could have peered through an open section where
roofing had not been installed.' On this account, it is the
' See Miller 425 U.S. 435 (bank records); see also Smith, 442 U.S. 735 (telephone
numbers).
46 SeeFlorida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989).
117 For the existence of the "DO NOT ENTER" sign, see id.
"' Id. at 451 ("Any member of the public could legally have been flying over Riley's
property in a helicopter at the altitude of 400 feet and could have observed Riley's




"snoop", a term the Court favorably invoked in California v.
Greenwood,'49 who defines privacy expectations. "° To be more
precise, it is the snoop aided by the human and mechanical
resources of modern police departments. 5'
Anyone encountering these summaries of post-Katz
opinions would say that the Court has turned privacy on its
head. Society's expectation of privacy isn't eternal vigilance
against outsiders, it's the reverse-an expectation that outsiders
will exercise forbearance with respect to personal matters,
thereby creating a context of security for the conduct of
everyday life.'52 That the Court has gone awry in its post-Katz
opinions seems clear enough. But it is not enough to charge
the Court with error; one must also explain why it is mistaken.
To do so, two steps must be taken. First, we must reconsider the
Harlan test from the ground up. We must think about the
relationship between expectations and interests and so come to
terms with the social basis of the test. Second, in working from
this foundation, we must examine the different methods courts
can employ to identify privacy interests. With these tasks
accomplished, we will be able to see why the Harlan test,
properly understood, requires adoption of the forbearance
model of privacy protection.
B. THE HARLAN TEST I: FROM SOCIAL EXPECTATIONS TO LEGALLY
ENFORCEABLE PRIVACY INTERESTS
One must question terminology when subjecting the Harlan
test to careful scrutiny. Why, one wants to know, did Harlan
employ the term "expectations" rather than "interests" when
talking about privacy?5 3  Had Harlan spoken directly about
privacy interests, his reference would have been unmistakably
normative, for in speaking of an interest, one suggests that an
individual has a good reason (though not necessarily a decisive
one) to engage in a certain kind of activity. The term"expectation," on the other hand, has a more ambiguous
meaning. First, it can be used in an exclusively predictive sense,
49 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
150 See supra notes 20-2 1.
15 Id
152 See infra Part II.D for further development of this point.
"' Harlan's Katz concurrence is framed exclusively in terms of "expectations." See
389 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967).
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as in "I expect the Yankees to win today." In this version of
"expectation," there is no suggestion of an obligation; if, for
example, the Yankees fail to win on the day in question, one
wouldn't say that they disregarded an obligation to do so.
But second, there is another version of "expectation," one
whose meaning is simultaneously predictive and normative.
Think, for example, about the word's use in the sentence "I
expect people arriving later at the movie theater to line up
behind me in the queue." Here, the word has a predictive
quality-in uttering the sentence, a person indicates she
considers it likely that people arriving later for the movie will
honor queuing conventions. But the term also has a normative
meaning: in this instance, it indicates a belief that individuals
arriving later ought to accept a less advantageous position in the
queue. The fact that people occasionally flout queuing
conventions (thus upsetting predictive expectations) would not
disturb someone's normative judgment that these conventions
ought to be honored. A person, when confronted with
another's violation of queuing rules, would defend them as
being fundamentally sound. These conventions fairly allocate
spaces for public events and so should be honored.
Harlan, it seems reasonable to suppose, had this more
complex version of "expectation" in mind when he spoke of
privacy.' Because the system of privacy operates through
conventions, the notion of a privacy expectation necessarily
involves a prediction about how people will behave. But
because people believe others ought to honor their privacy
expectations, there is an inescapably normative element to
Harlan's use of the term.m5 5 Harlan did, of course, distinguish
between subjective and objective privacy expectations-between
expectations people believe to be valid (the subjective "ought")
and those "expectations of privacy society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable" (the objective "ought").156 The former
"' For example, Harlan's statement that "a man's home is, for most purposes, 
a
place where he expects privacy," suggests not simply an empirically valid belief 
that
people will respect residential seclusion but also a normative commitment to 
the
value of such seclusion. See 389 U.S. at 361.
'55 It is for this reason that Harlan endorsed Stewart's remark in the majority
opinion by saying that "[t]he critical fact in this case is that '[o]ne who occupies 
it, [a
telephone booth] shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits 
him to
place a call is surely entitled to assume' that his conversation is not being intercepted."
Id. (emphasis added).
156 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan,J., concurring).
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category has to do with someone's conviction, which may or
may not be justified, that she has a good reason to be accorded
something she desires. The latter category has to do with
interests-that is, with valid claims on others, claims not
necessarily entitled to absolute weight (they might, after all, be
trumped by other interests), but claims that merit respect from
others. The challenge in interpreting Harlan's test is to identify
the circumstances in which certain, though not all, subjective
privacy expectations are transmuted into interests entitled to
legal protection.
The obvious and correct answer is that under Harlan's test,
society's privacy conventions provide the identifying criterion
for the interests entitled to legal protection. But while correct,
this simply reminds us of the premise underlying Harlan's test.'57
It does not tell us why this premise should be adopted. In
particular, it does not tell us why courts ought to honor social
conventions when considering privacy interests. To tackle this
more difficult issue, we must examine the nature of privacy
conventions and consider how they can generate interests
entitled to constitutional protection. In speaking of privacy, we
are concerned with a special kind of convention. Some
conventions originate in, or at least are deeply dependent on,
government sponsorship (think, for example, about patriotism).
Others, however, have origins that can be traced neither to
government sponsorship nor to formal agreement among
laypersons. These conventions, we can say, are spontaneously
generated.'58
The system of privacy is an instance of this, though hardly
the only such instance. For another case in point, consider
queuing conventions, which have already been discussed. No
government directive established queuing as a formula for
allocating spaces at public events. Nor does there seem to have
been a point in time when people deliberated about space-
This is not to say, of course, that it is easy to identify privacy conventions. For an
example of an ad hoc, unpromising way to identify them, see infra note 165.
15 Friedrich Hayek is the leading theorist of spontaneous order within society. In
commenting on modern society, he has remarked: "It is because it was not dependent
on organization but grew up as a spontaneous order that the structure of modern
society has attained the degree of complexity which it possesses and which far
exceeds any that could have been achieved by deliberate organization." FRIEDRICH
HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RuLEs AND ORDER 50 (1973). Hayek can
properly be faulted for having overgeneralized on this point, but his argument is
certainly helpful in thinking about the development of privacy conventions.
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allocation issues and decided it would be best to allocate them
through queuing. The term "spontaneously generated," while
perhaps not wholly satisfactory as a label, does at least remind us
that queuing conventions, like those of privacy, have emerged
through a process of social ordering that has received tacit
consent without having been the product of deliberate decision-
making. "Spontaneously generated" is thus certainly to be
preferred to "socially constructed." The latter term suggests
deliberate planning, but what characterizes privacy and other
social conventions is the absence of such planning. Privacy
conventions emerged through social processes that did not
involve careful reflection but that nonetheless won the consent
of the great majority of the population.
9
If we continue to focus on queuing for a moment, we can
begin to understand how an interest that merits legal protection
can emerge from spontaneously generated social norms. As we
have seen, the statement "I expect the people arriving after me
at the movie theater to line up behind me in the queue"
expresses a prediction and a statement of normative belief.
Does the subjective belief'become legitimate-is it transmuted
from a putative to a valid interest-merely because the
predictive statement is likely to be true? The answer to this is
clearly no-otherwise, any statement about the conventions
people are likely to honor would also become a statement about
those they ought to honor.
Rather, what is needed is the concept of a legitimate
reliance interest-the notion, in other words, that someone's
reliance on a convention is in fact justified. In the case of
queuing, one would say that the convention of allocating places
is sufficiently ingrained in current social relations and
sufficiently fair that people are entitled to rely on it in settings
where it is currently followed. The concept of legitimate
reliance thus provides the bridge to move from expectations to
(justified) interests. One cannot derive the statement that it is
legitimate to expect people to honor queuing conventions
simply from the fact that people tend to do so. At the same
time, though, it is clear that queuing conventions provide one
of the conditions necessary for the proposition that subjective
queuing expectations merit respect, for it is only when
"'For a discussion of privacy in colonial America, see DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PRIVACY
IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND (1972).
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conventions are widely followed that people can properly claim
to rely on them in their behavior.
There are two reasons why the concept of a legitimate
reliance interest is also critical to the analysis of privacy. First, it
seems reasonable to suppose that Harlan's Katz concurrence
was prompted by Stewart's statement in his opinion for the
Court that the government's eavesdropping "violated the
privacy upon which [Katz] justifiably relied while using the
telephone booth .... .16o Second, and more generally, we can
say that Harlan's appeal to expectations provides a way to
understand how social practices whose provenance lies outside
government directives can give rise to interests meriting judicial. .• 161
protection. The system of privacy hinges on a series of
16 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 351, 353 (1967).
"' See id. The Katz concurrence is adoptionist in nature: it treats privacy norms as
developing independently of, and as properly adopted by, the law. Justice Harlan
later came to doubt the wisdom of his expectations test. See United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In particular, he doubted that
expectations of privacy emerge primarily from social processes that develop
independently of legal norms. See id. "Our expectations, and the risks we assume,"
he suggested, "are in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules the
customs and values of the past and present." Id. In contrast to Harlan's adoptionist
approach in Katz, his account in White emphasizes the interaction of law and privacy
norms. See id. Harlan's interactionist approach in White is certainly plausible for some
kinds of social norms; norms about property, for example, have been shaped by
statutory and common law rules, and these rules in turn can be said to have been
formulated in light of widely held attitudes about property. For a discussion of the
subtle interaction in early English property law between social norms and formal
pronouncements of authorities, see 2 William Holdsworth, A History of English Law 54-
87 (4th ed. 1936).]. But privacy is different.
Legal rules about property are as old as the common law itself (and are also found
in the legal systems of ancient societies). See id. Rules protecting privacy, on the
other hand, developed only in the nineteenth century-and at first were placed
under headings such as implied contract and implied trust. See Samuel D. Warren
and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193, 209-10 (1890).
Indeed, it was the celebrated Warren-Brandeis article that stimulated judges invoke
privacy as a common law tort category. According to Harry Kalven, what Warren and
Brandeis wrote was perhaps "the most influential law review article of all." Harry
Kalven, Privay in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? 31 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 326, 327 (1966). In the case of privacy, then, Harlan's adoptionist approach
in Katz is more sound. The privacy conventions judges attempt to discover under the
expectations approach actually did develop in large measure without the influence of
legal rules.
Indeed, the alternative Harlan proposed in his White dissent to that which he
proposed in Katz illustrates the difficulty of trying to dispense with adoptionism when
thinking about legal norms of privacy. See White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Harlan remarked: "Since it is the task of the law to form and project, as
well as mirror and reflect, we should not, as judges, merely recite the expectations
and risks without examining the desirability of saddling them on society." Id.
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convention-based expectations as to how people will behave:
expectations about how they will respond to closed doors,
sealed envelopes, markings that something is confidential, and
so on. These are reasonable expectations in that they constitute a
widely-acknowledged basis for social interaction. Moreover,
given the Fourth Amendment's text, they are also legitimate
expectations, for failure to honor them undermines a person's
sense of security in everyday life. Thus courts must seek to
understand the conventions underlying the system of privacy
and seek to uphold these conventions in order to protect
Fourth Amendment interests.
C. THE HARLAN TEST II: METHODS OF IDENTIFYING PRIVACY
INTERESTS
Here, then, is the first step that needs to be taken in
correcting the Court's vigilance model. Privacy conventions
contribute to each person's sense of security in the conduct of
their everyday life. They assuage anxiety rather than exacerbate
it. The Court has indeed turned privacy upside down through
its emphasis on vigilance, for when privacy is at stake, people
expect (in both a normative and empirical sense) others to
exercise restraint; they do not expect them to act as snoops.
These general points are insufficient by themselves, however, to
help courts answer the intensely practical question of how to
identify privacy interests.
One way to approach this question-perhaps the one
Stewart would have followed given his "I know it when I see it"
162
approach to the definition of pornography -is to follow the
common law's case-by-case method of analysis. 63 Such analysis
Continuing, he stated that judges should "assess[ ] the nature of a particular practice
and the likely extent of its impact on the individual's sense of security [by] balanc [ing
the practice] against the utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement." Id.
Apart from the difficulties that accompany any attempt to balance incommensurable
goods, this test is flawed because it necessarily appeals to privacy conventions-to
"objectively reasonable expectations"-through its invocation of the term "sense of
security." See White, 401 U.S. at 786. For what is it that creates a sense of security with
respect to one kind of practice but not another if not social conventions? Judges can
avoid arbitrariness in their assessment of personal security only by considering social
conventions as regarding what generates security and what does not. On close
inspection, it turns out that Harlan's theory in White actually hinges on the judicial
assessment of social convention he advocated in Katz.
6' See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
"'See KARL N. LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAWTRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960).
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considers privacy claims seriatim (accepting some, rejecting
others), and eventually generalizing on the claims held to be
valid. 64 This common law method is not without its merits. To
understand how privacy conventions operate, one could argue,
it is essential to be sensitive to the subtle nuances of specific
settings-to think in terms of thick bundles of facts rather than
thin analytic principles. In developing this argument, one
could contend that the key to privacy analysis is to be found in
the factually rich details of a' given situation-in whether
someone closed a door all the way, in whether someone spoke
in a loud or soft voice, and so on.
Because no one on the Court has even discussed the
problem of how to identify privacy conventions, one can't say
that its members have actually chosen this situation-specific
approach. At most, one can say that the justices have fallen into
the habit of reasoning in this way. 165 In stepping back from it,
though, one can see that its weaknesses are greater than its
strengths. Consider first the problem of technological change.
When a technological innovation is at issue, it simply doesn't
make sense to reason from a situation-specific premise about
how society's expectations are likely to be aware of the
innovation; fewer still are likely to have reached a conclusion
about its implications for privacy.' Courts thus have to search for
patterns in current practices: they have to develop concepts that
164 For a general discussion of this method, see id. at 121-57.
161 See argument in Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000), which provides a
good example of the ad hoc form of inquiry that now prevails in privacy cases. At
stake in Bond was the lawfulness of a drug agent's handling of soft luggage by
squeezing it as he walked down the aisle of a bus loaded with passengers. Id. at 335.
Rather than reason from a general principle relevant to the case, the Court's
members argued on the basis of their own experiences about expectations of privacy
concerning luggage-squeezing. Linda Greenhou~e, Police Under a Microscope in 2
Supreme Court Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2000, at A17. Justice Breyer stated that when
he traveled by plane, people often shoved around his carry-on luggage after he had
placed in an overhead bin. Id. Responding to Breyer's point, other justices insisted
on a distinction between pushing around luggage and squeezing it to determine its
contents. Id. Justice Ginsburg remarked, "people don't take it [i.e., a piece of soft
luggage placed in an overhead storage bin] and feel it." Id. Justice Kennedy agreed,
stating that he didn't think a fellow passenger would be entitled "to start squeezing
my luggage to see what's in it." Id. For further discussion of Bond, see Linda
Greenhouse, Police Under a Microscope in 2 Supreme Court Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1,
2000, at A17. Oral argument in Bond thus began to seem like a dormitory bull-
session, with the justices drawing on personal experience to develop what Justice
Breyer, in a sarcastic dissent to the Court's opinion in the case, called "a
constitutional jurisprudence of 'squeezes."' Bond, 529 U.S. at 342.
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capture the significance of these patterns and then apply these
concepts to the innovation at issue.
Moreover, even when an innovation is not at issue, it is best
to begin by considering general patterns. Situation-specific
decision-making tends to produce biased results. If a court
makes no effort to discern the patterns underlying privacy
conventions, then that court will have little difficulty slanting its
conclusions to fit a preconceived ideological position. This
point is clearly relevant to a diagnosis of the problems with post-
Katz jurisprudence, for the Supreme Court's favorable view of
the "war on drugs" appears to have overwhelmed it in its search
for society's privacy expectations.166 Needless to say, there is a
danger lurking in the opposite approach. To begin by
identifying thin patterns underlying society's privacy
expectations and to give them ever-increasing thickness as one
comes to terms with the facts of a specific situation is to run a
different risk: it is to risk missing the judgments of degree that
inform conclusions about privacy claims. This risk is worth
taking, however, given the even greater risk associated with the
alternative. In what follows, I thus analyze the general structure
of privacy conventions. In particular, I concentrate on privacy's
function in protecting personal vulnerability.
166 See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 636 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The [Court's] acceptance of dragnet blood and urine
testing ensures that the first, and worst, casualty of the war on drugs will be the
precious liberties of our citizens.") Even if the Court were not predisposed to favor
the war on drugs over the Fourth Amendment, serious difficulties might arise with an
inductive, case-by-case approach to the identification of privacy expectations. Such
an approach could well produce an incoherent, patchwork privacy doctrine, one that
reflects contemporary attitudes but that lacks underlying unity. This is just the
danger that would emerge if courts were to give normative significance to polling
data about privacy expectations. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph Schumacher,
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical
Look at "Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42 DuKE LJ. 727 (1993). In
surveying members of the public, Slobogin and Schumacher asked subjects to rank 50
different kinds of interventions in terms of their intrusiveness on privacy. Id. at 738-
39. Topping their list (as most intrusive) were body cavity searches; at the bottom
were searches of foliage in public parks. Id. But interesting as these results are, they
do not hold out the promise of a coherent body of privacy doctrine. In particular,
they hold out no promise of guidance for technological innovations yet to be
produced. By contrast, the coherence method advocated here, which starts with a
unifying theme in privacy conventions (concern about personal vulnerability), and
considers how that theme is manifested in specific settings, does hold out the
prospect of a unified body of legal doctrine.
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D. THE FEATURES OF A VALID PRIVACY CLAIM
When we think about privacy, we are concerned with an
exclusionary practice-that is, we are concerned with a practice
that distinguishes between insiders and outsiders and accords
an advantaged position to the former vis-a-vis the latter. Privacy
is, of course, only one of many exclusionary practices. 16 7 There
are two ways in which privacy is different for other exclusionary
practices: (1) The way in which privacy is achieved; and (2) The
social function of privacy. Privacy is achieved by nonexposure-
that is, by an insider denying outsiders sensory access to what
she withholds from them. "Nonexposure" is an awkward word,
yet it is essential because it captures an important feature of
privacy. The term "privacy" is not the converse of the term
"publicity." There is a middle ground between active efforts to
achieve privacy and active efforts to publicize, and that middle
ground is a domain in which someone cannot validly claim
privacy.
Think, for example, about the placement of a relatively
unimportant object in a setting where members of the public
are likely to notice it in the course of their routine activities. If
someone leaves her sunglasses in the back seat of a car she has
parked on a city street, one would not say that she has made an
effort to publicize the sunglasses. On the other hand, one
would not say that she has made an effort to ensure the privacy
of the sunglasses. Because the sunglasses are exposed to
members of the public using the sidewalk, one would have to
conclude that their owner does not have a privacy interest in
them. 168
"' See, for example, Blackstone's characterization of property as "that sole and
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of
the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe." 2
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
"' The Supreme Court's first Amendment jurisprudence concerning public and
private figures provides a helpful contrast here. As a general rule, the Court has
stated, "public figures . . . thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved." Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). The Court has recognized exceptions
to this, noting that it is "possible for someone to become a public figure through no
purposeful action of his own." Id. It has emphasized, however, that "instances of truly
involuntary public figures must be exceedingly rare." Id The contrast with privacy is
quite clear, then. Privacy must be sought; if someone fails to take the precautionary
steps that ensure nonexposure, that failure can result in public consciousness of an
object or information and consenquently in loss of privacy. On the other hand, in
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What about the reverse, then? Can it be said that someone
achieves-or at least takes an important step toward achieving-
privacy by ensuring that an object is not exposed to people as
they go about their daily activities? This is the question Justice
Stewart avoided in Katz v. United States.1 6
9 He could, and should,
have addressed it, however, for it is clear that someone partially
fulfills the conditions of a valid privacy claim by taking steps to
ensure that an object or information he wishes to withhold from
others is substantially not exposed to them. The word
"substantially" is essential here. That privacy claims do not
require full nonexposure is made clear by everyday experience.
Consider, for example, the arrangement of door stalls in
public restrooms. In the typical restroom, closing the door to a
toilet stall does not wholly limit exposure of the person to those
outside. Someone standing outside a stall can still peer through
the slit that remains between the closed door and the beam to
which it can be bolted. Does this mean that privacy conventions
do not protect the person inside? Certainly not. In closing the
door to a bathroom stall, the person using it achieves substantial
nonexposure. A person standing outside is expected to grasp
the significance of the closed door. While that person may still
be motivated to look inside, she would not be able to do so.170
Stated more generally, the nonexposure condition holds that
the first identifying element of a privacy claim is met whenever
it is clear an outsider would be unlikely to happen upon an
object or information while ?resent in a place members of the
public are entitled to occupy.
Substantial nonexposure is insufficient, however, to
establish a valid claim. If it were sufficient, an individual could
claim a privacy interest in anything she takes steps to avoid
most instances someone becomes a public figure only by seeking to become one.
Only in the rare case will publicity be thrust upon someone.
169 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) ("What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected.") (emphasis added). Stewart thus never commented on
what is constitutionally protected given his nonexposure criterion. See id
70 See Lorenzano v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626, 636 (1973) ("There is no
requirement that a person 'enclose himself in a light-tight, air proof box.'); see also
ERVING GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES: NOTES ON THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF
GATHERINGS 151-52 (1963) (distinguishing "conventional situational closure" from
actual physical closure).
' ' See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
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exposing to others. Social conventions clearly do not support so
broad a conception of privacy. Two contrasting scenarios help
to underscore the importance of this point. Consider first a
scenario in which someone receives a letter while visiting
friends. The recipient of the letter opens the envelope, reads
the letter, reacts with astonishment to its contents, carefully
replaces it in its envelope, and then slips the envelope back in
his pocket, saying nothing to those around him about its
contents. Now consider a different scenario. While playing a
game of poker, someone picks up the cards dealt her, inspects
them, and holds them close to her chest, saying nothing to
those in the room about the contents of the cards. Each
scenario has important points in common. Each involves an
insider/outsider relationship. Furthermore, people take on the
status of outsiders in each instance by virtue of a person's effort
to avoid exposing something to them.
But of course there is an important difference as well. For a
poker player, efforts to exclude outsiders further only a strategic
interest. By contrast, the exclusionary strategy followed in the
letter-scenario involves a more substantial interest, one that is
characteristic of privacy claims. At stake in such a setting is an
individual's sense of personal vulnerability to others. At stake,
in other words, are the embarrassment, anxiety, and distress
people experience on having key features of their lives
involuntarily revealed to outsiders. 7 ' Clearly, the letter-writing
scenario involves a privacy interest; equally clearly, the poker-
game scenario does not.
Given the contrast between the two scenarios, it is
reasonable to conclude that the special power associated with
the word "privacy" is based on the term's connection to the
protection of matters involving personal vulnerability. One
would abuse the word were one to say that a poker player has a
privacy interest in the contents of her cards. By contrast, one
would use it properly were one to say that a person reading a
letter has a privacy interest in its contents. There's no reason,
of course, why "privacy," one of the many terms concerned with
nonexposure strategies, should be connected with the
172 A college applicant has captured this sense of vulnerability in speaking of the
embarrassment she felt if people examined even the return address envelopes of the
colleges sending her letters of admission and rejection. SeeJohanna Winant, Me and
My Mailbox, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2000, at A21 ("Waiting for the college letters is easier
in privacy.").
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protection of personal vulnerability. But some term must have
this connection-that is, some term is needed to emphasize the
high seriousness associated with shielding people from
unwanted revelations of personal matters to others.
It is because of privacy's connection to personal
vulnerability that outsiders are expected to exercise forbearance
when encountering it. Put differently, we can say that privacy
conventions define the circumstances in which outsiders are
expected to exercise restraint in order to spare insiders the
embarrassment that comes with the involuntary revelation of
matters related to personal life. The Court's fundamental error
in its post-Katz jurisprudence is traceable to its failure to grasp
privacy's social function. Vigilance expectations do indeed
prevail in certain settings; they simply do not prevail in settings
where personal vulnerability might be affected. When
something less important is at stake-for example, when all that
matters is winning or losing a card game-then vigilance is the
norm. A similar point can be made about corporate trade
secrets. An expectation of vigilance prevails for such secrets
because the vulnerability at stake is commercial, not personal.'73
It is only because personal vulnerability involves interests of a
higher order that the more stringent standard of forbearance
defines social conduct.
The forbearance expectation does not, of course, mean that
privacy can never be invaded. One must make allowance for the
fact that people sometimes employ nonexposure strategies in
order to make it seem as if personal vulnerability is at stake
when it is not. Indeed, Fourth Amendment case law is rife with
examples of people who have invoked the trappings of privacy
to carry out schemes harmful to others.'74 But while the
'7' A similar point can be made about vigilance expectations in sports: "Orlando
Hernandez and the new Yankee Roger Clemens are sharing secret information about
pitching that Hernandez cannot relate. This is like war, Hernandez explains through
an interpreter, and of course you cannot share war secrets." Buster Olney, A Habit
Yanks Can't Seem to Shake, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1999, at D2.
174 Modern case law, for example, has often been concerned with settings in which
people turn their homes-while invoking the trappings of residential privacy-into
business centers for assembling and selling narcotics. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter,
525 U.S. 83 (1998); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); United States v.
Lewis, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) ("[W]hen, as here, the home is converted into a
commercial center to which outsiders are invited for purposes of transacting unlawful
business, that business is entitled to no greater sanctity than it if were carried on in a
store, a garage, a car, or on the street.").
2001]
WILLJAM C. HEFE-ERNAN
forbearance model doesn't require absolute protection for
privacy, it does require that an outsider grant insiders
considerable leeway in settings where privacy might be at stake.
It requires, at a minimum, that people avoid prying and
snooping in such settings. Summarizing the points just made,
we can say that someone in the ex ante--an outsider not privy to
the conduct of an insider-is expected to exercise forbearance
in a setting where a substantial degree of nonexposure can
reasonably be supposed to signal an interest in protecting
personal vulnerability.
These remarks provide a general framework for thinking
about privacy. Let us now expand on the framework by
considering key issues related to it: the different types of
privacy, the possibility of interpersonal privacy, and the signals
people use to communicate an interest in privacy.
1. The Different Types of Privacy: Privacy of the Person
and Informational Privacy
The paradigmatic privacy claim has to do with the body, in
particular with limiting access to one's sexual organs.75 Why
people invest this issue with such importance is not entirely
clear. The likeliest explanation is that cultural taboos have
developed about sex, although it is possible something
instinctive is at stake. 76  But the source of this sense of
vulnerability is not critical here. What matters for purposes of
privacy analysis is that most people in our culture experience
feelings of embarrassment, distress, and anxiety about the
involuntary revelation of their sexual organs.177
17' Thomas Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233, 266 (1977)
('[Wh]atever the sources of its normative commitments, must take the body as its first
and most basic reference.") Elsewhere, Gerety states that privacy should be defined
as "an autonomy or control over the intimacies of personal identity." 1d. at 236.
'76 See NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIvLIZING PROcESs: THE HISTORY OF MANNERS 134
(1978). Elias has argued that during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, many
acts that were once viewed as public-wiping one's nose, defecation, and lovemaking,
for example-came to be considered private. As he puts it, there was a "notable rise
of the shame threshold" during this epoch. Id.
177 In commenting on mores in the Middle Ages, Norbert Elias has remarked on a
general "unconcern in showing the naked body .. " NORBERT ELIAS, THE CIVILIZING
PROCESS: THE HISTORY OF MANNERS 164 (1978). "This unconcern disappears," Elias
argued, "slowly in the sixteenth and more rapidly in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and
nineteenth centuries, first in the upper classes and much more slowly in the lower."
Id,
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The distinction between privacy of the person and
informational privacy is made clear by the fact that someone
can feel vulnerable about exposing her body to outsiders even
when outsiders have detailed information about it. Think, for
example, about a doctor who has just completed an
examination of the scars on someone's thighs. If informational
privacy were all that mattered to the patient, one would not
expect her to dress before conferring with the doctor about
remedies for her problem. That most patients decide to dress
on such occasions is an indication of the importance people
accord privacy of the person when it stands 
alone as a value.'
7
Informational privacy can also stand alone. Indeed,
although there are many occasions when informational privacy
and privacy of the person converge, informational privacy's
special significance is discernible in those settings when it has
no connection to privacy of the person. For example, when
someone leaves her home, she can still have an interest in
limiting access to the material she left behind-an
informational interest, in other words, that the traveler can
assert independently of her interest in limiting access to her
person.
2. Interpersonal Privacy: Symmetrical
and Asymmetrical Relationships
In thinking about privacy, one tends to focus first on the
protection it offers the solitary individual. In the classic setting,
an individual is the sole insider, someone who has taken steps to
ensure that important objects (perhaps his body, perhaps
something else) or information are not exposed to any outsider.
Familiar examples include closing the door to a room (privacy
of the person) or making a diary entry (informational privacy).
78 A parallel pattern can be found in a newspaper interview conducted with an
advocate of public nudity. See Sarah Lyall, Godiva Outstripped: A Global Call to Peel It Off,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2001, at A4. In trying to promote the cause of public nudity,
Vincent Bethell, an artist from Coventry, England, has founded an organization,
Freedom to Be Yourself, and even started a website. See id. He has also been
subjected to numerous arrests and, on at least one occasion, argued, while completely
naked, successfully before a jury for his acquittal on charges of being a public
nuisance. See id. Nonetheless, Bethell wears clothes while granting interviews to
newspaper reporters. See id. "Mr. Bethell takes his campaign seriously," one reporter
remarked, "even if he does not walk around unclothed all the time. He was not
naked, for instance, during a recent interview at home in Coventry-which,
coincidentally, was the scene of Lady Godiva's ride." Id.
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Here, then, is the public in its simplest form-the public is
everyone except the person who has taken steps to avoid
exposing something to all others.
But what if a small group of people-a married couple, for
instance, or a circle of friends-seeks privacy from the world?
Or what if someone confides information on the basis of a
special-purpose relationship with, say, a doctor or a
psychotherapist? Settings such as these involve interpersonal
privacy, not the privacy of one person vis-;k-vis the world.
Everyday conventions make allowance for circles of privacy such
as these. Indeed, the points already made about privacy of the
individual are relevant to small-group bonds as well. In
considering interpersonal privacy, we will be able to draw on the
distinction already developed between privacy of the person and
informational privacy. Moreover, we will find further
confirmation of the argument that privacy's social function is to
protect personal vulnerability.
Interpersonal privacy is possible in both symmetrical and
asymmetrical relationships. Consider first the negotiation
process that underlies the creation of small-group ties. Adults
establish bonds with one another through a delicate process of
exchange, one that can escalate from acquaintanceship to
friendship, and from friendship to intimacy. These can be
classified as "symmetrical relationships" because the defining
feature of each is reciprocal revelation and a corresponding
growth of trust. Sexual relationships involve two simultaneous
exchanges: an exchange of access to the person and a parallel
exchange of confidences. In friendship, there isn't the same
kind of access to the other's person, though the exchange of
confidences can be just as intense. Trust is established by each
side's not exposing delicate information to outsiders. Rarely are
formal agreements reached about what can be revealed.
Rather, people establish trust over time by not revealing
confidences exchanged, thereby laying the foundations for
further exchanges. Distinctions between different types of
symmetrical relationships are drawn in Table 2. The contrast
between symmetrical and asymmetrical relationships is easy to
state: the former are marked by reciprocal, the latter by one-
sided, revelation. Because people usually feel vulnerable about
making one-sided revelations, many asymmetrical
relationships-for example, those between doctors and patients,
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TABLE 2.































Characteristics of asymmetrical relationships:
Revelation of facts and sometimes of private parts of the body without corresponding
revelation by other person.
Power derived from (1) asymmetrical access to body and/or (2) asymmetrical possession of
information about the person making revelations.
Characteristics of symmetrical relationships:
Initial acceptance of forbearance: relationship predicated on each party's willingness to make
revelations to one another.
Negotiated revelations-of information and body-grounded in principle of exchange, thus
allowing for upward spiral of intimacy.
and lawyers and clients-are safeguarded by legal prohibitions
against the disclosure of confidences. Many asymmetrical
relationships are thus special-purpose in nature. People reveal








they hope to receive from professionals. 179 In this sense, there is
a quid pro quo arrangement discernible in client-professional
relationships. At the same time, one must note that, even when
safeguards against revelation to outsiders are in place, the one-
sidedness of a client-professional relationship confers
substantial power on the latter over the former. A patient
exposes his body to a doctor, but the doctor of course does not
reciprocate. A patient discusses her life's crises with a
psychotherapist, but no reciprocation is provided. The relative
standing of the parties is defined by this asymmetry.
3. Asymmetry in Surveillance Relationships
When asymmetrical relationships are not protected by legal
prohibitions against disclosure, they loom as ominous and
frightening to those under observation. Three types of
relationships fitting this description are mentioned in Table 2:
one having to do with the police, another with the press, and a
third with prison officials. Because the police are the subject of
this Article, let us turn for a moment to their closest analogue,
the press. Like the police, journalists are subject to legal
restrictions that require them to respect the privacy of others."'
One misunderstands the nature of the press, however, if one
focuses solely on such formal restrictions, for the press, like the
police, are occupationally committed to gaining information
through asymmetrical relationships with members of the public.
It is the highly atypical member of the public who follows
people about in the streets or who hangs around doorsteps in
"' The most telling example of this in modern life is to be found in the patient-
psychotherapist relationship. It is an axiom of psychotherapy that the therapist is not
to inject herself into the relationship with a client. A client discusses his anxieties in
the absence of reciprocal revelation by the therapist. The Court has upheld a client-
psychotherapist privilege through its interpretration of Rule 501 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996) ("Effective psychotherapy...
depends upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing
to make a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears.")
For a discussion of evidentiary privileges in other asymmetrical relationships, see 8
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, Chaps. 82 (Attorney-Client), 86 (Physician-Patient), and 87
(Priest-Penitent) (Walter Reiser ed. 1991).
"' These rules are sometimes place-based. Consider, for example, the conclusion
of the California Supreme Court that the secret placement of television cameras in a
workplace not open to the general public is an invasion of privacy. Sanders v.
American Broadcasting Companies., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909 (1999). The rules can also
incorporate a concern with social roles, in particular, with whether someone has
sought a public role for himself. SeeTime, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
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the hope of gleaning information about someone who leaves
her home. For the press (and the police), on the other hand,
this is part of their job. While legally placed in the same
position as members of the public in terms of what they can
observe, journalists in fact use the resources of their
organizations to carry out operations few individual members of
the public are able to execute.81
Now consider prison life. The Supreme Court has held that
inmates have no constitutionally protected privacy interests in
the contents of their cells. 82  Assuming for purposes of
discussion that this is a correct analysis of the Fourth
Amendment, we can say that prison life stands in direct contrast
with life outside, a contrast far more dramatic than the one that
prevails in relations between the press and the public. The
degradations of the prison-strip searches, random inspections
of inmates' cells, pervasive telephone surveillance-define the
polar opposite of everyday privacy expectations. Within prisons,
corrections officers affirm their power over inmates by imposing
on them a condition of permanent, asymmetrical exposure.
Given the numerous published accounts of the demeaning side
effects of this condition,'84 it is reasonable to conclude that
when asymmetry is subject to no legal standards, it confers on
the nondisclosing party a debilitating power over those living in
the condition of compelled exposure.
4. The "What" and "How" of Privacy Analysis: Conventional and
Idiosyncratic Sources of Personal Vulnerability
We have concentrated so far on the connection between
privacy and different types of interpersonal relationships. Let
181 Indeed, journalists avail themselves of exactly the same surveillance techniques
and expensive resources used by the police. Compare the helicopter surveillance by
reporters for THE NATIONAL ENQUIRER of the backyard of actor Carroll O'Connor
(discussed in JEANNETTE WALLS, DISH: THE INSIDE STORY ON THE WORLD OF GossiP 171
(2000)), with the Court's endorsement of the same technique for police surveillance
in Florida v. Reilly, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
182 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
183 See, e.g., GRESHAM SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A MAXIMUM
SECURITY PRISON 41 (1958) ("The most striking fact about this bureaucracy of
custodians is its unparalleled position of power vis-A-vis the body of men which it rules
and from it is supposed to extract compliance.")
84 See, e.g., JACK HENRY ABBOTt, IN THE BELLY OF THE BEAST (1981); PAUL
LIBERATORE, THE ROAD TO HELL: THE TRUE STORY OF GEORGE JACKSON, STEPHEN
BINGHAM, AND THE SAN QUENTIN MASSACRE (1996); STEVEN LINScOTr, MAXIMUM
SECURITY (1994); PETERREMICK, IN CONSTANTFEAR (1975).
2001]
WILLIAM C. HEFERNAN
us now consider the "what" and the "how" of privacy: what it is
that social conventions designate as private; and how a person
can avail herself of signals that convey an interest in privacy.
The "what" of privacy analysis is easily defined. In a given
society, matters are classified as private when their involuntary
exposure is likely to engender a sense of vulnerability to
others.185 This conventionalist account is consistent with the
analysis, provided earlier, of Harlan's reasonable expectations
test. On this account, nothing is intrinsically private. Indeed,
this approach allows for the possibility of changes over time in
the sources of personal vulnerability. Less than a hundred years
ago, ladies experienced anxiety over the involuntary exposure
of their legs. 186 Today, few women do. Even in contemporary
society, people experience anxiety over the involuntary
exposure of their genitals. Other matters that are strongly
private (in that people feel substantial anxiety about their
involuntary exposure) include the contents of medical records
and of one's home. Matters that are weakly private (i.e., that
generate only a mild feeling of anxiety) include the contents of
cars, of the curtilage of homes, of pockets, and so on.'87
185 Some examples from the press will help illustrate that the category "personal
information" (the "what" of privacy, as I have called it) is deeply embedded in
everyday speech. Medical records, for instance, are said to contain "intimate
information." Trifling With Medical Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1997, at A30.
Financial records are viewed as "personal information." Privacy in Financial Dealings,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1999, at A24. Love letters are said to be "as private as
correspondence can be .... " Peter Applebome, Love Letters in the Wind: A Private
Affair of the Famously Anonymous Salinger, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1999, at El. All the
above examples have been drawn from one newspaper, however, an example from
another underscores the broad consensus that exists in contemporary society as to
the "what" of privacy. In speaking of a requirement that an employee take a penile
plethysmograph test to find out whether he was attracted to young boys, a reporter
for The Wall Street Journal characterized the test as a "particularly intimate" one.
Stephen J. Adler, Privacy, Techology Collide in a Dispute over an Intimate Test, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 2, 1993, at Al.
86 See BERNARD RUDOFSKY, THE UNFASHIONAB'LE HUMAN BODY 47-48 (1974) ("For
five generations legs have led a twilight existence. Only outcasts of society who lived
on the periphery of proper conduct, such as circus performers, were recognizable as
bipeds .... When female legs came in the open, it was often thought necessary to
encase them in heavy stockings, tights, or, better yet, boots .... Human ingenuity,
tempered with hypocrisy, even found ways of measuring modesty in yards and inches.
When fashion magazines published charts giving the correct length of little girls'
skirts, the yardstick superseded the etiquette book.")
187 See Stanley Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in PHILOSOPHICAL
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY 224 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1984).
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And what about matters whose involuntary exposure
generates anxiety in only a few members of society? We can call
these "idiosyncratic" sources of vulnerability. Because the
possible sources of this kind of vulnerability are infinite, the
critical point here is an individual's resort to widely understood
cues that signal to others the individual's interest in withholding
something from others. This is the "how" of privacy
expectations. Because understandings of what constitutes a cue
can vary, the key to idiosyncratic sources of vulnerability can be
found in someone's invocation of a symbol that those around
her can be expected to understand-the closed door, for
example, or the sealed envelope (to cite two examples that are
unmistakable in our culture).
That someone's anxiety is prompted by an idiosyncratic
source doesn't mean that that person's concern is any less
worthy of respect than anxiety prompted by conventional
sources. On the contrary, both sources of vulnerability receive
widespread respect, though in different ways. Because the
defining feature of conventional vulnerabilities is that many
people feel the same way about revealing something, everyday
expectations are grounded in a presumption favoring privacy on
such occasions.188 Only a modest cue is needed to secure privacy
when conventional sources of vulnerability are at stake-closing
the door to one's room, pulling down a shade, sealing an
envelope, and so on. By contrast, the opposite presumption
prevails for idiosyncratic sources of vulnerability. In our
culture, people don't expect others to feel vulnerable about,
say, revealing their legs. A person emits an unmistakable signal
that he expects privacy when he does feel vulnerable (think, for
example, about someone wearing full length pants held tight by
a strong belt during a hot day at the beach).
This account, it should be noted, builds on, while also
modifying, Harlan's two-prong test.189 It is consistent with thetest in treating social conventions as the touchstone of privacy
' An affirmative act is thus required to make it clear to outsiders that someone
wishes a stranger to consider matters conventionally classified as private. Think, for
example, about Samuel Taylor Coleridge's ancient mariner. "It is an ancient
Mariner/and he stoppeth one of three .... " SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE, THE RHYME
OF THE ANCIENT MARINER (1798). In detaining the wedding guest and pouring out his
story to him, the mariner makes clear that he doesn't want to keep private his
peculiar tale of sea-faring woe. See id.
"' See note 153 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Harlan test.
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analysis. 90  It is also consistent with Harlan's approach in
holding that privacy must be secured-in holding, in other
words, that some affirmative step (a cue, as I have called it) is
essential to gaining privacy.' 9' But it modifies the Harlan test by
focusing on two distinct sources of personal vulnerability,
conventional and idiosyncratic ones. Harlan made no effort to
distinguish between these; indeed, he did not suggest that the
occasions for experiencing personal vulnerability are among the
identifying criteria of privacy. In this respect, the analysis I have
provided serves as a corrective to the Harlan test.
5. Recapitulation
A summary of the points just made will provide an overview
of the key elements of privacy analysis. When we speak of
privacy, we are concerned with an exclusionary practice defined
by two features. One has to do with nonexposure-that is, with
a condition that makes it unlikely a member of the public will
discover an object or information by chance. The other has to
do with personal vulnerability, for it must be reasonable to
suppose in the ex ante that the condition of nonexposure has
the function of shielding someone from the distress,
embarrassment, or anxiety associated with involuntary
revelation of the object or information. Implicit in this
framework is the distinction between privacy of the person and
informational privacy. Moreover, given the framework, a
further distinction can be drawn between conventional and
idiosyncratic sources of vulnerability. One can place under the
former heading those items whose involuntary disclosure is
likely to generate a sense of embarrassment and distress in most
members of a given society. The latter heading is concerned
with those items most members of a society do not consider
private but which someone may nonetheless not wish to
disclose. Privacy cues-signals that communicate to outsiders
an insider's interest in avoiding exposure-are needed for both
sources of vulnerability. However, the signals must be stronger
when the source of personal vulnerability is idiosyncratic.
... See notes 160-61 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the significance
of convention.
" See Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967), where Harlan, in outlining his criterion for
determining whether someone has a subjective privacy expectation, says that a person
must "have exhibited an actual ... expectation of privacy .. " (emphasis added).
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It is because privacy's social function is to protect personal
vulnerability that forbearance expectations surround it. The
special power of the term "privacy" is understandable in terms
of this connection to personal vulnerability. Many exclusionary
practices besides privacy employ nonexposure strategies: people
in card games exclude their fellow players by means of
nonexposure strategies; corporations exclude competitors from
trade secrets by means of such strategies; baseball teams keep
secret their signs for hitting and base-stealing; and so on.
Vigilance is the norm in these settings precisely because
personal vulnerability is not at stake. Forbearance expectations
prevail in privacy settings because of the importance accorded
to what is not exposed.
E. A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF FORBEARANCE ON THE PART
OF OTHERS
How do forbearance expectations operate in practice? In
particular, how do they operate given the distinctions just drawn
between conventional and idiosyncratic sources of vulnerability?
A contrast with vigilance expectations will prove helpful in
answering these questions. Under the forbearance model, a
person expects others to exercise restraint, once modest efforts
have been taken to avoid exposure, concerning matters
generally understood to be private. A person similarly expects
others to exercise restraint. Under the vigilance model, a
person operates under the opposite expectation-that is, a
person expects people will want to interfere with efforts to
ensure nonexposure. Privacy expectations in everyday life are,
of course, grounded in the forbearance model-or, to be more
precise, in what I call "qualified forbearance." But the vigilance
model, while not describing privacy expectations, does indeed
capture expectations that prevail in certain settings (for
example, card games) and special-purpose institutions (prisons,
for instance). Table 3 provides an overview of the contrast.This
table is based on a double distinction: (1) A general distinction
between vigilance and forbearance models; and (2) A further
distinction between full and qualified versions of each. Under
the full vigilance model, everything is legitimately subject to
surveillance. Full vigilance makes no allowance for privacy cues,
nor does it treat anything as a private fact. Prison life provides a
helpful example of full vigilance in action.
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TABLE 3.



































Inmates' bodies, including all body cavities, are subject to
routine inspection; given officials' concern with security, even
these aspects of human anatomy are not off limits. 92 Moreover,
corrections officers accept no cues as to privacy. Indeed, if an
inmate were to use a conventional privacy signal (if, for
example, an inmate were to seal an envelope and mark it
"Personal and Confidential"), this would have the perverse
effect of subjecting the inmate's activities to more intense
scrutiny than they would otherwise receive.19 An inmate can
... See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. 541(b) (Corrections officials may conduct a visual search
where there is a reasonable belief that contraband is concealed on the person of a
prisoner or where a good opportunity for concealment has occurred.); see also Covino
v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1992) (upholding random visual body cavity searches
for prisoners in Vermont's Northwest State Correctional Facility).
193 Numerous circuit courts have held that corrections officials do not violate an
inmate's constitutional rights by opening sealed envelopes containing nonlegal
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expect privacy, then, only in the sense that she can anticipate
that certain kinds of conduct will evade scrutiny.
Qualified vigilance creates important variations to the full
vigilance model. With qualified vigilance, one encounters a
world in which people are subject to surveillance by others (in
this respect, it is similar to full vigilance), but in which they can
invoke cues that require restraint on the part of those
conducting surveillance (in this respect, it is different). If we
return to the example of a card game, we will be able to discern
the specific features of this model. The rules of poker
presuppose an environment in which the players symmetrically
observe each other but are required to exercise restraint when
encountering cues that place limits on their quest for
information. Thus, if Smith holds her cards close to her chest,
Jones can not'rip them away from her, nor can she
surreptitiously inspect them if Smith places them face down on
the table and rises to get a drink of water. But the rules offer no
protection beyond this. In particular, if a player fails to hold
her cards close enough to her chest, others can legitimately
survey her hand. And of course, there is no conception of
private facts in a poker game-a player's cards are fair game for
inspection if she fails to exercise vigilance in shielding them
from others.
Structurally, there is little difference between the world of
the gossip and that of the poker player. For a gossip, human
relations are the "playing field" in which the "game" of
information discovery is conducted. The gossip engages in
systematic surveillance of others; in turn, the gossip's subjects
must exercise constant vigilance to ward off unwanted
attention.194 The gossip acknowledges the legitimacy of privacy
cues-he doesn't open unsealed envelopes or barge through
406 (9th Cir. 1993); Smith v. Delo, 995 F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Whalen, 940 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1990).
'9' SeePATRICIAMEYERSPAcKS, GossiP 11 (1985):
Gossip, even when it avoids the sexual, bears about it a faint flavor of the erotic. (Of
course, sexual activities and emotions supply the most familiar staple of gossip-as of the
Western realistic novel.) The atmosphere of erotic titillation suggests gossip's implicit
voyeurism. Surely everyone feels-although some suppress-the same prurient interest in
others' privacies, what goes on behind closed doors. Poring over fragments of others
people's lives, peeing into their bedrooms when they don't know we're there, we thrill to




closed doors, for example. But when a person's invocation of a
cue indicates that a 'juicy" fact is being withheld from others,
that cue simply prompts the gossip to look for other means of
discovering the withheld information. The gossip looks for that
information because he believes it will be about an individual's
vulnerability. For the gossip, there are no private facts-no facts
that require restraint. Instead, private facts, like privacy cues,
are bait for the gossip; they are exactly what the gossip's
surveillance is designed to uncover."'
Clearly, there are many important parallels between this
model and the Court's analysis of privacy. The Court
acknowledges that in everyday life each person has an interest• .• 196
in shielding matters from others' inspection. But the Court
analyzes this interest narrowly, in effect reasoning as if there are
small islands of privacy in an otherwise huge sea of
surveillance.'97 Its approach to privacy cues follows from this.
While recognizing that people can legitimately take steps to
ensure that objects and information are not exposed to others,
the Court insists, as would a gossip or a card player, on
complete nonexposure.' 98 Thus, a person's failure to achieve
complete nonexposure-for example, his failure to place a
piece of corrugated roofing on his otherwise completely
enclosed backyard'9-means that the person has no privacy
interest in the objects she wishes to conceal. In fact, the Court
sanctions police attempts to determine just what it is people
have unmistakably signaled they wish to conceal. °° The Court
has routinely rejected claims about private facts. It has refused,
See WAUS, supra note 181, at 9.
196 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) ("One who occupies [a booth],
shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely
entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast
to the world.")
197 This point is particularly clear in the aerial surveillance cases. There can be no
certainty that either Ciraolo or Riley "knowingly exposed" their backyards to the
public (the criterion for not securing privacy adopted in Katz, 389 U.S. at 351). In
each instance, the defendants took steps to make sure passersby at the street level
could not inspect the contents of their yards, and Riley took the further step of
covering most of his greenhouse with corrugated roofing. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209,
and Riley, 488 U.S. at 448. It seems quite possible, then, that Ciraolo and Riley
inadvertently exposed the contents of their yards to members of the public engaged in
aerial surveillance.
'9' See infra notes 296-310 and accompanying text.
See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989).
211 See infra notes 296-310 and accompanying text.
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for example, to acknowledge that people in our society feel a
sense of vulnerability to others when their bank records are
involuntarily disclosed to outsiders. °1
If privacy had no special function-if the protection of
personal vulnerability were of no greater urgency than the
protection of information in a card game-it would make good
sense to say that privacy expectations are grounded in vigilance.
It is because privacy does indeed have a unique social function
that the more stringent expectations associated with qualified
forbearance have developed for the conduct of personal life.
The general principle underlying qualified forbearance is one
of restraint in one's dealings with others. This principle can be
stated in terms of a presumption against the sustained,
uninvited interest in the lives of others. Consistent with this
presumption are two specific rules of forbearance: (1) The rule
to respect the conventional sources of personal vulnerability;
and (2) The rule to respect the idiosyncratic sources of personal
vulnerability.
Restraint is required when it is reasonably clear to an
outsider in the ex ante that care has been taken to avoid the
exposure of objects or information whose involuntary disclosure
generates a feeling of vulnerability to others among most
members of a given society. When it appears that conventional
sources of vulnerability are at stake, an outsider must ascertain
that an insider has affirmatively indicated her willingness to
disclose them. Restraint is also required when privacy cues are
employed as signals for objects or information that do not
normally generate a sense of vulnerability for others. A cue
having been used, outsiders must view it as interdicting access to
the object or information; they must also honor the cue by not
trying to gain access to the item by some other means.
Taken together, the general presumption in favor of
restraint and the specific rules of forbearance define the
underlying structure of the privacy expectations that prevail in
everyday life. They do not offer full protection for privacy.
Rather, they strike a balance, one that imposes on privacy-
seekers the modest burden of signaling a desire for privacy
while imposing on outsiders a burden of restraint once it seems
likely a privacy interest is at stake. Two important points are
understandable in light of this balancing calculus. First,
"', See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441-43 (1976).
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because privacy conventions place a burden on those seeking it,
these conventions make allowance for the possibility of an
inadvertent loss of privacy,, either through negligence or bad
luck. But while inadvertent losses of privacy are possible under
everyday conventions, outsiders are expected not to exploit such
mishaps through sustained scrutiny of what an insider meant•• 202
not to expose to others. Thus if we think about a misplaced
wallet, we can readily agree that that owner of the wallet must
accept some loss of privacy concerning the wallet's contents if
he carelessly leaves it behind upon leaving a room. However,
once an outsider has determined who owns the wallet, the rule
enjoining respect for personal facts requires the outsider to stop
examining the wallet further and to find a way to return it to its
owner.
The second point relevant here has to do with the
distinction between the curiosity and systematic scrutiny of
others. Neither the general presumption in favor of restraint
nor the specific rules of forbearance require people to rein in
all curiosity about the world. Rather, they prohibit sustained,
uninvited surveillance of others. For example, if Smith, who
enjoys observing the world, happens to note as she walks down
the street thatJones, who hasn't pulled the blinds for the parlor
of her first floor apartment, is sobbing and wailing as she sits on
her couch, Smith can properly say to herself that she did not
interfere with Jones's privacy by noticing her behavior. At the
same time, though, privacy conventions require Smith to hold
her curiosity in check. The fact that she happened upon a
setting that piqued her interest does not provide her with
license to begin sustained surveillance to determine what is
going on. Everyday privacy expectations, we can say by way of
summary, offer people a chance to appreciate the surface of the
human comedy but prohibit them, absent invitation from the
players, to penetrate the comedy's details.
202 See Eleena de Lisser, Hearing and Seeing Business Travel Blab and Laptop Lapses,
WALL ST.J. Nov. 8, 1999, at Al:
Steven Bennett was pecking away on his laptop on a flight from San Francisco when he
sensed another pair of eyes intently looking at his computer screen. Mr. Bennett, a media
consultant in Cambridge, Mass., has experienced this before. So, he swung into action.
With just a few keystrokes, Mr. Bennett opened a filed called READTHIS.Doc. Up popped
a single sentence: 'If you can read this, you ought to be ashamed of yourself.' The busted
traveler next to him stiffened in his seat. 'It works every time,' says Mr. Bennett, 'It's a
nice, polite two-by-four between the eyes.'
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With full forbearance, by contrast, the possibility of enjoying
any part of the human comedy is almost completely precluded.
This is because the contrasts just noted disappear-or at least
are strongly attenuated-under the full forbearance model.
Strenuous efforts are taken by outsiders to ensure that insiders
do not inadvertently lose privacy, and outsiders also act on the
assumption that there can be no legitimate curiosity in others'
activities absent an explicit, affirmative invitation 
to inquire.20 3
In this respect, the full forbearance model takes us into the
world of exquisite manners-a world of tact and restraint, a
world beyond society's everyday expectations. Privacy cues
cease to matter in this context because everything having to do
with personal life is presumed private. Correspondingly, the
domain of private facts and objects is vastly expanded, and the
threshold for discussion is raised through the requirement that
people unambiguously demonstrate their willingness to have
them discussed. There is often an element of hypocrisy in the
world of perfect manners, with people feigning a lack of
curiosity in private facts when they actually are immensely
interested in what might be discovered. Fine manners should
not be scorned, however. Although they do not define the
rougher world of everyday privacy conventions, they do remind
us that there is a realm of consideration and tact located beyond
it.
F. THE POSSIBILITY OF A ROLE DISCOUNT FOR THE POLICE:
REJECTING AN ACROSS-THE-BOARD DISCOUNT WHILE
ACCOMMODATING THE GOVERNMENT DURING EMERGENCIES
A critic of the points just made could agree with the
characterization of laypersons' privacy expectations but still
maintain that the police should not be held to them. The critic
might advance two arguments on this score. First, the critic
could argue for an across-the-board discount for the police from
lay expectations. Second, the critic might make a more modest
claim, contending that a discount is appropriate in emergency
settings. The broader claim is without merit, I shall maintain,
103 See EUZABETH L. POST, EMILY POST'S ETQUETTE 90 (15th ed. 1992). Consider
Emily Post's rules about contact with the handicapped. See id, First, "NEVER stare or
indicate that you are conscious that the person is different from others in any way."
Id. Second, "never... ask personal questions of one with an obvious disability." Id.
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while the narrower one can be sustained, though only in
substantially modified form.
Consider first the argument for an across-the-board
discount. Although the Court has spoken in terms of laypersons'
privacy expectations, it has reasoned in terms of a police discount
from these. The results, the critic could suggest, have thus been
sound; the only problem is that the Court has failed to argue
candidly for its conclusions. In openly declaring its position,
the Court would reject the prospect of a full discount from lay
expectations. It would, however, provide a partial one-that is,
it would openly exempt them from the more stringent
expectations of everyday life but would still proscribe egregious
conduct. Because this is exactly the line the Court has already
been pursuing, all that now needs to be done, the critic could
maintain, is to muster the courage to acknowledge its position
candidly.
This argument is deeply flawed, both as a matter of
prudence and of principle. The consideration of prudence is
easy to grasp. As noted earlier, the police stand in an
asymmetrical relationship with the public: they scrutinize
individuals, but they are not subject to comparable scrutiny in
return. Moreover, as also noted, the police devote vast
resources-in manpower (stakeouts and tailing, for example)
and equipment (infrared devices, eavesdropping
paraphernalia) -to the systematic scrutiny of members of the
public. Even when the layperson baseline is used, then, the
difference between police resources and those of most
laypersons means that the police can subject people to far more
surveillance than can virtually any other organization in
contemporary society (with the press a somewhat distant
second). And if the layperson baseline occasions concern given
current police resources, deeper disquiet is appropriate if the
police receive a discount from this baseline. Indeed, from the
standpoint of prudence, an across-the-board discount appears
to be the height of folly. Rules that hold the police to the
layperson baseline pose danger enough given the special
resources available to them. To grant the police a discount in
all times and places from this baseline is to court disaster.
This, of course, is simply an argument (though a powerful
one) from prudence. There is, however, a quite different
argument-one based on principle-that explains why the
current, unacknowledged, across-the-board discount should be
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rejected. As noted in the first section of this Article, courts
follow a two-step process of inquiry in assessing Fourth
Amendment claims."' 4 Courts first ask whether the police have
violated an interest the Amendment protects.
5 If the answer to
this question is negative, no further inquiry is needed.
2
06 If
positive, then courts further ask whether the police activity was
reasonable (whether, for example, an officer had probable
cause to arrest). 207 The distinction between the two steps is
critical. The first involves a norm of general application,
applicable to both government officials and the public.
0 8 The
judicial inquiry into privacy interests begins with an
examination of the expectations that prevail generally in social
life. °9 Courts also begin their inquiries into property and liberty
interests with an analysis of norms of general application.
It is in the second stage of analysis that the police receive a
role discount.21' Consider electronic surveillance, for example.
Laypersons are legally barred from interfering with privacy
interests by conducting electronic surveillance of other people's
phone conversations. The police, by contrast, are authorized
to do so upon obtaining a court order 2 3-and the police further
possess qualified immunity against tort suits when they act
pursuant to an order's conditions. 4 Think also about the
discount accorded the police with respect to liberty and
property interests. A citizen's arrest for a felony is legally
justified if the arrestee actually committed the felony for which
he is arrested or if, a felony having occurred, the citizen
carrying out the arrest has reasonable grounds to suspect the
arrestee actually committed that crime.2' By contrast, an officer
can justify a felony arrest on the basis of probable cause-and




'0' See the Jacobsen passages cited supra in Table 1. In each, the Court invokes a
norm of general application.
210 Id
"2' That is, they are subjected to a more lenient standard than the one imposed on
members of the public.
212 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1) (a) (2000).
2,2 See 18 U.S.C. §2516 (1) (2000).
214 SeeMalley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
211 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 2d, § 119(a)-(b).
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provided probable cause is present, is immune from civil
liability even if it turns out no felony was actually committed.2 6
Thus, the special nature of the police role is already taken into
account in the second stage of inquiry. To include it in the first
as well would introduce a spurious form of double-counting into
the Fourth Amendment calculus.
The points just made provide a framework for determining
what is, and is not, plausible about an argument for reducing
privacy during times of emergency. What courts should not do
is discount privacy interests themselves. Indeed, for the reasons
just stated, this is wholly unnecessary. Given the reasonableness
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, the approach courts
should take during times of emergency is not to discount
privacy interests but to give greater weight to public security,
thereby recalibrating the balance between government and
individual interests. This approach avoids the devaluation of
privacy interests. While the weight of privacy interests remains
constant, those interests are simply eclipsed by the increased
urgency of public security. This approach also promotes candor
in judicial opinions, requiring courts to focus directly on the
factors that justify a recalibration.
Although the Court has tended to discount privacy interests
in almost all its opinions, it has, on the specific question of how
to respond to pressing emergencies, taken the recalibration
approach advocated above. For example, in Camara v.
Municipal Court, the Court remarked, when considering how to
weigh factors on the government side of the reasonableness
equation, that "the public interest demands that all dangerous
conditions be prevented or abated." '217 Moreover, in numerous
opinions considering the permissibility of government
intrusions not based on particularized suspicion, the Court has
distinguished carefully between settings in which "ordinary
criminal wrongdoing" is under investigation (particularized
suspicion always required) and settings in which a "special
governmental need beyond the normal need for law
enforcement" requires immediate action (particularized
suspicion not required if dispensing with it is reasonably related
" See id. at §121. The common law origins of the special protection of police
officers are discussed in Horace Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 673
(1924).
217 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
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to solving the problem)."' Thus, under the Court's analysis,
when there is a substantial, immediate hazard unrelated to
ordinary criminal wrongdoing, the reasonableness inquiry is
recalculated. This approach makes it necessary for government
officials to identify an emergency and to explain why their
disregard of particularized suspicion will help to address that
emergency.
Inevitably, we must ask what counts as an emergency? The
question is by no means an easy one, but certainly a paradigm
case of a national emergency is to be found in the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. This emergency had the
following characteristics: (1) There was no doubt that some
people were willing to inflict mass death on innocent American
civilians; (2) Particularized suspicion of those willing to carry
out terrorist schemes was frequently unavailable; and (3)
Confined public spaces essential to modern life-bridges and
tunnels, for example, as well as public conveyances-provided
particularly inviting targets for terrorists. Under such
circumstances, it was reasonable for the police to dispense with
particularized suspicion and to conduct random searches that
would ordinarily be impermissible. 220 The Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness requirement allows for this kind of flexibility.22'
In using it, courts need not discount privacy interests but
"' See also Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449-50(1990); U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 561-64 (1976). Compare City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-42
(2000) (discussing ordinary criminal wrongdoing), with Treasury Employees v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989) (discussing special governmental needs beyond the
normal need for law enforcement.
'19 See David Wessel, A Pivot Point in American Life, WALL ST. J, Oct. 4, 2001 at AI:
Before Sept. 11, Americans worried about the growing capacity of government and
business to use technology to instantly retrieve and share intimate details of our lives.
When the Department of Health and Human Services was drafting new privacy rules for
medical records last year, it got 52,000 comments. Today, concern about privacy is
displaced by concern about security. At Tyler's airport [in Tyler, Texas], the screeners
open every carry-on bag and examine every crevice. But no one complains, even silently
about exposing dirty underwear in a public place.
Mr. Wessel's comments on the change in public attitudes are perceptive. It seems
unlikely that the concern with privacy he notes with respect to medical records and
technology in general will simply disappear.
"o See Justice O'Connor's remarks, cited in note 17 supra, for an indication of the
way in which currentjustices may be willing to rethink fourth amendment doctrine in
light of the terrorist attacks on the United States.
"' See the Court's analysis of reasonableness in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 537 (1967).
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instead revalue, as circumstances require, the public's interest
in security. In the remainder of this essay, my discussion will
assume that an emergency does not justify the overriding of
privacy interests. My remarks here serve as a reminder that this
justification will not always be the case.
IV. APPLYING THE FORBEARANCE MODEL
If society's core privacy expectation is forbearance with
respect to matters of personal vulnerability, then a great deal of
post-Katz privacy jurisprudence must be reassessed. The
reassessment will not, however, invariably require an expanded
version of privacy protection. As we shall see, the Court has
erred in both directions. In many instances, it has been too
stingy about privacy; in others, it has been too generous. 22 I
begin by considering the latter possibility-by considering
settings where an outsider can discern in the ex ante that no
privacy interest can possibly be at stake but where the Court has
nonetheless spoken of Fourth Amendment privacy protection. I
then turn to the reverse possibility by noting the even greater
list of settings where the Court has failed either to note the
existence of privacy interests or to accord them sufficient
weight.
A. SETTINGS WHERE PRIVACY CANNOT BE AT STAKE
Because no Court opinion has tackled the question of what
we mean by the term "privacy," numerous cases have proceeded
from the premise that an object or information is the subject of
Fourth Amendment privacy protection when it is fully shielded
from the public-at-large. We have already seen why this
premise involves a conceptual error. 24 Complete nonexposure,
as I have noted, is not essential to a valid privacy claim.225
Rather, two other factors, each of which must be discernible in
the ex ante, are essential: (1) A substantial degree of
222 For my argument that it has been too stingy, see infra Parts IV.B, IV.C; for my
argument that it has sometimes been too generous, see infra Part IV.A.
2 In the aerial surveillance cases, for example, the Court assumed that the
defendants could not claim Fourth Amendment privacy protection because they had
failed to shield their backyards completely from surveillance by airplanes and
helicopters. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445
(1989).
.2 See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
225 Id,
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nonexposure, enough to signal to an outsider that caution is
required before proceeding further; and (2) Some reason to
believe that the nonexposure is related to the protection of
personal vulnerability. When something has been fully shielded
from others, there may be a privacy interest at stake. There may
not be, however; indeed, on many occasions, it is possible to
know in the ex ante that a concealment strategy has nothing to
do with privacy.
We have already considered this point with respect to poker
games.226 The poker player, we have seen, has a strategic interest
in making sure his cards are not exposed to other players in a
game.22 ' This strategic interest is not to be confused with a
228 fct
privacy interest, however. In fact, because personal
vulnerability is not and cannot be at stake in a poker game, a
poker player operates with an expectation about the vigilance,229
not the forbearance, of others. We can now apply this point
to other settings, in particular to those in which government
agents subject corporations to surveillance.
Let us start with what the Court has gotten right in this
context-its conclusion that certain methods of penetrating
concealment don't interfere with privacy interests. The seminal
case regarding this issue is United States v. Place, where the Court
considered the constitutionality of dog-sniffs of luggage.
2 °
Suspecting that Place had narcotics in his suitcase but not
having probable cause to seize and inspect it, police at New
York's LaGuardia Airport instead detained the bag for ninety
minutes while bringing over a detection dog from nearby
Kennedy Airport.231 The dog reacted positively to the luggage,
thus providing the probable cause needed to secure a warrant
232
to search the suitcase.
The Place Court unanimously held the search to be illegal,
reasoning that the nineS-minute wait Place had had to endure
was unreasonably long. However, in dicta endorsed by six of
226 See supra p. 50.
227 i
228 i
229 See supra p. 51.
2'0 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
23' Id. at 698-99.
232 See id. at 699.
233 See id at 709-10.
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its nine members,234 the Court also stated that dog sniffs in the
absence of even reasonable suspicion do not offend the Fourth
Amendment since they do not implicate an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy.3 5 The Court assumed that a
sniff by a well-trained dog offers a highly accurate way of
determining the presence of narcotics in a concealed space. 36
Drawing on this assumption, it stated that a "sniff discloses only
the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item.
Because no one can have a privacy interest in contraband and
because the Court assumed that sniffs by well-trained dogs
accurately detect narcotics and narcotics only, such sniffs were
held to have no implications for Fourth Amendment privacy
interests.
Provided we accept the Court's premise about the accuracy
of dog sniffs, the Court's conclusion is sound. Needless to say,
the premise is open to serious challenge given the fact that even
trained dogs sometimes do produce false positives. But even if
the Court's specific premise is set aside, one can still defend a
more abstract principle arising out of Place--i.e., that all devices
which detect a certain type of contraband and only that type of
contraband are acceptable under the Fourth Amendment. Even
2" Three justices-Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall-declined to join the
Court's opinion. In two separate opinions, Justices Blackmun and Brennan noted
that it was unnecessary for the Court to consider the constitutionality of dog sniffs
under the Fourth Amendment given the holding that the police violated Place's
Fourth Amendment rights in holding his luggage for 90 minutes. 462 U.S. at 710-24..
Concurring in the judgment of the Place Court, Justice Blackmun faulted the majority
for resolving the question of whether a dog sniff implicates a privacy interest. See id.
at 723.
235 Id. at 707.
236 Id
217 Id. at 707 (emphasis added).
228 See Doe v. Renfrew, 475 F.Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979). Four years prior to
Place, for example, the Northern District of Indiana considered a case in which a
trained dog reacted positively to a teen-age girl while a dog sniff inspection was being
conducted in the girl's school. See id. at 1017-18. The dog continued to react
positively even after the girl emptied the contents of her pockets. See id. at 1024. The
girl was then required to remove all her clothes and submit to a search by two
women. See id. The search produced no evidence of contraband, and the court noted
the possibility that a dog may be responding not to contraband on a suspect but
rather to the odor of contraband on the suspect's clothes. Id. Note also the
possibility that a trained dog will react positively to luggage that previously carried
marijuana but that does not at the time of the sniff. If, for example, A, who has used
a piece of luggage to carry marijuana, sells the luggage to B, who packs it and flies on
an airplane, a trained dog might react positively to the traces of marijuana despite the
fact that none is presently contained in the luggage.
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this principle is subject to a collateral criticism, for a foolproof
device can have humiliating side effects, a point noted by critics
of dog sniffs. 39
Some detection devices have no such side-effects,
however-or at least none except those brought about either by
wrongdoing or carelessness. Think, for example, about the
clasps department stores place on unpurchased merchandise or
the computerized signals libraries use for books that have not
been checked out. Assuming these do not produce false
positives, no one can claim a privacy interest is violated when
such a device sounds an alarm. A somewhat more complicated
calculus is needed for gun detectors because people licensed to
carry concealed weapons have a legitimate privacy interest in
not revealing them. But provided a detector can be devised that
identifies only those concealed weapons people have not been
licensed to carry, this too would not implicate Fourth
Amendment privacy interests.
240
Place, of course, deals only with methods of intrusion.
241 What
about the larger question of whether one can tell in advance,
regardless of the method of intrusion to be followed, that no privacy
interest will be affected by interference with an arrangement
designed to avoid exposure to the public? The Court has
sedulously avoided this question, yet it is inescapable once one
understands that concealment is an over-inclusive category as
far as privacy is concerned. Card games have served as our
initial guide on this point. It is easy to provide other examples,
though; indeed, corporations and governments routinely rely
on concealment strategies for matters that have nothing to do
with personal vulnerability. I shall concentrate in a moment on
corporations, but it would also be helpful to consider
government efforts to ensure concealment.
239 See United States v. Place 462 U.S. 696, 721-22 (1983) (Brennan,J., concurring)
("A dog adds a new and previously unobtainable dimension to human perception.
The use of dogs ... represents a greater intrusion into an individual's privacy" than
does an electronic detection device.).
2140 See Arnold Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81
U. MicH. L. REv. 1229, 1248 (1983) ("[I]f a device could be invented that accurately
detected weapons and did not disrupt the normal movement of people, there could
be no Fourth Amendment objection to its use.") For the reasons advanced in the text,
this standard is too weak. The device would have to distinguish between concealed
weapons people are licensed to carry and those they are not licensed to carry. See id.
2'1 That is, Place is concerned with the legality of dog sniffs.
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Governments, of course, have national security interests in
concealment. The very term "national security," however,
reminds us that one would make a conceptual error if one were
to speak of a government as having a privacy interest in, say, its
military capabilities or its diplomatic initiatives. These are
matters wholly unrelated to personal vulnerability. The terms
applied to them include "Top Secret," "Secret," and
"Confidential"-but not "private."212 And of course, national
security is an area in which expectations of vigilance rather than
forbearance prevail. Governments must exercise extreme care
to make sure their national security secrets remain well-
concealed.
Similar points can be made about corporations. While the
term "privacy" is simply not used in everyday corporate speech,
corporate terminology does include the phrases "trade secrets,""proprietary information," and "strategic planning." Ignoring
these road signs from everyday language, the Court, on the
other hand, has consistently reasoned in terms of corporate and
commercial privacy.4s Moreover, it has done so while reviewing
settings in which it was clear prior to the inspections carried out
by government agents that those agents would look over
commercial and manufacturing operations but wouldn't
encounter anything remotely related to personal vulnerability.2 4
For example, in Dow Chemical v. United States, the Court was
concerned with the aerial surveillance of a chemical plant, an
activity with implications for corporate and financial, but not for
personal, vulnerability.2 45 Chief Justice Burger, however, stated
in his opinion for the Court that "Dow plainly [had] a
reasonable, legitimate, and objective expectation of privacy
within the interior of its covered buildings. Furthermore, in
an embarrassing appropriation of the rhetoric of personal
relationships, Burger even went on to discuss the possibility that
government surveillance of Dow's plant would reveal "intimate
details" of Dow's plant.2 47 In Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., where a
2 See Executive Order No. 12356, 47 F.R. 14874, 15557 (April 2, 1982) (reprinted
in supplement to 50 U.S.C. Sect. 401) (setting out classifications for national security
information "Top Secret," "Secret," and "Confidential").
211 See infra notes 245-54 and accompanying text.
244 id
5 See476 U.S. 227, 229-30 (1986).
24 Id, at 236.
117 See id at 238.
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company had challenged an on-site factory inspection, the
Court reasoned in terms of an owner's expectation of privacy in
business premises regularly used by employees but not open to
the public. 48  And in United States v. Biswell, a 1972 case, the
Court even spoke of a gun dealer's 'justifiable expectations of
privacy" in the contents of his shop. 49
What accounts for this strange pairing of privacy and
corporations, and how can Fourth Amendment doctrine be set
straight? The answer to the first question is to be found in the
influence of Katz v. United States on Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Long before Katz was decided, the Court had
held that, although the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination
clause applies only to individuals, the Fourth Amendment
applies to corporations as well as persons.250  Katz of course
should have occasioned a judicial reappraisal of possible
beneficiaries of the Fourth Amendment.2 5' But since the Court
has failed to acknowledge privacy's role in the protection of
personhood, it has also, not surprisingly, failed to note the
inappropriateness of its invocation of privacy in cases involving
corporate concealment. We can call this a one-size-fits-all
approach to constitutional decision-making. Once the Court
established privacy as a critical concept in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, it mechanically applied the term to corporations
seeking the Amendment's protection.2 2
How, then, should Fourth Amendment doctrine be set
straight? The first step, of course, is to recognize the
inappropriateness of references to privacy in this context. Not
every concealment strategy has a connection to privacy.
Because an outsider (an EPA inspector, for example) will be in
a position to determine in advance that no privacy interest is
241 See 436 U.S. 307, 315 (1978).
2" 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972).
2. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75-77 (1906).
211 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 ("[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.") As noted earlier, however, the Stewart opinion avoided systematic analysis
of privacy issues; it certainly did not investigate the connection between privacy and
personhood. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
252 The first post-Katz case in which the Court applied privacy analysis to a
corporation is Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978). Subsequent cases
include Donovan v. Dewey, 453 U.S. 594 (1981) and United States v. Dow Chemical, 476
U.S. 227 (1986). There appears to have been no occasion in which any member of




likely to be implicated by his activity, references to the
oxymoronic phrase "corporate privacy" should disappear from
the judicial lexicon. The second step must be to ask about
Fourth Amendment property protection for corporate
concealment strategies. In some settings, even property
protection is irrelevant; in others, it remains so. Let us pursue
this property-based inquiry at greater length.
If government officials never enter corporate property but
simply subject it to surveillance from the outsider, then the
Fourth Amendment offers no protection at all to the
corporation subject to scrutiny. In this limited respect, it is
appropriate to reason in terms of a variation on the Olmstead
rule-that is, to hold in settings where privacy cannot be at stake
that interfering with property interests by trespassing is a
prerequisite to Fourth Amendment liability.53  Under this
analysis, the proper resolution of Dow Chemical would have been
for the Court to reject Dow's claims completely. The only
surveillance the company complained of in the case involved an
overhead flight of its Midland, Michigan plant by EPA officials
trying to discover violations of the agency's standards. This was
a quest for information of course, but not a quest for
information with any bearing on personal vulnerability.
Moreover, while Dow could properly complain on common law
and statutory grounds about rival corporations trying to discover
its trade secrets, it could not advance such a complaint about
EPA overflight inspections since EPA officials do not engage in
such inspections as part of a government effort to compete with
2514corporations.
Thus, no argument Dow might advance could secure
Fourth Amendment protection. First, as a corporation, Dow
could have no privacy interest in the contents of its plant.
Second, although Dow could properly claim that it had a
proprietary interest in information about its manufacturing
procedures, it could not claim that the government was
interfering with this interest in conducting overflights of its
plants since the government was not trying to appropriate the
information for its own use. And third, since no government
... See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
211 See Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. 227, 231-32 (1986) ("Governments do not generally
seek to appropriate trade secrets of the private sector, and the right to be free of
appropriation of trade secrets is protected by law.").
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official actually entered Dow's plant, Dow could not complain
about government interference with its property interest in
exercising control over its real estate and equipment.
By contrast, when government inspectors actually enter a
corporation's premises, the corporation can properly point to
"meanintul [government] interference with a possessory
interest." '  Thus, in Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., where OSHA
inspectors sought access to the corporation's work area, the
corporation was clearly able to complain about interference
with the use it wished to make of its facilities.5 6 Similarly, in
Donovan v. Dewey,257 when federal inspectors sought entry to the
Waukesha Lime and Stone Company's mines,2 8 the company
could, under the theory advanced here, have sought judicial
protection against government interference with its property
interests. Corporations are property holders, after all, so courts
must consider their property interests when assessing the
permissibility of inspections of their premises.
But what about family shops and stores, where living
quarters can shade imperceptibly into commercial premises?
And what about closely held corporations in which all
shareholders and employees are members of the same family?
Boundary problems of this kind are inevitable once we agree
that not every concealment strategy has implications for privacy.
The best approach in gray area settings, I suggest, is to err on
the side of caution. If there is even some reason for an outsider
to believe that a concealment arrangement might protect
personal matters from unwanted exposure, then an outsider
should proceed on the assumption that a privacy interest is at
stake. Thus, if it seems possible, when standing on the
threshold of the back room of a family-run shop where the
... SeeJacobsen v. United States, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
256 See 436 U.S. 307, 314 (1978) ("The critical fact in this case is that entry [into the
premises of Barlow's Inc.] over Mr. Barlow's objection is being sought by a
Government agent." )
117 See 452 U.S. 594 (1981). Whether it could have sought protection against
warrantless inspection of its premises is another matter. Barlow's and Dewey hinge on
the question of whether warrants are required for inspection of regulated industries.
Id. at 604-05. The Court treats the extent to which a type of business activity is subject
to public regulation as the decisive factor in determining whether a warrant is
required prior to entering the premises of a corporation. Id. As the Dewey Court
noted, even when a warrant is not required prior to entry, a corporation still enjoys
Fourth Amendment rights. Id
..8 Id. at 597.
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room contains items of personal use as well as the store's
inventory and records, a government inspector should exercise
the restraint appropriate in settings where personal vulnerability
might be at stake and so, absent exigent circumstances, seek a
warrant prior to searching.25 9 The points just made about
corporations are simply the converse of this: they apply in
settings where an outsider can tell, without penetrating
concealment arrangements, that privacy is highly unlikely to be at
stake.
B. OBSERVATIONAL SURVEILLANCE
Now let us turn to the longer list of settings in which the
Court has spurned legitimate privacy claims. For purposes of
analysis, we should distinguish between two kinds of surveillance
-observational and interactive-that can interfere with privacy.
When engaged in observational surveillance, government agents
passively scrutinize the behavior of others-they report on what
is occurring but try not to affect the conduct they are
observing. 26  By contrast, when engaged in interactive
surveillance, agents actually intervene in human relationships:
on some occasions, they operate undercover; on others, they
reveal their identity and try to persuade an insider to betray
another. 6' I begin by considering settings involving
observational surveillance. Later, I turn to interactive
surveillance.
29 This is perhaps best characterized as a prophylactic rule for privacy. The
constitutional status of prophylactic rules for police interrogation has been the
subject of considerable debate. Compare, e.g., Joseph Grano, Prophylactic Rules in
Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 100 (1985),
with David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 190 (1988).
There is no need, however, to engage in a similar debate about Fourth Amendment
prophylaxis. Everyday expectations of privacy are grounded in a prophylactic
framework-that is, forbearance is required in settings where personal vulnerability
might be at stake. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text. Thus if there is a
possibility that privacy might be at stake when conducting an inspection of, say, the
back room of a family store, then everyday expectations require government agents to
exercise the restraint appropriate for privacy when carrying out their inspection.
210 See RIcHARD H. WARD, INTRODUCTION TO CRMINAL INVESTIGATION 207 (1975)
("Surveillance is the observation of a person, place, or thing, usually
surreptitiously.").
261 Id at 205 ("[A]n undercover operative is a law enforcement agent who attempts
to develop the confidence of an individual or to infiltrate a group or operation for
the purpose of developing information concerning criminal activity.").
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1. Private Objects and Information
When conducting observational surveillance, government
officials engage in sustained scrutiny of one or more
individuals.2 In doing so, agents attempt to avoid influencing
the behavior of those they are scrutinizing.2 63 Indeed, a central
aim of people conducting observational surveillance is to
become part of the background-to stand outside the subject
and compile information about his activities without making
him aware of the surveillance.264  It is arguable that sustained
scrutiny of this kind almost invariably interferes with privacy
interests. At the very least, though, it is clear that observational
surveillance interferes with privacy when the focus of an
individual's attention is a private object or information.
The term "peeping Tom" provides a helpful way to illustrate
this point. To classify someone as a "peeping Tom" is to say that
the person has engaged in sustained, nonconsensual scrutiny of
something viewed as intrinsically private. It doesn't matter that
a peeping Tom stands in a place he is lawfully entitled to
occupy. Someone isn't any less subject to condemnation if, for
example, he stands in the public area of a restroom and stares
through the slits of closed stalls. Rather, what is critical to such
settings is that the person doing the observing has not respected
what we may call the "principle of ancillary privacy." This
principle holds that given conventional understandings that
certain objects are private-the naked body, for example, or the
contents of bedrooms-then sustained, nonconsensual scrutiny
of those objects even from a public place amounts to an
interference with privacy interests. Needless to say, it is drawn-
out scrutiny that is condemned on such occasions. No one is
called a "peeping Tom" if, by chance, he notices-but then
turns away from-a private object.265
262 id, at 208.
263 Id. at 207.
264 m
265 See 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DIcTIONARY 615 (1933). Citing an 1837 publication
concerning Lady Godiva, the Dictionary reports: "The story [of Godiva] is
embellished with the incident of Peeping Tom, a prying inquisitive tailor who was
struck blind for popping out his head as the lady passed." Id. The tailor, it should be
noted, was staring at someone who was traveling through a public thoroughfare. Id.
His transgression was not that he was in a place he was not supposed to occupy;




The principle of ancillary privacy can be applied in settings
beyond the lurid ones at stake in peeping Tom cases. For
example, if (as the Katz Court held) a telephone call is a private
activity, then outsiders can reasonably be expected to exercise
restraint not simply about the contents of phone conversations
but also about their incidental features, such as the pattern of
someone's calls. Similarly, given the respect due the contents of
first-class mail, privacy interests are also implicated if someone
scrutinizes another person's pattern of correspondence by
examining the addresses and return addresses on his envelopes.
And given the respect due the home, privacy is certainly
implicated if someone tries to peer through open windows to
see what's going on. Needless to say, the expectations
associated with ancillary privacy are more relaxed than those
associated with full privacy. As was made clear in the peeping
Tom example, it is systematic scrutiny that is unacceptable, not
the inadvertent, passing glance. People occasionally notice
addresses on envelopes or the contents of a room when a
window has been left open. This can readily be distinguished,
however, from a full-blown, deliberate inspection.
The Court, as one would expect, has consistently rejected
the principle of ancillary privacy. On the Court's analysis,
private objects have no penumbra, no outer area in which a
modest degree of restraint is needed in order to support the
object's function in securing privacy. The conclusions reached
in Smith v. Maryland provide a chilling illustration of this
point.2 66 At issue in Smith was the ability of the police to use a
pen register, a device that provides information about the
pattern of calls from a given telephone.2 67 The pen register had
been installed at police request on a phone in Smith's home,
with no warrant having been obtained prior to installation.268
Because Katz had recognized the telephone's role in protecting
personal communication, 269 the Smith Court had a particularly
strong reason to consider a caller's ancillary privacy interest in
the pattern of calls he makes.27 ° Instead, Justice Blackmun,
writing for the Court, held that pen registers don't implicate
... 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
267 Id. at 737.
268 Id.
261 See 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967).
270 Indeed, Justice Blackmun's opinion in Smith defined the issue in light of Katz.
See 442 U.S. at 739-42.
[Vol. 92
FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVA CY INTERESTS
objectively reasonable privacy expectations because phone
company customers "assume the risk" that the company will
reveal their pattern of calls to the police. 27' Blackmun, it should
be noted, could not claim that customers assume the risk that
the company will reveal their pattern of calls to the public-at-
large. This claim would clearly be false. Rather, essential to
Blackmun's argument was the proposition that a customer's
reliance on a third-party facilitator-even on one who would
not be willing to divulge information to the public-at-large-
robs that customer of any expectation of privacy with respect to
272the police.
So stated, the Smith Court's conclusions seem particularly
questionable. Members of the public can sometimes act as
snoops when checking on the pattern of someone's incoming
and outgoing mail and can always act as snoops by looking from
sidewalks into the open windows of other people's homes.
However, they can never gain access to the pattern of someone's
phone calls from her home because phone companies would
flatly refuse to reveal such information. But this of course
isn't all that's wrong with Smith. The general principle at stake
in the case is respect for ancillary privacy, and this principle
extends far beyond pen registers.
The proper way to approach ancillary privacy issues is to say
that they raise less serious questions about forbearance than do
the private objects with which they're concerned. A standard
lower than probable cause (reasonable suspicion, for example)
can justify interference with ancillary privacy. Ironically, the
government could, in all likelihood, have satisfied this standard
in Smith. At the time it requested the pen register, the
Baltimore Police Department had already accumulated a good
deal of information indicating that the defendant was making
threatening phone calls to the victim. 274 That the Court failed to
remand the case with instructions to employ the reasonable
suspicion (a remand that would almost certainly have still made
it possible for the government to prevail) shows just how deeply
committed it is to the vigilance model.
271 Id. at 744.
172 Id. at 744-46.
273 A telephone call to Verizon Communications on Apr. 5, 2002 confirmed this
point.
271 See 442 U.S. at 737.
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Questions about ancillary privacy arise in settings where the
Court has recognized the private status of an object or
information. But what if the Court has simply refused to accord
an object its proper status? Two examples-one involving
judicial refusal to treat a (mobile) home as a home, the other a
refusal to recognize the private status of bank records-
illustrate how stingy the Court has been in classifying objects as
private. The first shows the Court working at the margins,
making a concerted, and implausible, effort to lessen the
protection available for one type of residence.275 The second
shows the Court denying the obvious-denying that bank
records are conventionally treated as private. 76
Consider first the Court's approach to mobile homes. By
the time it reached the issue of mobile motor homes in
California v. Carney,277 the Court had already concluded that
people have a modest privacy interest in cars-an interest that
requires probable cause in order to justify a full-scale search but
an interest insufficiently strong as to require a warrant prior to
commencement of the search.2 78  Also, in case law prior to
Carney, the Court had consistently accorded substantial privacy
protection to homes, requiring a warrant for searches of a home
unless exigent circumstances justify dispensing with one.2 79 The
issue in Carney was thus one of classification-whether to think
about searches of mobile motor homes in light of the warrant
requirement that prevails for stationary homes or to think about
them in light of the more relaxed requirement that prevails for
280cars.
That the Court opted for the latter alternative should hardly
occasion surprise given its record on privacy issues. The critical
271 See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
171 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
277 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
278 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); see also United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798 (1982).
2179 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) ("The Fourth Amendment
protects the individual's privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy
more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions
of the home."); see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984) ("At the risk
of belaboring the obvious, private residences are places in which the individual
normally expects privacy free of government intrusion not authorized by a warrant,
and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as
justifiable.")
280 471 U.S. at 393-94.
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question, of course, is whether one can provide an argument
that improves on its Khadi-style methodology for pronouncing
on society's privacy expectations. The answer is that one surely
can by relying on the Court's own conclusions in other cases.
The question posed by Carney has to do with the privacy
expectations associated with temporary "homes."2 81  Prior to
Carney, the Court had addressed this issue in Stoner v. California,
where it held that a warrant is required to search a hotel
room.282 Five years after Carney, it considered a related question
when it held in Minnesota v. Olson that overnight guests in
someone else's home have an expectation of privacy in the
premises they occupy, thus making it essential that government
officials obtain a warrant before searching those premises.
Viewed in light of the Court's holdings in Stoner and Olson,
Carney's conclusion is anomalous, then. The Court has
recognized substantial privacy expectations for home-substitutes
284such as hotel rooms and spare rooms for overnight guests.
The Court's denial of a similar level of seriousness for mobile
motor homes is particularly troubling since such a home
sometimes functions not simply as a home-substitute on the
road but as a full-time home.185 A careful examination of the
Court's opinion in Olson reveals why it overlooked this analogy.
In Olson, Justice White, writing for the Court, repeatedly
referred to what "we" feel as overnight guests in other people's
homes. "We stay in others' homes when we travel for business or
pleasure," White stated, "when we visit our parents, children, or
relatives out of town, when we are in between jobs or homes, or
when we house-sit for a friend. 286 In one of the rare references
to personal vulnerability in a Supreme Court privacy opinion,
White remarked: "We are at our most vulnerable when we are
asleep" in someone else's home.287
By contrast, one finds no references to "we" in Carney's
opinion about mobile motor homes. This is a temporary
residence arrangement wholly unfamiliar to Supreme Court
81 d at 387.
376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964).
... 495 U.S. 91,100 (1990).
284 See notes 183-84 supra and accompanying text.
2" This point is made in Justice Stevens's Carney dissent. See 471 U.S. at 399 and
n.9.
286 O/son, 495 U.S. at 98 (emphasis added).




justices. It is an arrangement used primarily by economically
and socially marginal members of society, by people who also
"travel for business or pleasure" but do so under circumstances
constrained by financial need.8 9 It is hardly surprising, then,
that the analogy to other types of homes was not advanced in
Carney. The Court's method of discerning privacy expectations
begins, and ends, with the experience of the affluent.
20
Finally, let us consider an absolute devaluation of privacy-a
claim that certain objects are not conventionally deemed private
at all. In United States v. Miller, decided in 1976, the Court
concluded that bank customers have no expectation of privacy
in the papers, such as deposit slips, they fill out when
conducting transactions with their banks.' Relying on
assumption of risk analysis, the Miller Court concluded that in
undertaking transactions with third parties, people assume the
risk that the information they provide will ultimately be
"conveyed . . to Government authorities."292  In Miller,
information about the defendant's banking transactions wasn't,
of course, voluntarily conveyed to the government. Rather, the
defendant's bank was served with a subpoena duces tecum
concerning the transactions. 29' The Miller Court sidestepped
this point. Because the possibility existed that the defendant's
deposit slips might be (involuntarily) conveyed to the
government by the bank, the defendant, the Court held, could
not claim an expectation of privacy in them.294
288 justice Douglas retired from the Court more than a decade before Carney was
decided. He proudly recounted his use of an early twentieth century analogue to the
trailer home in his memoir when he told how he had ridden a freight car from
Yakima, Washington to New York City to enroll at Columbia Law School. WILLIAM 0.
DOUGLAS, Go EAST YOUNG MAN 127-33 (1974).
289 id,
211 Once Douglas had become (moderately) affluent following his appointment to
the Supreme Court, he told ChiefJustice Harlan Fiske Stone, who had been a Dean
of the Columbia Law School, about how he had arrived in New York. Stone asked
whose railroad freight cars Douglas had used. When Douglas replied that he had
slept mostly in Great Northern cars, Stone replied, "'Then you should always ride the
Great Northern, paying first class fares. Come to think of it, why not send them a
check for your Law School transportation?"' Id. at 135.
291 See 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
112 Id. at 443.
211 Id. at 437-38.
... Id at 443 ("The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that
the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.").
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The difficulty with this account is that it fails to take note of
the complex set of reliance interests underlying banking
transactions. Banks are physically arranged so as to make it
possible for customers to avoid broadcasting to the public-at-
large the nature of their transactions. Tellers' cages are
constructed so that a customer can turn her back to the queue
and carry out her business. Automatic teller machines envelop
a customer, creating barriers to snoops in the rear who might
want to find out about the customer's transactions. And, most
important, banks do not provide members of the public-at-large
with information about their customers; indeed, no bank could
stay in business if it did so. Customers thus rely on their banks to
keep financial information private.
On the Miller Court's account, this consistent pattern of
confidentiality vis-A-vis that public-at-large counts for nothing in
the calculation of privacy interests given the government's
subpoena power over banks. But this approach wholly
undercuts the reasonable expectations test. The test's central
premise is that the government must operate according to the
expectations that prevail among the public-at-large. There
can be no doubt, given the precautionary measures undertaken
by banks, that each person's finances are deemed private. Miller
rejects this obvious conclusion by focusing on ways in which the
government exercises special power unavailable to members of
the lay public.
2. Privacy Cues
When social conventions do not treat an object as private,
privacy cues become particularly important as a way of
indicating an interest in privacy. The Court has examined
numerous settings in which cues have been critical. In each
instance, however, the Court has mentioned the cues employed
only to disregard their significance in reaching its conclusions.
I begin by considering settings in which people signaled an
interest in the privacy of their backyards. Later, I turn to police
inspection of garbage.
29 See Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315 (1978): "Without a warrant, [a
government official] stands in no better position than a member of the public. What
is observable by the public is observable, without a warrant, by the Government
inspector as well." See also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986).
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Two post-Katz cases consider warrantless aerial surveillance
of backyards. In California v. Ciraolo, decided in 1986, the Court
held such surveillance constitutional when conducted from an
airplane one thousand feet in the air.29' Florida v. Riley, decided
three years later, produced only a judgment of the Court, one
that upheld warrantless surveillance conducted from a
helicopter hovering four hundred feet above a yard.297
Although the difference in the height of the surveilling aircraft
is significant, it is the similarity in the owners' use of privacy
cues that is particularly striking. Ciraolo enclosed the backyard
2981of his suburban home with high double fences. In looking at
the property from the street, passersby first encountered a six-
foot outer fence and then saw a ten-foot inner one, the effect
bein to close off the property completely from street-level
view.9 Riley was even more thorough. He posted a "DO NOT
ENTER" sign on his backyard and had enclosed two sides of a
greenhouse located in his backyard."' Trees and shrubs
surrounded the other two sides of the greenhouse and thereby
cut off the view of the back yard from the street."0 ' Riley also
placed corrugated roofing over most of the top of the
greenhouse, with only two panels missing at the time the police
carried out their surveillance.3 2 Given the narrowness of the
greenhouse's rooftop opening, a helicopter was needed to
hover at a low altitude in order to peer into it."'
By the time Ciraolo was decided, the Court had declared that
the curtilage surrounding the home must be "considered part
of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. 04 Because
there is no doubt that Ciraolo's backyard and Riley's
greenhouse lay within the curtilage of their homes, each case
could be classified as one of ancillary privacy in which there
were also unmistakable cues indicating an interest in privacy.303
This analysis, which is clearly sound, makes the Ciraolo and Riley
29 See 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986).
27 See 488 U.S. 445, 450-52 (1989).
2" See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209.
211 Id at 211.




"0 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
... For discussion of the concept of ancillary privacy, see notes 266-66 supra and
accompanying text.
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conclusions-that neither defendant had an objectively
reasonable privacy interest in the contents of his backyard-
patently untenable. There is no point, however, in considering
the cases from this perspective, for it is clear that no member of
either the Ciraolo or Riley majorities accorded any special
significance to the private status of the curtilage . 6 Rather, the
Ciraolo majority and Riley plurality reasoned in terms of the
307plain view doctrine °. Because the officers in each case were in
a position they were lawfully entitled to occupy and because
they observed matters that were in plain view once they had
taken their positions, their surveillance, the justices reasoned,
interfered with no privacy interests whatsoever. In each case,
the Court concluded that the Plain View Doctrine settled the
matter-there is no privacy protection for what can be seen
from a public place.
So much, then, for the special status of the curtilage. But
even if considerations about the curtilage are set aside, one still
must ask about the respect due privacy cues. This question is
particularly relevant to Ciraolo and Riley, for a majority of the
justices in both cases conceded that in each case the officers
were aware of the privacy cues before undertaking aerial
surveillance."0 8  The Court deemed this point irrelevant,
however. The cues indicated that each defendant had a
subjective expectation of privacy, the justices reasoned, but they
did not establish the further point that the defendants'
116 Thus the significance of the following remark in Ciraolo: "That the area
[observed] is within the curtilage does not itself bar all police observation." 476 U.S.
at 213.
117 See Ciraolo: "Any member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down
could have seen everything that these officers observed." Id. at 213-14; Riley: "Because
the sides and roof of his [Riley's] greenhouse were left partially open .... what was
growing in the greenhouse was subject to viewing from the air" by those within
navigable airspace. 488 U.S. at 450 (White,J., plurality opinion).
See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209 ("Police were unable to observe the contents of
respondent's yard from ground level because of a 6-foot outer fence and a 10-foot
inner fence completely enclosing the yard. Later that day, Officer Shutz, who was
assigned to investigate secured a private plane and flew over respondent's house at an
altitude of 1000 feet, within navigable airspace; he was accompanied by Officer
Rodriguez."); see also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989) (White, J., plurality
opinion) ("When an investigating officer discovered that he could not see the
contents of the greenhouse from the road [because of the protective measures Riley
had taken to shield it from the glances of passersby on the ground], he circled twice
over respondent's property in a helicopter at a height of 400 feet."); Riley, 488 U.S. at




expectations were objectively reasonable."9 On the contrary,
the justices concluded in each case that the defendants' privacy
cues did nothing to establish an objectively reasonable privacyS.• 310
expectation. Under Ciraolo and Riley, a person acts
consistently with everyday understandings of privacy if he
disregards unmistakable signs that someone wants privacy for
his backyard, hires an aircraft to fly over the yard, and then
takes pictures of the yard to provide a detailed inventory of its
contents.
If the source of this proposition were not the Supreme
Court, one might simply laugh at it as a "snoop's" version (a very
rich "snoop") of privacy. Given the source, however, one must
take it seriously. In assessing the Court's position, think first
about what would happen to the system of privacy if cues were
systematically disregarded-if, for example, the markings
"Personal and Confidential" were taken as an invitation to hold
an envelope up to the light to inspect its contents, or if the fact
that someone closed a door before beginning a conference
were taken as an incitement to outsiders to cup their ears
against the door. These circumvention techniques meet the
criteria established in Ciraolo and Riley. They involve nothing
more than an effort, undertaken by people in places they are
lawfully entitled to occupy, to sidestep unmistakable signals
indicating an interest in privacy.
But these are, of course, the techniques of the snoop.
Courts must reject such techniques if privacy conventions are to
serve as the basis of the law. Once someone has signaled an
interest in privacy by cutting off the straightforward ways in
which people are likely to come upon an object, the burden
shifts to outsiders to honor these signals by not looking for
techniques of circumvention. Police officers having discovered
"' See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211 ("Clearly-and understandably-respondent has met
the test of manifesting his own subjective intent an desire to maintain his privacy
..... "; see also Riley, 488 U.S. at 450 (White, J., plurality opinion); Riley, 488 at 454
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Individuals who see privacy can take precautions,
tailored to the location of the road, to avoid disclosing private activities to those who
pass by.").
"' Ciraolo recognized that the defendant had, through his construction of double
fences for his backyard, manifested a subjective expectation. 476 U.S. at 211. But it
held that Ciraolo had no objective expectation of privacy vis a vis aerial surveillance
from 1000 feet. Id. at 215. The Riley plurality also recognized that the defendant in
the case had demonstrated a subjective privacy expectation. 488 U.S. at 450. But it
too held that the defendant did not have an objective expectation. Id. at 451-52.
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that Ciraolo and Riley had signaled an interest in privacy bore the
burden of securing by other means the requisite level of
suspicion about the backyards. Any other ruling is incompatible
with everyday understandings of privacy."
The same line of reasoning should be followed when
considering settings in which the police scrutinize activities in
the home from street vantage points. Home-dwellers often use
blinds, shades, or curtains to prevent scrutiny by outsiders. But
what if there is a gap in, say, someone's window blinds that
makes it possible for an outsider to peer into the person's home
provided he positions himself in just the right way outside the
window? Given privacy conventions, the answer to this is
straightforward: blinds function as a cue, one that outsiders are
expected to honor rather than circumvent. Not surprisingly,
the Court has ignored this convention-or, at least, it has done
so with respect to guests in a home. In Minnesota v. Carter, the
Court concluded that short-term guests cannot claim a privacy
interest from outsider surveillance of their behavior within a
home.312 Indeed, given Carter's facts, the conclusion was more
stark: that short-term guests have no privacy interest in being
free of surveillance when a police officer climbs over bushes
partially obscuring a ground-floor window, places his face twelve
to eighteen inches from the window, and peers for fifteen
" But what if the police are unaware of the privacy cues? For example, what if a
police officer on routine aerial patrol were simply to notice the contents of
someone's backyard without having encountered any street-level cues signaling an
interest in privacy for that yard? The answer to this is that the officer's discovery
cannot be said to have violated a privacy interest. Privacy conventions allow for a
distinction between casual glances and systematic scrutiny. Police officers on foot
patrol sometimes happen upon objects that provide probable cause for further
investigation-and the same is possible when officers conduct aerial patrol of, say, a
city's highways. But this, of course, is a principle that depends on happenstance and
chronology. In enforcing it, courts must guard against pretextual searches by
insisting that officers demonstrate their discoveries were made in the course of
routine patrols. The Court, it should be noted, has blurred the distinction between
casually noticing objects and seeking them out. In Ciraolo, for example, it even went
so far as to state that "[T]he Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never
been extended to require law enforcement to shield their eyes when passing by a
home on public thoroughfares." 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986). But this statement was
disingenuous given the facts of the case. It's true, of course, that an officer on aerial
patrol might have noticed the contents of Ciraolo's yard. In fact, though, the officer
expended great effort to find out about its contents. In the gap between these two
extremes lies the difference between everyday privacy conventions and the Court's
distortion of them.
"' 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998).
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minutes through a small gap in the blinds drawn over the
window.313
Had there been anything in the record to indicate that the
officer in Carter knew he was observing short-term guests, the
Court's conclusion might have met a minimum-though still
contestable-standard of plausibility. However, because there is
no reason to believe that the officer was able to distinguish
between guests and homedwellers, Carter stands for the
proposition that even the privacy interests of the latter can be
legitimately undermined for the sake of monitoring the
activities of the former. As Justice Ginsburg observed in her
dissent, given Carter's conclusion, "people are not genuinely
'secure in their ... houses ... against unreasonable searches
and seizures' if their invitations to others increase the risk of
unwarranted governmental peering and prying into their
dwelling places." ' 4 How should Carter have been resolved, then?
The question is difficult given the problematic status of the
short-term guest. But even if we agree with the Court's claim
that social conventions deny such guests any privacy interest, it
seems clear that the proper resolution of Carter would have been
to hold that police officers may ignore a home-dweller's privacy
cues only if they are aware ex ante-that is, at the time they
engage in surveillance-that the people they are observing are
short-term guests.
These comments about privacy cues for homes provide a
context in which to understand the Court's conclusions about
police inspection of garbage. The way in which people usually
signal an interest in privacy for their garbage is to wrap it in
opaque bags tied at the top. This is exactly how the defendants
in California v. Greenwood dealt with their garbage: after placing
their trash in dark bags, the defendants deposited it at the curb
in anticipation of its collection.315 The Greenwood Court
conceded that the defendants may have had a subjective
expectation of privacy. 16 But it yielded no further ground. No
one can have an objectively valid privacy expectation in trash
placed on the curb outside the home, the Court stated, since
"scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public" can go
3 See id. at 103 (BreyerJ., concurring).
311 Id. at 108 (GinsburgJ., dissenting).
"' 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988).
116 Id. at 39.
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through such garbage if they wish.317 The police, the Court
concluded, did not infringe on the Greenwoods' privacy when
they systematically went through their garbage without
obtaining a warrant since the police were simply doing what
snoops already do.
Greenwood will always be memorable for this point, for here
the Court openly acknowledged that it considers the behavior of
snoops relevant to the definition of objectively reasonable
privacy interests. Expanding on its reference to snoops, the
Greenwood Court even inserted a footnote in which it explained,
with no indication of disapproval, how a tabloid reporter had
gone through garbage left outside Henry Kissinger's home.'
Presumably, the Court meant that because Kissinger had been
preyed on by reporters, everyone else should consider the
possibility of snooping in seeking privacy for themselves. But
this turns matters upside down. The snoop threatens privacy.
The term "snoop" is instructive because it reminds us of the
precautions we must take beyond those normally needed to
insure privacy. So, for example, if I'm worried that a snoop
might cup his ear to the door of the room in which I'm talking
to someone else, I'll then have to speak in a whisper rather than
my normal tone of voice. But a whisper, of course, goes beyond
the normal precautions associated with privacy. Speaking in a
whisper, even when the door has been closed, indicates that
someone is insecure even when in a setting normally associated
with privacy. Greenwood, we can thus say, errs in its unwillingness
to treat the normal precautions people take to ensure privacy as
sufficient to create an objectively reasonable interest in it.
Must the police always obtain a warrant to search garbage,
then? Of course not. Garbage is not a private object, so if a
police officer happens to come upon garbage strewn on the
sidewalk, the officer cannot be said to have interfered with a
privacy interest on inspecting it. The Greenwood Court actually
endorsed a formula of this kind when it remarked that "the
police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from
evidence of criminal activity . ,,319 Given the facts in
"' Id. at 40.
... Id. at 40 n.4 ("Even the refuse of prominent Americans has not been
invulnerable," the Court remarked. "In 1975, for example, a reporter for a weekly
tabloid seized five bags of garbage from the sidewalk outside the home of Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger.")
9 Id at 41.
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Greenwood, this remark was as disingenuous as was a similar one
in Ciraolo20  But the remark does at least underscore the
importance of the distinction between serendipitous discovery
and devious snooping. We can thus readily agree that no
privacy interest is at stake if the police stumble upon garbage
strewn on the sidewalk. But we can also agree that the police
can't disregard the signal provided by a closed, opaque bag;
they open the bag, inspect its contents-and then say they
shouldn't have to "avert their eyes from evidence of criminal
activity. 32'
3. Surveillance of Behavior in Public Places
What if conventional understandings don't classify an object
as private and no signals are sent indicating an interest in
keeping it that way? At first glance, it would seem that the
answer to this is easy: no privacy interest, one might argue, can
ever be claimed under these circumstances. To use Erving
Goffman's phrase, people "present themselves" to others in
public places. 2 When they do, it could be said, there is nothing
they can claim as private. It may be rude to engage in
prolonged staring at others in public places, but rudeness, it
could be claimed, must be distinguished from an actual invasion
of privacy. The system of privacy is not to be confused with the
rules of exquisite manners.
There is a great deal to be said for this line of reasoning. In
presenting ourselves to others, we make allowance for the
occasional stare as we sit on subway trains or walk along on
sidewalks. And if the occasional stare is acceptable from the
layperson, then it is acceptable as well from a police officer. An
officer on foot patrol or riding in a car surveys the world before
her, letting her eyes run over a great many objects and pausing
to stare more carefully at a few. But does this point establish the
further one that there can never be an objectively reasonable
privacy expectation for behavior in public places? Does it show
that privacy interests are not implicated when technology is
substituted for a police gaze-when, for example, a television
... See Ciraolo ("The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been
extended to require officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public
thoroughfares." 476 U.S. at 213.
21 Id.
2 ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LiFE (1959).
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camera is used to survey a street scene? And does it show that
privacy interests are not implicated when, either by means of
technological innovation or regular use of police manpower,
someone is followed as he moves about through public places?
These are the questions addressed in the following pages. I
concede that privacy interests are modest indeed for behavior in
public places. However, I challenge the Court's conclusion that
they are nonexistent.
Consider first the issue of "shadowing"-the question of
whether someone has a privacy interest in not being followed
around in public places. Given modern technology, police can
track someone's movements without having to keep that person
within eyesight at all times. A beeper, for example, can be
attached to a device someone has purchased; when properly
monitored, the beeper can often provide the police with
information about the buyer's movements.32 3 In United States v.
Knotts32 and United States v. Karo,25 the Court upheld beeper
surveillance of conduct within-public places. Each case involved
surveillance of prolonged travel. In Knotts, for example, the
beeper was used to monitor the defendants' movements as they
drove more than a hundred miles from Minneapolis to the
Minnesota/Wisconsin state line and, ultimately, to a cabin
located in northern Wisconsin. 26  The Knotts Court
unequivocally rejected the defendants' claim that beeper
surveillance of their car ride interfered with a protected privacy
interest. "When Petschen [one of the Knotts defendants]
traveled over the public streets," the Court stated, "he
voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the fact that
he was traveling over particular roads in a particular direction,
the fact of whatever strops he made, and the fact of his final
destination when he exited from public roads onto private
property.,
32 7
325 In Knotts, for example, the Court remarked that "[a] beeper is a radio
transmitter, usually battery operated, which emits periodic signals that can be picked
up by a radio receiver. In this case, a beeper was placed in a five-gallon drum
containing chloroform purchased by one of respondent's codefendants." 460 U.S.
276, 277 (1983).
3" 460 U.S. 276.
325 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
26 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278-79.
32 Id at 281-82.
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There is a surface plausibility to this conclusion, given the
fact that movement in public places isn't considered a private
activity. However, the Court's reference to "anyone who wanted
to look" should alert us to the disingenuousness in this context
similar to its disingenuousness in California v. Ciraolo. In that
case, it will be recalled, the Court stated that police shouldn't
have to "shield their eyes" to avoid examining the contents of
Ciraolo's backyard-a point it made only after noting that the
police had disregarded signals indicating an interest in privacy
for the yard, hired a plane, and taken pictures of the yard from
an altitude of one thousand feet."' The term "shielding their
eyes" correctly appeals to privacy conventions, then, but it does
so in a context where the police have already flouted them.
Exactly the same point can be made here. Anyone "wanting
to look" at Petschen as he traveled through the streets of
Minneapolis would have noticed him for a fleeting moment. A
further look, however, would have required instant access to a
car with a full tank of gas and a detective's ability to follow
another car for hours on end. "Wanting to look" thus captures
an important convention-the legitimacy of the brief glance at
someone in a public place. It doesn't capture what's at stake in
prolonged surveillance of a lengthy trip over a public road.
In developing this point, we can identify two reasons why
shadowing someone's public movements runs afoul of everyday
privacy understandings. The first has to do with the symmetry
of encounters in public places. The fleeting glance in a public
place is often returned by another person's fleeting glance. As
already noted, privacy conventions depend on this kind of
329symmetry. Shadowing someone, by contrast, breaks the
symmetry, for the shadower subjects the person under
surveillance to sustained scrutiny with nothing comparable
being returned. Of course, more than privacy is at stake in such
settings. There is something ominous about being shadowed.
At its most extreme, shadowing can amount to stalking, with the
person being followed feeling terror about her physical safety.33
But even when this is eliminated-even when we subtract this
... California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
.29 See supra p. 54.
330 Some states have made stalking a crime. In 1999, for example, New York
criminalized stalking and distinguished between four different degrees of it. See NEW
YORK PENAL LAw §§ 120.45-120.60 (McKinney (2002)).
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fear-there is still a privacy concern that arises out of the
asymmetry of the relationship.
The second reason why privacy is implicated in shadowing
has to do with the resolution of uncertainty. On the Court's
account, uncertainty is only an incidental element of privacy. 31
What matters, as far as the Court is concerned, is full
concealment from other people of what one wishes to keep
private. 32 We have seen time and again, though, how deeply
this approach departs from everyday understandings of
privacy.3  The everyday concept of privacy allows for partial
nonconcealment. It requires only that an insider take
meaningful steps to generate uncertainty among outsiders as to
what is being withheld, with the burden then placed on
outsiders not to resolve this uncertainty by a scheme of
circumvention. In shadowing someone, a person rejects the
uncertainty about others that characterizes symmetrical
encounters in public places. The still picture each party takes
away from a brief encounter in a public place is replaced by a
one-sided moving picture of a person's movements throughout
the public world.
In this respect, shadowing someone is not unlike examining
a person's pattern of phone calls. There is rarely much
significance to be found in the isolated call. The accumulation
of information about calls made can, however, help to identify
the patterns of someone's life. Chance encounters at the
supermarket or on the street also reveal little about a person. In
shadowing someone for days or weeks, though, one can often
discover a good deal. The concept of privacy is relevant in this
context precisely because people are likely to feel vulnerable
about an outsider's discovery of such information.
To speak of a privacy interest in public places is not, of
course, to suggest that the interest is a strong one. The
vulnerability at stake here is far weaker than that associated with
the involuntary revelation of the contents of, say, one's home or
331 That is, if an insider has taken sufficient steps to signal an interest in privacy by
creating uncertainty as to what he wishes to withhold from outsiders but has failed to
conceal completely an object or information, then outsiders, on the Court's account,
are under no obligation to refrain from trying to discover what the insider was






finances. However, one also can't say, as the Court has, that
shadowing someone's movements has no implications for that
person's privacy. 34  How, then, should courts address
shadowing? The proper approach, I suggest, is to treat
shadowing as implicating a modest privacy interest and so to
require Terry-type reasonable suspicion as a prerequisite for
undertaking it. In Teny v. Ohio, the Court held that reasonable
suspicion, rather than probable cause, is required for brief
interference with someone's liberty interests. 3  Shadowing
offers a privacy analogue to the liberty interests at stake in Terry:
it is sufficiently important to warrant judicial oversight but not
so weighty as to require probable cause. The soundness of this
conclusion is underscored by considering the facts in United
States v. Knotts. At the time the police began shadowing the
Knotts defendants, they knew that officials of the 3M Company
suspected one of the defendants, Armstrong, of stealing
chemicals needed to manufacture drugs.336 The police also
knew that Armstrong had been buying the same kind of
chemicals from a retailer in Minneapolis.' The Court thus
could have remanded the case on the basis of a reasonable
suspicion rationale, with instructions to the lower courts to
determine whether government shadowing of Armstrong would
have led to the discovery of the other defendants. That it failed
to do so-that it instead held shadowing to be wholly
unconnected to privacy-reveals how aggressive it has been in
building the vigilance model.
The points just made apply to beeper-enhanced shadowing
as well as person-to-person surveillance, so if a police officer can
be said to interfere with privacy by following someone through
the streets, the same objection can be made to shadowing
someone by beeper. There is, however, a further difficulty with
beepers, one that may well make them wholly unacceptable
under the Fourth Amendment. This difficulty has to do with
their installation-with their attachment to objects prior to
conducting surveillance. In Knotts, the retailer of chemicals had
attached a beeper to a container of chloroform, a fact that of
course was not conveyed to the Knotts defendant who
"' For the Court's position, see Karo, 468 U.S. at 713-14.
... 392 U.S. 1, 16-30 (1968).
"6 SeeUnited States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983).
17 Id at 277-79.
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subsequently purchased the container.3 8 No Knotts defendant
challenged the constitutionality of this installation, however, so
the installation issue was not addressed in that case.
3 9 A year
later, in United States v. Karo, the Court did take up this issue,
considering a fact-pattern pertaining to installation similar to
the one in Knotts."4 °  Karo argued that the warrantless
installation of a beeper on an object followed by a sale of the
object (without a warning to the buyer of the beeper's
presence) constitutes an unreasonable search and an
unreasonable seizure."' The Karo Court rejected both
contentions. 4 No privacy interest is implicated before a beeper
is turned on, the Court held, because police officers begin
beeper monitoring only after a sale has been completed.
4 3
Furthermore, one cannot claim that beeper installation
implicates a privacy interest.3 11 No property interest is
implicated, the Court concluded, because beeper installation
amounts only to a technical trespass.345  "Although the can
[purchased by Karo] may have contained an unknown and
unwanted foreign object" at the time of sale, the Court
remarked, "it cannot be said that anyone's possessory interest
was interfered with in a meaningful way.
46
Karo's conclusion about privacy is arguably sound: no threat
to privacy can be said to exist until a beeper begins
transmission. Its conclusion about property interests, on the
other hand, is palpably wrong. The Jacobsen Court, it will be
recalled, established the criterion for determining when
government officials interfere with property interests under the
Fourth Amendment. According to Jacobsen, a seizure of
property occurs when "there is some meaningful interference
with an individual's possessory interests in that property. 4 ' As
Justice Stevens aptly noted in his Karo dissent, "[w]hen the
. Id. at 278.
"'Justice White noted this at the beginning of his opinion of the Court in Karo.
468 U.S. 705, 707 (1984).
"0 468 U.S. 705.
"' Id. at 710.4 Id. at 712-13.




'47Jacobsen v. United States, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
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Government attaches an electronic monitoring device to
[someone's] property, . . . it convert[s] the property to its own
use."348 Moreover, this conversion-of-property phenomenon is
inescapable as far as involuntary beeper monitoring is
concerned. In attaching a beeper to a person's clothing, car, or
bicycle, government officials meaningfully interfere with that
person's possessory interests. Only voluntary beeper
monitoring-that is, monitoring conducted by someone who
has agreed to have a beeper attached to his person or
possessions-will be constitutionally acceptable. Involuntary
attachment of a beeper will invariably interfere with an
individual's possessory interests.
If beepers fail on possessory grounds and if shadowing in
the absence of reasonable suspicion is, in any event,
unacceptable because of its interference with privacy interests,
what conclusion should be reached about television surveillance
of behavior in public places? It is here that the analogy with a
police officer's wandering gaze proves to be well-founded. In
surveying a public place, a television camera captures exactly
what an officer could capture on scrutinizing the place.
Because no privacy interest is implicated when an officer surveys
a public place (just as none is implicated when a private citizen
does so), one would have to say that television surveillance of
conduct in public places doesn't affect privacy. It is true, of
course, that television cameras vastly enhance the efficiency of
police surveillance; a single police officer, for example, can
monitor five or six screens, thus surveying far more than she
could were she actually out and about in a public place. But
efficiency arguments have no weight here. The fact that a
television camera outperforms an officer walking a beat doesn't
mean that television cameras must be rejected as a surveillance
device.
What if television surveillance of a public place is
videotaped, with the tapes retained indefinitely by the police?
The analogy with an officer's surveying eye is, of course,
weakened once this extra factor is added. Few individuals have
(though many claim to have) a "photographic" memory;
retained videotapes, by contrast, are photographic memories.
But it is hard to see why retention of a videotape should alter
our conclusions about privacy in such a setting. Once it is
348 Karo, 468 U.S. at 729.
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agreed that individuals don't have a privacy interest in being
free from chance "spottings" in public places, one must also
agree that devices facilitating permanent retention of these
spottings also don't interfere with privacy.
4. A Note on Technology and Privacy
Lurking in the background of this-and, indeed, any-
discussion of surveillance is a concern about the threat to
privacy posed by technological innovation. If technology
invariably undermined privacy interests, it would be possible to
reject aerial overflight (in Ciraolo and Riley) and beeper
surveillance (in Knotts and Karo) on that ground alone. But in
doing so, one would offer a simplistic, Luddite solution to what
in fact is a complex problem. People welcome technological
innovation for the efficiencies it offers in everyday life.
Furthermore, technology only sometimes subverts privacy; it can
also serve as a shield for it."9 One thus can't take a given year-
say, 1967, the year in which Katz was decided350-and declare
that all innovation occurring since then is incompatible with
privacy. Rather, one must consider carefully the ways in which
technology impinges on the sources of personal vulnerability.
On this analysis, Katz was properly decided because it prevented
technology from interfering with each person's interest in
intimate conversation. But Dow Chemical also was properly
decided given the fact that the government's technology was
being used to examine objects with no connection to personal
relationships.
Unfortunately, the contemporary Court has not employed
this framework when examining technology's implications for
privacy. Indeed, its approach has had the effect of undermining
Katz while leaving the scope of permissible technological
'9 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Techology Will Solve Web Privacy Problems, WALL ST. J.,
May 31, 2000, at A26 (arguing that encryption codes will help to ensure privacy on
the internet).
"0 Katz, it should be noted, was decided at a moment in the development of
telecommunications technology that was uniquely favorable to privacy claims.
Operators, though still needed to place long distance calls, were no longer required
for local ones; had they still been needed for local calls, operators could of course
have noted where calls were made and listened to them. Also, telephone booths were
full enclosures. It was only in the seventies that banks of public telephones, with only
modest plexiglass partititions, came to separate one another. An appeal to
principle-to the importance of phone calls in sustaining personal communication-
makes it unnecessary to consider changes such as these.
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infringement on privacy far from clear. The leading case is Kyllo
v. United States, which considered the use of a thermal imaging
device to detect heat waves emanating from inside a home.3 ' A
thermal imager detects infrared radiation.352  By converting
radiation into images reflecting warmth, it provides information
about the amount of heat emanating from a home.
Suspecting that Kyllo was using high-intensity lamps to grow
marijuana in his home, police officers stood outside it at three
o'clock on a January morning and used a thermal imager to
detect heat emanating from it. The scan established that the
roof over the garage was hot by comparison with the rest of
Kyllo's home and the homes nearby.355 Relying on this finding
as well as tips from informants and utility bills, the police
obtained a search warrant.356 On executing it, they found an
indoor drug operation that included more than one hundred
marijuana plants.5 7
Writing for the Kyllo Court, Justice Scalia announced that
"[t] he question we confront today is what limits there are upon
th[e] power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed
privacy."' 58 His expression of concern was reassuring, and at
first sight, the rule he announced appears reassuring as well.
"[O]btaining by sense-enhancing technology," Scalia wrote,"any information regarding the interior of the home that could
not otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area' constitutes a search, at
least where (as here) the technology in question is not in
general public use."359 This final caveat-about general public
use-makes the scope of the rule uncertain. On Scalia's
approach, market forces have the potential to subvert any
privacy arrangement, for once the manufacturer of a device
such as the thermal imager succeeds in generating substantial
"' Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
112 Id. at 29 ("Thermal imagers detect infrared radiation, which virtually all objects
emit but which is invisible to the naked eye.").
53 Id at 29-30.
... Id at 29.
... Id. at 30.
356 Id
357 See id.
... Id at 34.
.5.Id (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
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sales for its product, individuals will no longer be protected
against it.
This, however, is only one of the difficulties posed by Kyllo.
A more important problem is doctrinal, for Kyllo intimates an
approach to privacy fundamentally at odds with the Katz
reasonable expectations test. Concurring in Minnesota v. Carter,
a case decided three years before Kyllo, Justice Scalia denounced
the test as "notoriously unhelpful" and "self-indulgent.
'' 6
0 He
went on to state that the Fourth Amendment protects privacy
through its enumeration of specific objects ("persons, houses,
papers, and effects") and so leaves "expansion [of privacy
protection] to the good judgment, not of this Court, but of the
people through their representatives in the legislature.
36' In
Kyllo, Scalia revived this criticism of Katz. He did not, however,
reject Justice Harlan's reasonable expectations test. On the
contrary, after expressing his dissatisfaction with the test, he
invoked it, stating that the no-technological-enhancement rule
protects "the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and is-- 36 1 -
acknowledged to be reasonable," for homes.
The almost certain explanation for this peculiar about-face
(criticizing a framework and then employing it) is that Scalia
did not have the votes to reject outright the reasonable-
expectations test. The result, however, is a muddle. Perhaps
the best interpretation of Kyllo is that houses now enjoy a
specially privileged position under the expectations test. Any
item in which there is an objective expectation of privacy will
enjoy some protection, but houses, one might say, are fully
protected-or at least they are fully protected against
technology not in general use.16 ' But if this is so, does
'0 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (ScaliaJ., concurring).
361 Id. at 97-98.
362 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
6 Indeed, it is far from clear that even this qualification is sufficient. Justice
Scalia's Kyllo opinion contains the sweeping dictum that "[in] the home, as our cases
show, all details are intimate details because the entire home is held safe from prying
government eyes." Id. at 37. The Court's cases hardly do establish this. In Carter, a
decision that Justice Scalia joined, the Court held it permissible for government
officials to peer through a hole in living room blinds to inspect the activities of
people the officials did not know to be temporary guests. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 98.
Similarly, in Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966), the Court declared that
when "the home is converted into a commercial center to which outsiders are invited
to transact unlawful business, that business is entitled to no greater sanctity than if it
were carried on in a store, a garage, a car, or on the street." It seems unlikely that
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enumeration in the Amendment's catalog ensure superior
protection for all objects mentioned there-for persons, papers,
and effects as well as houses? Or is the privileged status of the
house not dependent on the fact of enumeration? Could it be
that Justice Scalia, despite his criticism of Harlan's reasonable
expectations test, was in fact relying on that very test in
according the house greater protection than he would be
prepared to provide persons, papers, and effects?
The difficulties with Kyllo's analysis do not end here,
however. Indeed, the most important problem posed by Justice
Scalia's approach has to do with the legitimacy of Katz itself.
Kyllo concludes with an approving citation of Chief Justice Taft's
claim that "[t] he Fourth Amendment is to be construed in light
of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it
was adopted .... ,364 As we have seen, Chief Justice Taft relied
on this premise in Olmstead to hold that the Fourth Amendment
cannot protect people against nontrespassory surveillance of
their conversations.3r" Scalia didn't endorse this conclusion in
Kyllo, but his invocation of Taft's premise cast in doubt the
foundation of modern privacy jurisprudence.
How, then, should Kyllo have been resolved? The answer to
this is that the Court reached the right conclusion for very
much the wrong reason. The proper framework was to ask
whether a thermal imager identifies matters of personal
vulnerability that people are likely to want to avoid disclosing to
others. Heat waves, it is clear, can indicate lawful, as well as
unlawful, activity-they provide evidence of substantial use of,
say, a sauna or a microwave. Even when they provide
information about high-intensity lighting, this information
doesn't necessarily establish that someone is growing marijuana
plants; it may turn out that the lighting is being use to fight a
skin disease or simply to help someone gain a tan. These are
not the activities people are most likely to want to shield from
public scrutiny in our society. Privacy analysis, however, must
make allowance for plausible and not wholly far-fetched sources
of vulnerability. A rule permitting warrantless surveillance of
Justice Scalia wants to rethink these conclusions. But if he does not, then his dictum,
and indeed his entire emphasis on the home qua home, is drained of its significance.
564 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)).
... See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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heat waves from the home would most certainly increase this
sense of vulnerability.
In contrast with the rule announced in Kyllo, the approach
just outlined allows for the possibility of warrantless, sense-
enhancing technological surveillance of the home, provided
such surveillance poses no threat to privacy interests. In Kyllo,
Justice Scalia proudly stated that the Court was announcing an
exceptionless rule for technological surveillance of the interior
of the home.366  But homes, like offices, luggage, purses,
clothing, and so on, not only provide privacy, they also can be
used to conceal contraband. Technology that is unable to
distinguish between contraband and lawfully possessed items
impermissibly interferes with privacy-thus the propriety of
rejecting a device such as the thermal imager. But, as the Court
noted in Place, technology that accurately identifies contraband
and produces no false positives with respect to legally possessed
items is compatible with the Fourth Amendment.
Even if no such technology presently exists, it is essential to
make allowance for its development. Consider, for example,
the possibility of a machine that responds only to the existence
of enriched uranium in a concealed place. No one has a privacy
interest in possessing enriched uranium, so a machine that
accurately identifies its existence should undoubtedly be upheld
on Fourth Amendment grounds. Kyllo, however, prohibits
police use of such a device when applied to homes. Similarly,
Kyllo will stand in the way if a device is developed that responds
solely to stolen merchandise with special tags attached to it, and
the case will have a similar effect if a machine is invented that168
can detect illegally possessed firearms stored in a home. In
this critical respect, Kyllo extends beyond what the Fourth
Amendment requires.' 69 Had the Court considered technology
See Kyllo, 553 U.S. at 39 (The line drawn to protect the home, Justice Scalia
stated, "must be not only firm but also bright ... ").
67 See supra notes 230-40 and accompanying text.
The technology for this kind of search may well be available now. Also, the
technology appears to have been developed for detecting explosives on gunpowder
by placing taggants on it. SeeJohn J. Fialka, Tracing Explosives Through Taggants Draws
Heavy Fire From Gun Lobbies, WALL ST. J., July 31, 1996, at Al6.
369 In Kyllo, the Court stated that its rule "assures preservation of that degree of
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted."
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 231. The rule outlined here would have the same effect, however
but would not in the process sacrifice the legitimate public interest in discovering
objects within the home that cannot be the subject of privacy interests. In short, the
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in a more nuanced way, it could thus have created a rule that
was neither over-, nor under-protective of privacy interests.
C. INTERACTIVE SURVEILLANCE
Our discussion so far has concentrated on observational,
rather than interactive, surveillance. Observational surveillance,
as I noted earlier, is passive in nature; its aim is to provide
unobtrusive monitoring of a subject's behavior. Interactive
surveillance, on the other hand, involves direct contact with a
subject. This, however, is only one of its distinguishing features.
With interactive surveillance, government agents try to
penetrate human relationships to discover information or
objects of evidentiary value. The penetration can be carried out
by deception. Officials can pretend to be drug dealers, for
example, or can pretend to be willing to accept bribes. But the
penetration can also be carried out by acts of betrayal, as when
government officials persuade an insider to provide information
about other insiders, or when an insider decides on her own to
betray others. Needless to say, deception and betrayal aren't
mutually exclusive. For example, if an insider engages in an
ongoing act of betrayal by reporting secretly to the government
about her conversations with a suspect, the insider's actions can
be said to involve an element of deception as well as betrayal.
The Court has set no Fourth Amendment limits on either
deception or betrayal. Most of its decisions concerning these
matters were reached prior to Katz; it has, however, shown no
inclination to revise its approach in light of Katz. With the
exception of the modest restraints imposed by the law of
entrapment, ° there are no legal barriers to the government's
use of deception and betrayal as means of gathering evidence.
In numerous cases, some decided before and some after Katz,
the Court has, among other things, approved undercover
operations in which friends turn on friends, 7' in which
rule proposed here protects privacy of the home as it existed in the eighteenth
century but does not freeze technology which does not threaten privacy at its
eighteenth century level of development.
370 The entrapment defense focuses on a person's predisposition to commit a
crime: "Where the Government has induced an individual to break the law and the
defense of entrapment is at issue .... the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being
approached by Government agents." Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549-50
(1992).
371 See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
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government officials posing as customers have purchased drugs
from unwitting d in which officials have worn electronic
equipment to record the conversations of the people they wereS • 373
monitoring -and the Court has reached these conclusions by
turning aside time after time arguments that such conduct
implicates the Fourth Amendment. As a matter of legal
doctrine, then, schemes of betrayal and deceit are not subject to
judicial review under the Fourth Amendment. In forging ties
with others, people take the risk, the Court maintains, that the
government has either planted friends among them or, the
associations having been formed, that it has induced their
friends to turn on them.74
In one respect, the Court's position is surely correct. The
Fourth Amendment, it is clear, cannot be construed to provide
full protection against government deception and betrayal.
Many different kinds of undercover operations have nothing to
do with privacy. For example, when government agents pose as
buyers of narcotics or when agents pretend to take bribes from
people seeking to evade taxes, no interest associated with
privacy is implicated at all. The problem with the Court's
position is that it has embraced the other extreme, with the
result that its jurisprudence offers no protection against
interference with even intimate relationships. Revising the
Court's approach is by no means an easy matter. At the least,
three different propositions must be considered by way of
corrective. I outline the propositions here; later, I apply them
to cases decided by the Court.
The first point to note is that people in intimate
relationships can reasonably expect others engaged in
relationships with them not to deceive or betray them. The
"reasonably expect" in this sentence is simultaneously empirical
and normative. In forging personal ties, people exchange
confidences, the initial confidences serving not simply as tokens
of interest but also as tests of reliability. Close personal ties are
... Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
... See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Osborn v. United States, 385
U.S. 323 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
374 As the Court remarked in Hoffa, "petitioner... was not relying on the security
of the hotel room [in which he engaged in conversation with an associate who,
unbeknownst to him, was a government informer]; he was relying upon his misplaced




formed when these tests have been passed. In this critical sense,
the exchange of confidences and the sharing of personal space
define the boundaries of "interpersonal privacy"375 for specific
relationships, with those boundaries policed by normative
injunctions against deceit and betrayal. The Court,
unfortunately, has made no allowance for interpersonal privacy.
One can readily concede that claims of interpersonal privacy are
often amorphous and so hard to enforce in practice, a point
that will be explored later. It is simply implausible, however, to
banish the phenomenon of interpersonal privacy altogether.
Given Katz's adoption of privacy as an independent variable in
Fourth Amendment analysis, this specific type of privacy must
be given consideration.
The second point to bear in mind qualifies the first in one
substantial respect. A liberal legal order, it is clear, cannot
prohibit betrayal by those within intimate relationships;
moreover, for pragmatic reasons, it also should not prohibit
certain kinds of deceit within such relationships. The argument
concerning betrayal is straightforward. Respect for individual
autonomy requires the law to stay its hand when intimates
choose to betray fellow intimates by revealing confidences or
unusual quirks of behavior. This point holds true even in the
face of privacy's injunction against betrayal, for while a liberal
legal order must respect privacy and so must respect the
spontaneously generated norms that enforce it, this order also
must respect autonomy's trump claim that people may opt out
of intimate relationships if they so choose.
The argument concerning deceit is more complex. Certain
kinds of deceit within intimate relationships can indeed be
prohibited consistent with the principles of a liberal legal
order-think, for example, about legal prohibitions against
deceitful concealment of one's capacity to transmit a sexually
communicable disease.7 But deceit about one's affections-
375 Albert W. Alschuler, Interpersonal Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 4 N. ILL. L.
REV. 1 (1983).
376 The general principle involving fraudulent misrepresentation is:
One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law for the
purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject
to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused to him by his justifiable reliance
upon the misrepresentation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 525 (1977).
[Vol. 92
FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY INTERESTS
deceit about whether one genuinely cares for another person-
is another matter. Even if it were desirable to adopt legal
prohibitions in this context, major problems would arise if the
government were to use criminal or civil law as enforcement
measures. The relationships that come under the heading of
interpersonal privacy are too fluid, and also too subtle in their
structure, to lend themselves to legal oversight as to this kind of
deceit."' For insiders, then, both betrayal and deceit
concerning affections are legally permissible options, a point
that is not inconsistent with the fact that they are also
normatively disfavored within the system of privacy.
The third proposition to be considered has to do with
outsiders' use of deceit and betrayal to penetrate intimate
relationships. It is because autonomy claims can override the
claims of privacy that betrayal and deceit are acceptable options
for insiders to intimate relationships. The same cannot be said
for outsiders who want to use these stratagems to gain access to
insiders' relationships. No autonomy claim is sufficiently strong
to support an outsider's resort to such measures. On the
contrary, outsiders who use deceit or who to try to induce
betrayal in order to penetrate intimate relationships can
properly be charged with invading insiders' privacy. Here, then,
is the most profound error in the Court's jurisprudence of
undercover operations. Given the fact that close, personal
relationships are matters of privacy, efforts by outsiders to gain
access to these relationships by resort to deceit or betrayal
invade that privacy. Because one of the basic axioms of Fourth
Amendment case law is that the government is subject to the
same norms as private parties, government resort to deceit
and betrayal also stands as an invasion of privacy.
This principle is discernible in decisions holding parties liable for deliberate
misrepresentation of the presence of sexually transmitted diseases. See, e.g., Kathleen
K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 277 (Cal. 1984).
... For a discussion of the rationale for abolishing the tort of alienation of
affections, see Nathan P. Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm, " 33 MIcH. L.
REv. 979 (1935).
378 The point is implicit in Katz's statement that "[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection." Katz. V. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). The
Court explicitly acknowledged the axiom when it stated more than a decade later that
"[w]ithout a warrant, [a government official] stands in no better position than a
member of the public. What is observable by the public is observable, without a




The points just made still allow the government
considerable leeway in undercover operations. First, the
government can use deceit and betrayal to penetrate
relationships that have nothing to do with privacy-to penetrate
commercial relationships, for example. Second, the
government is not foreclosed from accepting defectors from
intimate relationships. If someone decides on her own to reveal
confidences acquired in the context of intimacy, the
government certainly can't be said to invade privacy when it
accepts information provided by the defector. What the
government cannot do, consistent with the norms of privacy, is
to take steps on its own to penetrate intimate relationships.
Admittedly, this principle is hard to apply. Difficult border-
definition issues arise as to when a relationship involves
personal ties, when the government is offering inducements to
betrayal, and when an insider has defected of her own volition.
Ease of application cannot, however, be the controlling
principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence; otherwise,
Olmstead would have to be preferred to Katz, and "fuzzy"
concepts such as probable cause and reasonable suspicion
would have to be rejected altogether. Rather, precepts that
accurately reflect Fourth Amendment values (and the precepts
just outlined are clearly successful in this regard) must be
preferred to simplified versions of them unless substantial
problems in application are encountered. In what follows, I
argue that difficulties in applying the precepts just outlined are
manageable: the precepts, I suggest, inject a tolerable, and
appropriate level, of complexity into Fourth Amendment
analysis. I begin by showing that there are many settings in
which the precepts are not at all difficult to apply. I then turn
to harder cases, showing that there are indeed some difficult
border areas, but that even these do not pose insuperable
difficulties.
1. Nonproblematic Settings
No difficulty is encountered in a given setting when it is
clear that the relationship at stake is not an intimate one or
when it is clear that someone's act of betrayal was not prompted
by government inducement. A case decided by the Court in
1966, Lewis v. United States, 79 will prove helpful in identifying the
17' 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
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key elements of undercover operations that have no connection
with personal relationships. A 1980 circuit court case, United
States v. Baldwin,8 ° takes us to the other pole; it deals with an
undercover operation that, incontestably, did involve close ties.
For inducements to betrayal, we will have to go outside the
range of reported cases. A well-known modern betrayal that has
had repercussions in judicial proceedings-Whittaker
Chambers's testimony about Alger Hiss-will prove helpful in
this regard.8 '
Lewis provides an example of a straightforward business
transaction with no overtones of personal ties at all. Identifying
himself as 'Jimmy the Pollack," a federal undercover narcotics
agent, who hadn't met Lewis prior to the call, phoned Lewis's
home, saying that someone had told him Lewis would be able to
sell him some marihuana .3' Lewis responded, "Yes. I believe,
Jimmy, I can take care of you"-and then provided the agent
with directions for reaching his home, where the sale of
marihuana occurred 33  Two weeks later, Lewis made another
marihuana sale to 'Jimmy" at his home.384
In Lewis, we thus encounter systematic deception by a
government official, but no interference with interpersonal
privacy. As Chief Justice Warren noted in his opinion for the
Court, Lewis' "only concern was whether the [government]
agent was a willing purchaser who could pay the agreed price."
Warren continued: "During neither of his visits to [Lewis's]
home did the agent see, hear, or take anything that was not
contemplated, and in fact intended, by [Lewis] as a necessary
part of his illegal business. 385
But what about the locus of the illegal transaction-Lewis's
home? Warren's argument is cogent here as well. He
remarked:
The fact that the undercover agent entered [Lewis's] home does not
compel a different conclusion. Without question, the home is accorded
the full range of Fourth Amendment protections. But when, as here, the
home is converted into a commercial center to which outsiders are
50 621 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1980).
See infra notes 406-09 and accompanying text.





invited for purposes of transacting lawful business, that business is
entitled to no greater sanctity than if it were carried on in a store, a
garage, a car, or on the street. 86
According to Warren, then, the Fourth Amendment offers
no protection against government officials' use of deception to
enter the home when the homeowner has invited them into his
residence for the purpose of transacting business with them.
This is surely a sound result, one that focuses on the nature of
the relationship at stake and the use someone makes of her
home. If we generalize on it, we can see that government
deception is legitimate (because interpersonal privacy is not at
stake) in other types of relationships-in police decoy and sting
operations, for example."7 Indeed, whenever government
officials: (1) Have no prior acquaintance with the suspects they
deceive; and (2) Confine their dealings to impersonal business
transactions, there is no reason to say that the Fourth
Amendment is implicated at all. This conclusion remains sound
even when recording devices are used. If an undercover
operation doesn't interfere with a privacy interest, then the fact
that a recording device was used doesn't transform it into a
388Fourth Amendment concern.
Now let us turn to the opposite pole-to a setting, described
in the Sixth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Baldwin, where
an undercover operation clearly interferes with interpersonal
privacy.38 9 The operation at stake in Baldwin was initiated by the
Memphis Police Department when it assigned officer Joseph
Hoing to conduct undercover surveillance of Baldwin and the
local nightclubs he operated.3 90 Hoing started out by taking a
job as Baldwin's chauffeur and general handyman; later, he
became a bartender, and then a manager, of one of Baldwin's
38 Id. at 211.
For a discussion of such operations, see Gary T. Marx, Police Undercover Work:
Ethical Deception or Deceptive Ethics ?, in POLICE ETHICS: HARD CHOICES IN LAW
ENrORCE NrTrr83-115 (W. Heffernan & T. Stroup eds., 1985).
This argument provides support for the Court's conclusions in Lopez v. United
States, in which a federal official secretly taped conversations with a bar owner after
the owner offered the official a bribe not to enforce the law. Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427, 430-32 (1963). The factual account in United States v. White, is so sparse
that one cannot tell how the case would be resolved under the framework presented
here. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 746-47 (1971).
39 United States v. Baldwin, 621 F.2d 251, 252 (6th Cir. 1980).
s90 Id.
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clubs.3 91 As Hoing became better acquainted with Baldwin, he
accepted an offer to share an apartment with him. 92 Hoing
testified that although he occupied the downstairs bedroom and
Baldwin the one upstairs, he had free access to all parts of the
house g. 3  While in Baldwin's bedroom, he testified, he
discovered on two different occasions white powder on a
tabletop; the police laboratory analyzed the samples he
provided and determined each was cocaine.' 9' Hoing also
found white powder while cleaning the floorboard of Baldwin's
car; a sample of this powder established that it, too, was
cocaine.3 95 Baldwin was subsequently convicted for possession of
cocaine .96
Here, then, is a particularly strong instance of a close,
personal relationship created in the course of an undercover
operation. Admittedly, courts face difficult problems in
identifying such a relationship when parties claim friendship
but not some other tie such as shared membership in a nuclear
family or joint use of living quarters. The latter, however, is just
what is at stake here. Indeed, there are few more serious tokens
of trust than the granting of unlimited access to one's living
quarters. We can thus say that a relationship of reciprocal,
interpersonal trust exists when each party has given the other
unimpeded access to jointly shared physical property.
Moreover, we can also say that although mutual betrayal may
well be acceptable under the Fourth Amendment (an issue that
will be considered shortly), an operation in which a government
agent deceptively creates the conditions of reciprocal trust
amounts to a search (because it interferes with interpersonal
privacy) within the meaning of the Amendment.
Given Supreme Court precedents on this issue, a lower
court would, however, be hard-pressed to reach this conclusion.
Certainly the Sixth Circuit was unwilling to do so in Baldwin.
Citing two leading Supreme Court decisions on point-Hoffa v.





... See id. at 252.
s9' 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
"' 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
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rejected Baldwin's claim that, acting in the absence of the
probable cause and a warrant, Hoing conducted a search within
the meaning of the Amendment when he took up residence in
Baldwin's home. 99 The court used Hoffa to affirm the vigilance
theme that runs throughout the Court's jurisprudence
operations-that the Fourth Amendment never offers
protection against misplaced confidence in a friend. 00 It then
read Lewis to mean that a government official can legitimately
gain entry to a home through misrepresentation of his
identity."'
We have already seen that Chief Justice Warren's Lewis
opinion emphasized the extent to which Lewis had transformed
his home into a place of business. When we review Hoffa, we
shall see that the misplaced confidence in that case did not
involve false friendship created ab initio by the government.
402
The Sixth Circuit thus had some room to maneuver. However,
had it held the Fourth Amendment to have been implicated at
the time Hoing moved into Baldwin's home, it would have had
to rule not only in the absence of a Supreme Court precedent
on the subject but also in the absence of any Court dicta
indicating that there might be Fourth Amendment limits for
undercover operations. Clearly, the doctrinal responsibility
here is the Court's, not that of the lower courts.
Baldwin illustrates how intrusive police undercover
operations can be under current law. What makes the case
particularly significant is that it reminds us that the Court's
"misplaced confidence" doctrine extends to relationships where
intimacy is falsely established from the outset by government
agents.4  Two features of the government operation deserve
particular notice. First, Hoing was engaged in an
indiscriminate, judicially unsupervised search from at least the
moment he took up residence with Baldwin.4 4 A warrant
should be required for such a search for the same reason that a
warrant is currently required when police (who are identified as
police) enter a home and then go through its contents looking
for evidence of crime. On this analysis, an undercover agent
... 621 F.2d at 252.
... Id. at 252-53.
401 Id.
412 See notes 414-21 infra and accompanying text.
... See notes 399-401 supra and accompanying text.
404 Id.
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such as Hoing can properly be characterized as a perpetual
audio and visual recording "device," providing information
about the entire range of intimate activities within a home.
Second, Baldwin is a case of outsider, not insider, betrayal.
It is not a case in which an insider decides to betray another
insider. Troubling as such conduct is, it must be understood to
trump norms of trust within interpersonal privacy given a liberal
society's commitment to personal autonomy. In Baldwin,
however, we have an outsider planning to abuse the trust he
expects to gain. Conduct such as this is condemned when a
gossip engages in it to secure information he wishes to have.
Given the Fourth Amendment's baseline of privacy norms in
everyday life, it is also to be condemned when the government
engages in it-and perhaps to be condemned even more
strongly given the resources available to the government for
penetrating interpersonal privacy.
Now let us turn to clear cases of betrayal by insiders. As I
have just suggested, the rationale for permitting insider betrayal
is to be found in a liberal society's commitment to norms of
personal choice-in its commitment to letting people decide
for themselves whether to sacrifice, for the sake of some other
good, the trust established through mutual intimacy. A few
evidentiary privileges do accord priority to personal trust.
°5 The
norms of interpersonal privacy, which cover many relationships
besides those protected by evidentiary privileges, don't extend
so far, however. These norms condemn outsider insinuation of
intimacy for the purpose of betrayal (think of Baldwin, for
example). At the same time, they recognize the risk of betrayal
by an insider as a necessary concomitant of the freedom to
choose intimates.
Given this general framework, the question courts must ask
is whether the government has used its power to induce an
insider to betray another. Admittedly, such a question will
sometimes be difficult to resolve given the range of
inducements available to the government in such settings.
Some clear examples of betrayal freely decided upon can,
405 "The essence of the [marital] privilege is to protect confidences only .... The
purpose is to insure subjectively the unrestrained privacy of communication, free
from any fear of compulsory disclosure." 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 648 (John
McNaughton ed., 1961). Other privileges also protect relationships of trust: the
attorney-client privilege, see id. at 541; physician-patient privilege, see id. at 818; and
priest-penitent, see id. at 869.
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however, be found-though they can be located only by going
beyond reported cases since, quite understandably, there has
been no litigation about betrayals undertaken without
government prompting. A particularly telling instance of
betrayal without government prompting is to be found in
Whittaker Chambers' decision to turn on Alger Hiss. In
discussing the Chambers-Hiss case, I take no position on the
truth of the charges each advanced against the other. Rather,
my concern is with facts not in dispute, in particular with the
fact that Chambers was involved on a personal basis with Hiss
prior to the betrayal and that Chambers provided evidence to
the government without any prompting from it.
Chambers's conduct is of particular interest because he has
written movingly about what it means to turn on a friend. In his
1952 memoir, Witness, Chambers sought to justify his decision to
inform on Hiss; at the same time, he emphasized how sullied he
felt by the entire experience. The informer, he wrote, "risks
little":
He sits in security and uses his special knowledge to destroy others. He
has that special information to give because he knows those others'
faces, voices and lives, because he once lived within their confidence, in
a shared faith, trusted by them as one of themselves, accepting their
friendship, feeling their pleasures and griefs, sitting in their houses,
eating at their tables, accepting their kindness, knowing their wives and
children .... [T]he police protect him. He is their creature. When
they whistle, he fetches a soiled bone of information.06
This third person account captures well the tension
between loyalty and betrayal in Chambers's own experience
with Hiss. In testimony Hiss ultimately did not challenge,
Chambers revealed that during the mid-1930s, he and his wife,
on befriending the Hisses, often dined with them at their home,
sometimes stayed as overnight guests as well, received from
them the gift of a car, and went on bird-watching expeditions
with themy7 When Chambers turned to the government, then,
he was turning on a friend, something he often emphasized in
his congressional and courtroom testimony. Even moreimportant for our purposes, Hiss himself was unable to identify
... WHITrAKER CHAMBERS, WITNEss 454 (1952).
407 See SAM TANENHAus, WHrrrAKER CHAMBERS: A BIOGRAPHY 272-73 (1997).
408 See id. at 273.
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any mercenary motive on Chambers's part in turning to the
S409
government.
The uncontroverted facts about Chambers's decision to go
to the government were that he did so in September 1939,
immediately after the signing of the Soviet-Nazi nonaggression
pact; that he did not gain immunity from prosecution for the
information he provided; and that, in confessing he had been a
courier for a Soviet spy ring in the mid-30s, he named Hiss and
about a half dozen other officials of the American government
as people who had provided him with information. Whether
Chambers accurately identified Hiss as a Soviet agent is still a
matter of controversy.4 " That he did so without inducement
from the government-and that his testimony involved betrayal
of a formerly close friend-cannot be open to doubt."
We can summarize a complex argument by noting the
following points. First, deceptive government undercover
operations do not implicate the Fourth Amendment when the
relationship at stake is simply an impersonal business
transaction. Second, even when interpersonal privacy is at
stake, an insider's decision to betray another insider has no
relevance to the Fourth Amendment as long as the government
has taken no steps to induce the insider's betrayal. But third,
the Fourth Amendment is indeed implicated when an
undercover government agent deceptively forms a relationship
of interpersonal privacy. We have concentrated so far on
straightforward cases illustrating each of these points. Let us
now turn to problem cases.
'" In his 1988 memoirs, for example, Hiss did not allege that Chambers acted for
money. Rather, he characterized Chambers as "a possessed man and a psychopath."
ALGER HIss, RECOLLECTIONS OF A LiFE 207 (1988).
0 See id, at 162. Chambers's biographer, Sam Tanenhaus, reports that Chambers
turned to the United States government immediately after learning about the Soviet-
Nazi pact of August 23, 1939. Id. at 159. Chambers divulged his past, and also
presented evidence of a Soviet spy ring in Washington, in a conversation with Adolf
A. Berle, Assistant Secretary of State, on September 1, 1939, the day after the
Germans began their invasion of Poland. Id. at 162.
4. Sam Tanenhaus, Chambers's biographer, reports on evidence discovered in
1993 in Moscow archives, tending to suggest that Hiss was indeed a Soviet agent. See
id. at 518-19.
112 It must be borne that it was only after the Nazi-Soviet pact was signed (on
August 23, 1939) that Chambers decided to speak to government officials about his




The framework provided so far for thinking about
interpersonal privacy has the distinct advantage, when
compared with the Court's approach, of tracking the norms of
everyday life. It emphasizes the difference between business
and personal relationships; it allows for a distinction between
use of the home as a place of business and the home used for
intimate association; it also brings out the difference between
betrayal initiated by an insider and betrayal induced by an
outsider, such as the government. The Court's approach, on
the other hand, makes allowance for none of these subtleties.
Its sole virtue is ease of application. Indeed, because it allows
the government free rein in undercover operations, at least as
far as the Fourth Amendment is concerned, the Court's
approach poses no problems of application whatsoever. The
question we now confront is whether the difficulties that of
course do arise in applying the everyday distinctions of privacy
norms are so severe as to make the Court's "anything goes"
framework superior. I suggest here that these difficulties are
manageable, that in most instances, courts will be apply the
categories of everyday experience in a principled way, and that
the Supreme Court's approach should thus be repudiated.
Let us begin with the boundary question of where a business
relationship ends and a personal one begins. Lewis v. United
States provides us with a clear example of a relationship on the
business side of this line, and United States v. Baldwin provides us
with an equally clear example of a relationship that had become
personal.4  The facts in a case decided on the same day as
Lewis, Hoffa v. United States,414 show how the line can be blurred.
While on trial on another matter, James Hoffa, president of the
Teamsters Union, was frequently visited in his hotel room by
Edward Partin, an official of a Teamsters local in Louisiana who
was already acquainted with Hoffa4 1' At the time he made visits
to the Hoffa hotel suite, Partin had already received two
substantial benefits from the government: (1) He had been
released on bail on a state criminal charge; and (2) Proceedings
on a federal indictment had been postponed. 41 6 Hoffa was, of
41 See supra notes 379-80 and accompanying text.
4 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
4" Id. at 296.
416 Id. at 298.
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course, unaware of the fact that Partin was regularly reporting
to the government about the plans Hoffa was formulating in his
hotel room to bribe jurors in his current trial.41 7  Partin's
testimony about Hoffa's jury-tampering efforts proved critical in
obtaining Hoffa's conviction on that charge."" Moreover, after
testifying against Hoffa, Partin received further government
benefits: state and federal charges against him were dropped,
and his wife received four monthly installments of $300 from
government funds. 9
That Partin was induced to betray Hoffa is clear, then. Does
this mean, though, that the Fourth Amendment was implicated
by the betrayal? The Court, applying its free rein approach to
undercover operations, answered this question in the negative.
Hoffa, it asserted, Was acting on his "misplaced belief' in Partin
and so was not entitled to judicial protection.42 ° This, of course,
is hardly a satisfactory answer, for it ignores the difference
between misplaced confidence in a friend who chooses betrayal
and misplaced confidence in someone who has been induced
by an outsider to engage in betrayal. But even if the Court's
analysis is too facile, one might argue that if Partin and Hoffa
were merely business associates-as long as they never
developed a relationship that extended beyond the discussion
of Teamster business-then the government didn't interfere
with Hoffa's privacy in using Partin as an agent.
This is surely a plausible argument. The problem, of
course, is that it relies on terms such as "business associate" and
"friend," terms that admit of differing degrees of strength. If
courts were assigned the job of finding a mid-point on the
continuum where a business associate, or an acquaintance,
becomes a friend, the prospects for principled, consistent
decision-making would be bleak indeed. Such an approach is
unnecessary, however, for another framework is possible, and
preferable. It is reasonable to suppose that when someone such
as Partin-someone who has had business dealings in the past
with his target for surveillance-enters the target's hotel room
"7 The Hoffa Court proceeded "upon the premise that Partin was a government
informer from the time he first arrived in Nashville [where the Hoffa trial was taking
place] ... and that the Government compensated him for his services as such." Id. at
299.
41' Id. at 296.
411 See id, at 297-99.
420 Id, at 302.
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on a broadly defined mission to find evidence of criminality, the
person conducting the surveillance will be exposed to at least
some of the exchanges typical of friendship. Partin's access to
Hoffa's suite is, in this respect, distinguishable in principle from
'Jimmy the Pollack's" access to Lewis's home.
In Lewis, Lewis as homeowner set the terms for a carefully
circumscribed business relationship.42' Because nothing of the
sort can be said of Partin-because Partin was, in effect, a roving
audio and visual device for the government-a warrant should
have been required for his entry into Hoffa's suite. As a general
matter, then, we can say that whenever an undercover agent will
have a reasonable opportunity to gain access to private facts in
the course of his work, a warrant should be required prior to his
undertaking it. As the agent undertakes his work, he may in fact
encounter nothing that can be classified as a private object or
information. But this can't be known in advance. The critical
point is that there is a reasonable likelihood of this. There
having been no such likelihood in Lewis, a warrant wasn't
required in that case. The likelihood having been present in
Hoffa, a warrant should have been required there.
Now let us turn to another boundary-defining issue: the
question of when the government can be said to have induced a
betrayal. A troubling decision by the Supreme Court-
troubling because it is not palpably wrong, but also not entirely
satisfactory-is the 1974 case of United States v. Matlock.422 This
case helps to illustrate the problems at stake. In Matlock,
evidence of the defendant's crime was obtained through a third
party's consent to search his home. Aware that Matlock shared
a home with his girlfriend, Gayle Graff, police officers didn't ask
him for permission to search the home.423  Instead, after
arresting him in the yard of the home, they went to the front
door and asked Graff for permission to search.42 ' Although
Graff later claimed she never consented to the search, the trial
421court concluded she had voluntarily done so. On searchingthe home, the officers found a gun and about $5000 in cash in a
421 Thus the significance of the Court's remark that Lewis "converted [his home]
... into a commercial center to which outsiders [were] invited for purposes of
transacting unlawful business... " 385 U.S. at 211.
422 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
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diaper bag in the closet of a bedroom Matlock shared with
Graff. 12  This evidence was later used to convict him of bank
robbery.
27
If Graff had gone to the police and invited them to search
her bedroom, this would be a clear case of betrayal initiated by
an insider. Under those circumstances, the Fourth Amendment
would be irrelevant to the search; indeed, an insider's betrayal
would not implicate the Amendment whether the insider's
motive was to even a score or to help in solving a crime. By
contrast, if the police had offered Graff money in order to gain
her permission to search, the case would involve betrayal
induced by an outsider, with the result that the police effort to
obtain evidence would (according to the principles outlined
earlier) have to be characterized a search within the meaning of
the Amendment.
Graff's actual conduct falls between these extremes. On the
facts found by the trial court, Graff consented to the search.
28
But did she do so while fearing reprisal from the police in the
event of a refusal? Or did she believe at the moment of consent
that she could say "no" without further complication? The
Matlock record is too bare to provide an answer to these
questions. Two factors, however, make the fear-of-reprisal
hypothesis worth considering. First, as the Court emphasized,
at the time police sought her permission to search, they did not
warn Graff she had a right to refuse their request.4 9 This
omission was consistent with Fourth Amendment practice.
Although the Supreme Court has established elaborate
safeguards to protect waivers in Fifth
43 ° and Sixth Amendment 43
cases, it declined in Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte,"' decided a year
42 Id at 166-67.
427 Id
428 Id. at 166.
42 See id at 167 n.2.
'"o See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (holding that safeguards for
custodial interrogation established in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), are of
constitutional dimension).
431 SeeJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (first announcement of waiver rules
for assistance of counsel at criminal trials); see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967) (first announcement of rules for assistance of counsel at post-indictment, pre-
trial lineups).
... 412 U.S. 218 (1973). It should be noted that Schneckdoth was decided after the
search was conducted in Matlock Schneckcloth's holding that no warning is required
for Fourth Amendment consent did not undermine the government's position in
Matlock. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 167 n.2 (1974) ("Schneckcloth...
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before Matlock, to take a similar approach to Fourth
Amendment rights. 3  But while no warning was, legally
required, the fact that none was given must be considered in
light of another factor-Graf's denial that she ever consented
to a search. 3 ' Graff's denial may have been truthful, in which
case there was no betrayal at all. The more interesting
possibility, however, is that she agreed to the search out of fear
of police reprisal and later, on hearing from a lawyer that she
could have said "no" without repercussion, denied giving
consent.
If we assume for a moment that this hypothesis is correct,
can it be said that the government induced Graff to betray
Matlock? The answer to this is not entirely clear. If someone (a
particularly timid person, for example) unreasonably fears
reprisal for a refusal when none is likely, then the person
making the request can hardly be held responsible for the
assent given. It's possible this was true of Graff. But a quite
different possibility also has to be considered. If: (1) The
person asked reasonably fears that refusal might cause
displeasure and bring about police harassment; and (2) The
officer making the request is aware of this fear and willingly
exploits it to gain consent, then the government can indeed be
said to have induced the consent. If this was true in Graft's
case-if, for example, she reasonably feared that saying "no" to
the search would lead to police harassment-then the
government may have induced her betrayal of Matlock.
How should courts inquire into the issue of government-
induced betrayal when conducting suppression hearings? The
answer to this is straightforward. Indeed, no new rule is needed
to deal with this concern, for trial courts need only heed
Schneckcloth's warning that "account must be taken of subtly
coercive police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable
subjective state of the person who consents. 4 3 Schneckcloth was
of course concerned with first party consent. Its framework,
however, is also relevant to third party consent-or at least it is
assuming a judicial commitment to the protection of
has . . . made clear, of course, that it is not essential for the prosecution that the
consenter knew of the right to refuse consent in order to establish that the consent
was voluntary.")
... Id. at 227.
' See415 U.S. at 166.
13' 412 U.S. at 229.
[Vol. 92
FOURTH AMENDMENT PRIVACY INTERESTS
interpersonal privacy. Given such a commitment, the proper
resolution of Matlock should have been a remand to determine
whether Graff was confronted with "subtly coercive" pressures to
grant access to the space she shared with Matlock. Careful
inquiry into such pressure is essential to protect interpersonal
privacy from government interference.
Now let us turn to one last type of hard case, "hard" not
because of a problem of boundary-definition but because an
effective law enforcement technique stands in possible tension
with the value of interpersonal privacy. When government
officials offer a reward for the capture of a criminal, there can
be no doubt that intimates who respond to the reward have
been induced to do so by the government's offer. Similarly, if
an official offers an arrestee the chance of leniency if the
arrestee will implicate someone he knows well, there can be no
doubt that the official has offered an inducement. Because the
government's use of an inducement is unmistakable in these
settings, the issue at stake is not one of boundary-definition.
Rather, it is one of constitutional legitimacy, for government
inducements to provide information about criminals are, on the
one hand, highly effective law enforcement measures and, on
the other, problematic given the Fourth Amendment
commitment to protecting interpersonal privacy. If such
inducements invariably implicate the Fourth Amendment, law
enforcement would be severely hampered-hardly a palatable
outcome. On the other hand, to uphold such inducements in
every case would require rejection of the principle of
interpersonal privacy-also an unacceptable outcome.
As it happens, each pole can be avoided. Let us note first
why inducements don't invariably implicate the Fourth
Amendment. This point is easily made if we consider conduct
that has nothing to do with interpersonal privacy. If, for
example, a person who is unacquainted with the target of a
government investigation sees the target on a street and,
responding to a cash offer for help in leading to the target's
capture, calls the police, there is no sense in which
interpersonal privacy can be said to be involved. Similarly, if a
43 Matlock was in fact remanded. See 415 U.S. at 171, 177-78. However, the Court
remanded it not to consider the question posed here, but instead, to consider
whether Graff had "common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the
premises or effects sought to be inspected." Id.
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person's dealings with, say, a drug dealer have been limited to
illicit purchases, interpersonal privacy cannot be at stake.
Moreover, even when the Fourth Amendment is implicated,
there will be many occasions when government inducements to
betray will easily pass constitutional muster. If government
officials have probable cause to believe that someone has
committed a crime, an offer of a cash reward for the person's
capture will then be constitutionally acceptable. With probable
cause having been established, government interference in
interpersonal privacy would be justified.
If we turn to the other pole-inducements that do implicate
the Fourth Amendment-we will see that there are indeed
troubling cases, that protection of interpersonal privacy will, on
some occasions, undercut efficient law enforcement, but that
this interference must be deemed salutary if we also value
interpersonal privacy. The starting point for inquiry is this:
what if an inducement is offered when probable cause has not
been established? For example, what if a major crime has been
committed and government officials, completely baffled about
the identity of the perpetrator, offer a cash reward to anyone
who provides information leading to the perpetrator's arrest
and conviction? Here, a serious constitutional issue arises once
interpersonal privacy is treated as a Fourth Amendment value,
for the government's offer of a reward could induce an intimate
to betray the perpetrator. A poignant instance of this can be
found in the unabomber case, where David Kaczinski, in
responding to an FBI cash offer for help in capturing and
convicting the unabomber, provided critically important
information about his brother Ted. The information David
offered had little to do with Ted's actual crimes; David knew
nothing of these. Rather, it had to with Ted's habits of thought
and way of life, matters that Ted undoubtedly wanted to keep
private and that David had come to know through the
development of a relationship of trust as he lived with his
brother in Texas.437
Because the Court has shown no concern for interpersonal
privacy, the FBI proceeded to interview David without having to
consider David's betrayal of his brother's trust. The question we
must ask is how a law enforcement agent could take steps to
minimize the effects of such a betrayal while also fulfilling its
'" See ROBERT GRAYsMrrH, UNABOMBER: A DESIRE TO KILL 377-385 (1997).
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crime-solving function. The best way to answer this question is
to consider the Court's reasoning in United States v. Sokolow,
which approved the use of profiling research as a tool for
establishing reasonable suspicion.4 8  The particular kind of
profiling at stake in Sokolow had to do with drug couriers.09 But
law enforcement agencies, it is important to understand, use
profiles in other contexts as well. Certainly profiles are a
particularly helpful tool in cases where an anonymous
perpetrator has repeatedly inflicted violent harm on others.
Whatever the aim of a profile, its effect is to focus police
attention on a cluster of factors, none of which involves illegal
conduct, but that when "taken together . . . amount to
reasonable suspicion. "" ' In Sokolow, the drug courier profile
included (1) paying for plane tickets with cash, (2) traveling to
cities that are a source for illegal drugs, (3) staying in such cities
for less than forty-eight hours, and (4) having no luggage to
check.4 2 For complex cases such as that of the unabomber, an
individualized profile is developed, one that tries to capture the
characteristics of a perpetrator simultaneously conversant with
the technology of death and with the rhetoric of those opposed
to technology.
Working with an individualized profile of this kind,
government officials can limit the scope of the interviews they
conduct with people volunteering information. If someone
volunteers information that has no bearing on the profile from
which they are working, the police can terminate the interview
quickly. By contrast, if the information provided corroborates
the profile, the police will have established reasonable
suspicion, which in turn will justify further investigation of the
details of the suspect's personal relationships. This cautious,
stage-by-stage approach will undoubtedly frustrate some law
enforcement investigation, but it will do so for the sake of the
privacy values that lie at the heart of the Fourth Amendment.
Moreover, there is reason to believe that the frustration will not
be substantial. The "reasonable suspicion" standard will allow
the government substantial leeway in conducting investigations.
'- United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-11 (1989).
9 Id. at 10 n.6.
44o See generally BRENT E. TuRvEY, CRIMINAL PROFILING: AN INTRODUCTION TO
BEHAVIORAL EVIDENCE ANALYSIS (1999).
"'Id. at 9.
"' See id at 8-9.
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To insist on more would be to discount privacy interests for the
sake of unimpeded investigative power.
CONCLUSION
In giving meaning to Katz's reasonable expectations test, the
Supreme Court has produced a caricature of the privacy norms
that prevail in everyday life. On the Court's account, privacy is a
matter of constant vigilance. It is available only to people who
seek full concealment for objects and information; it is achieved
only through assumption of risk through betrayal by
government informants; and it offers no protection against
those outsiders who wish to subject insiders' conduct to
permanent surveillance. By contrast, I have argued that the
privacy conventions of everyday life are best understood in
terms of a forbearance model, one that requires individuals
seeking privacy to take certain reasonable steps to indicate their
desire for it but that then requires restraint on the part of
outsiders. In this Article, I have outlined the key features of the
forbearance model, explained how it applies to both the solitary
individual and to interpersonal privacy, and then used the
model to assess critically the Court's post-Katz decisions. Were
the Court to adopt the forbearance model, the result, I have
contended, would be a jurisprudence that captures the privacy
norms of everyday life and that thus places modest, but wholly
justified, limits on law enforcement activities.
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